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


YUGOSLAVIA'S WARS: The Problem From Hell


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
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FOREWORD

The continuing warfare in the former Yugoslavia looms as one of the most intractable problems in contemporary world politics. For four years the international community has struggled merely to contain this fire and prevent it from inflaming a general European crisis. Only now does there seem a real chance of extinguishing it. By late 1994, it was apparent that the danger of continued fighting could fracture the NATO Alliance and lead to the spread of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Bearing this possibility in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, convened its second annual roundtable on the subject on January 30, 1995. SSI asked the specialists published in this volume to assess how we have gotten to the present situation, to define its parameters, and, finally, to suggest where we should and might be going in the future.

Because of the continuing urgency and intensity of the crisis these wars have caused, SSI offers the analysis and information herein to specialists, policymakers, and laymen alike with a goal of helping to clarify the issues at stake in former Yugoslavia.



RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

**YUGOSLAVIA'S WARS:
THE PROBLEM FROM HELL**

**Stephen J. Blank
Editor**

1995

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

By the summer of 1995 it appeared possible that the wars in the former Yugoslavia had reached a climactic point. During that summer Croatia's army revealed itself as a professional, competent force and recaptured the Krajina territory lost to Serbia in 1991. Though this campaign led to thousands of Serb refugees, neither the UN nor the West did anything and, indeed, it was clear that this offensive enjoyed tacit Western support. In August 1995, immediately following this campaign, the United States launched its own diplomatic offensive that combined its political standing, Croatia's military prowess, and NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions due to Serb shelling of Sarajevo and other safe havens. While the outline of an accord was signed in Geneva on September 8, 1995, stating that Bosnia would be a state within its internationally recognized borders and would contain a Serbian entity (Respublika Srpska) that could have ties abroad, the bombing continued as the Bosnian Serb military leadership refused to bow to NATO demands for withdrawal of its artillery from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo.

Thus, although a peace accord, or the outline of one exists, the wars are hardly over and most, if not all, political issues, remain to be settled. This most recent turn of events, described above, reflects the fact that already by June 1995 United States and its allies stood at a dangerous fork in the road in confronting the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The truce negotiated in December 1994 never was really effective and by April it had broken down totally. In May, Croatia launched a new offensive to regain Serbian-inhabited territories lost when Serbia invaded in 1991. By doing this Zagreb further exposed the inadequacy of the United Nations Protection Force



Figure 1.
Map of Former Yugoslavia.

(UNPROFOR), the UN mission in Yugoslavia, as a force for peacekeeping.

Since Croatia, Bosnia, and the Bosnian Serbs were all willing to go on fighting because they believed that they had more to gain from war than they did from any negotiation, these events made the position of the UN's forces even more precarious. These events, by June, had led to increased shelling by both sides in the vicinity of Sarajevo and other major Bosnian cities. These truce violations further dramatized the helplessness of the UN's forces and once again revealed that they were ultimately hostages to the belligerents' intentions. When General Rupert Smith of the United Kingdom, UNPROFOR's CINC, called for NATO air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs on May 25-26, 1995, the Serbs retaliated by making hostages out of the UN soldiers. Thus, for the second time, UNPROFOR found itself in danger of exposure as an ineffective military force. Worse yet, until the Croatian Army

swung into action, it seemed as if the Bosnian Serbs would be able to go on defying the world, seizing cities, conducting massacres and ethnic cleansing, and so on with impunity.

As this chronicle of events through the summer of 1995 shows, apart from the consequences to the UN, the consequences for the West have been enormous. NATO and the European Union have, until now, shown themselves unable to devise any workable responses to the crisis, leading many to doubt their competence or relevance in dealing with future European crises. After meetings in the Hague on May 29-30, 1995, the only response was to send more troops, and to concentrate UNPROFOR in fewer towns. Ultimately, the cities which UNPROFOR leaves will be abandoned to the fates of war, and the probable result will be a partition of Bosnia by default. Meanwhile, the members of these organizations who have troops in Yugoslavia, mainly France and Great Britain, ever more insistently demand that unless the fighting is terminated, or the UN mandate and response toughened up, they will remove their troops. Because these are NATO allies, the United States has promised to take the lead in providing up to 25,000 troops in a much larger NATO force (the exact number remains to be determined) to undertake an extrication of UNPROFOR from Yugoslavia. Since such an operation will, at best, take several months, the Clinton administration faces the prospect of a prolonged military operation. At present this operation has no discernible political goal and will take place against the opposition of Bosnia, and perhaps the other belligerents (who do not want to lose their hostages and risk NATO's direct attacks). Should the new Jacques Chirac regime in France and the British Government decide to withdraw, the United States may then be challenged to live up to its commitment to use force on behalf of its allies.

These considerations perhaps explain the timing of the U.S. diplomatic intervention and the Croatian offensive. Without such actions, and NATO's takeover of the campaign from the UN, Serb humiliation and defiance of the world community would probably have taken stronger forms. As it was, in the summer of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs had demanded a pledge of no more NATO air strikes, intensified their shelling of cities,

and conducted massacres of those captured in these cities. They also enjoyed the protection of Russia, who had refused to allow the Contact Group of the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain and itself to use violence against the Serbs, forcing a temporizing response. Both the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian government in Belgrade had also refused to accept a political solution drafted by the Western powers that would recognize Bosnia in return for a gradual end to UN sanctions. In other words, while fighting escalated and the number of belligerents could easily widen, the United States and NATO had not gotten closer to a true political solution. Thus any further intervention could well trigger a pan-European crisis by increasing the tensions already inherent between Russia, Serbia's patron, and the involved Western forces. At the same time, failure to arrive at a Western political consensus over objectives was continuing to erode the cohesion of the alliance.

Many of these dilemmas were already visible in late 1994 when it was clear that the belligerents still saw war as their best alternative and had good reason not to accept proposals brokered by the West or the Contact Group. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College convened a roundtable in Washington, DC, on January 30, 1995, to examine all the aspects of these wars and their likely developments.

The complexity and intractability of these wars, with their multiple intransigent combatants and issues, have stymied efforts at a resolution and led Secretary of State Warren Christopher to call Yugoslavia "the problem from hell." That complexity obliged SSI to try to provide a synoptic view of the many ramifications of these wars so that our audience could gain a broader appreciation of the issues at stake and the magnitude of the repercussions of any further decisive action. Accordingly, the scholars at the roundtable analyzed the problem from military, political, and diplomatic perspectives, and speculated on its implications for European security.

The sequence of the papers presented here follows this outline and suggests how difficult it has been and will be to bring these wars to termination. These difficulties do not by any

means exhaust all the problems, real and potential, that have emerged in the wake of the breakup of the former Yugoslav state. Thus it proved impossible to provide a detailed examination of the Macedonian and Albanian issues that are themselves microcosms of these ongoing wars. This work is by no means definitive. Nevertheless, we hope it will be useful to our readers in helping understand the importance of the issues, the problems raised by these wars, and the urgency of finding a way to terminate the suffering before these conflagrations expand geographically.

CHAPTER 2

THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Paul Shoup

The Bosnian crisis—the “problem from hell” as Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called it—is now about to enter its fourth year. The conflict, which began in April 1992, has been a humanitarian disaster and has seriously strained relations between the United States and Europe. The spring of 1995 brought renewed fighting, and some significant gains by the Bosnian Muslim forces. Whether these gains will be only temporary remains to be seen. Meanwhile, there is a glimmer of hope, not evident earlier, that negotiations for a political settlement will recommence, if only both sides are willing to forgo the effort to score a decisive victory over the other.

The course of the war can be quickly summarized. The front lines stabilized after the initial gains of the Serbs in 1992. The United Nations launched an unprecedented relief effort in Bosnia and actively, if unsuccessfully, attempted to mediate the conflict. NATO assumed new responsibilities in respect to the protection of civilians within Total Exclusion Zones (TEZs) and Safe areas. Although UNPROFOR came under sharp criticism for allowing the Serbs to violate UN resolutions dealing with Bosnia, UN commanders and their troops achieved near miracles in keeping the population fed and civilian casualties down. The efforts to find a political solution nevertheless failed. By the spring of 1995 there was still a slight hope that the Serbs might be won over to the Contact Group plan, but the prospects were for a protracted conflict and possibly a withdrawal of UN forces.

The account to follow will elaborate on these points and comment on the options open to the United States and its NATO allies in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. So far, the

United States has wavered between throwing its support behind the Bosnian government and backing the Europeans in the search for a political settlement which would, by its very nature, involve concessions to the Serbs. Both American and European policies toward the crisis have been marked by uncertainty and confusion, compounded by the glare of publicity surrounding ethnic cleansing and atrocities committed against the civilian population.

The stage was set for international intervention in the conflict in the spring of 1992, when it appeared that Sarajevo, under siege by the Serbs, was on the verge of starvation. In June, after difficult negotiations with the Serbs and the Bosnians, UNPROFOR took over responsibility for the Sarajevo airport, and humanitarian aid began flowing into the city. Aid convoys were organized to bring assistance to the rest of Bosnia as well. The aid kept the civilian population alive but also, unfortunately, created an artificial economy which sustained the contending parties—and fed their armies—through the first 3 years of war.

In retrospect, the West could have acted more decisively at this stage of the crisis. The destruction of Sarajevo might have been halted by a NATO ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw heavy weapons as soon as the siege began, rather than 2 years later. The Muslim-Croat conflict in 1993 might have been avoided if the United States had taken forceful action—as it did in the spring of 1994—to end the fighting between the Croats and the Muslims. It is also perhaps true—if more problematical—that the embargo on arms to Bosnia could have been lifted in the first months of the war without jeopardizing the role of the UN in Bosnia, or placing strains on relations between the United States and her allies.

Yet it is also the case that from the beginning the United States and Europe faced a dilemma: they could work through the United Nations to reach a solution to the crisis, which meant trying to mediate between the parties; or they could come to the aid of the Bosnian Muslims, as victims of aggression, which would mean taking sides, antagonizing the Russians, and endangering humanitarian aid to the victims of the war.

The Vance-Owen plan, introduced in the fall of 1993, sought to reconcile these underlying contradictions by proposing a quasi-protectorate for Bosnia under UN auspices. The plan, if implemented, would have rolled back Serbian territorial gains. The proposal was ambitious, and hinged on American support, which was given only grudgingly. The American alternative to Vance-Owen, "lift and strike," was nevertheless of dubious merit. Lift and strike promised an open-ended and perhaps futile war to roll back Serb gains, and if implemented would have encouraged the partitioning of Bosnia, an outcome which the United States adamantly opposed.

In any event, the Vance-Owen plan collapsed in the spring of 1993, rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament of the Republic of Serbs (RS). Lift and strike was opposed from the outset by the Europeans, who viewed the proposal as a threat to the UN operation in Bosnia. The two mediators representing the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Owen and Stoltenberg, then proposed a plan under which the borders of Bosnia would remain, but the country would be divided among the Serbs, Muslims and Croats. The three ethnic regions would be tied together in a loose confederation. In effect, this meant the partitioning of Bosnia. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan would have required the RS to return certain areas to the Bosnians, but most of the territory which had been subject to ethnic cleansing by the Serbs after the conflict broke out—Eastern Bosnia, Bosanska Krajina and the Posavina—would have remained in Serb hands.¹ Negotiations over the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal consumed most of the second half of 1993. In the end, the international mediators were unable to gain the consent of the Bosnian government to a plan which did not return lost territories and denied the Bosnians access to the Adriatic sea in the south and to the Sava river in the north.

The military situation remained largely unchanged during 1993. The Serbs consolidated their positions by widening the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina in the west and Semberija in the east, and by seizing the strategic town of Trnovo, which had linked Muslim territory in central Bosnia with Gorazde and

Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia. In August of 1993 the Serbs also managed to push the Bosnian Muslims off Mt. Bjelasnica and Mt. Igman, raising fears that the siege of Sarajevo would be intensified. American pressure—the first significant intervention of the United States in the conflict—led the Serbs to agree to the positioning of UN peacekeepers on Mt. Igman, and the threat to Sarajevo was averted. Earlier, in April, Serb forces launched an attack on the Eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. A last-minute agreement with the UN created a safe area around Srebrenica. This was followed by a UN Security Council resolution which established a total of six safe areas: Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and Zepa. (See Figure 1.)

Fighting between the Muslims and the Croats broke out in central and southern Bosnia in the spring of 1993 and continued into early the following year. The confrontation was a serious setback to the principles of multiculturalism and ethnic tolerance in Bosnia, and revealed underlying tensions in the Croat-Muslim relationship hitherto overlooked by the international community. The fighting was marked by ethnic cleansing and atrocities similar to those that had taken place in areas seized by the Serbs. The siege of Mostar by the Croat HVO, which began in June and was not lifted until the following February, was particularly devastating. Outside of the Croat strongholds in the south, the fighting favored the Muslim forces. The Croats were finally compelled to bring in Croat regulars (HV) to stop Muslim advances in central Bosnia. The international community in turn demanded the withdrawal of Croat troops and raised the prospect of sanctions against Croatia. By early 1994 the Croats were threatened with international isolation, a factor which undoubtedly eased the task of the Americans in persuading the two parties to end their conflict in February.

The fighting in 1994 brought no major changes in the battle lines outside eastern Bosnia and the Bihac pocket. Muslim forces launched several major offensives in central Bosnia during the summer. After initial successes, the Bosnians suffered a severe setback when, on July 6, Bosnian units fell into a trap in the vicinity of Mt. Ozren and were decimated by

Serb artillery.² A Bosnian offensive against Trnovo fell short in the beginning of November. The Bosnian army was initially successful when it launched an attack southward out of the Bihac pocket in early November, but the Serbs responded with a counterattack which had, by mid-November, succeeded in encircling Bihac. These attacks put the Serbs on the defensive for the first time, but did not achieve lasting gains for the Bosnian forces.

The Muslims and Croats were able to score limited, but significant, victories when they joined forces against the Serbs. The siege of Maglaj was lifted in the spring when Croat units besieging the city withdrew. In November the Bosnians and Croats collaborated in the capture of Caprice, a strategically located town in southern Bosnia which had changed hands twice in the course of the fighting. On the other hand, the Croats failed to come to the assistance of the beleaguered Fifth corps in Bihac in November. Nor did the Croats support the Bosnian drive on Doni Vakuf at about the same time, instead launching an attack from the Croat stronghold of Livno against neighboring Serb towns (Glamoc and Bosansko Grahovo).

The most serious crises in 1994 resulted from Serb attacks on the civilians in Sarajevo and the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia. The UN and NATO responded to this danger by threatening air strikes against the Serbs, and by establishing safe areas. On February 5, over 60 persons were killed by the explosion of a mortar shell in a market in Sarajevo. NATO responded by issuing an ultimatum to the Serbs on February 9. The ultimatum gave the Serbs 10 days to remove their heavy weapons from the area around the city,³ or turn the weapons over to the UN peacekeepers. A NATO strike against the Serbs was narrowly averted the next day.⁴ Finally, amid rising tensions, the Serbs turned over the bulk of their heavy weapons to UN peacekeepers, and removed the rest from the total exclusion zone (TEZ). A ceasefire negotiated by the UN commander in Sarajevo, General Michael Rose, ended the fighting and prevented a Bosnian break-out under cover of the NATO ultimatum, and Russian troops were inserted along the confrontation line. Later an agreement was reached for limited

movement of civilians in and out of Sarajevo and the opening of access routes to civilian traffic.⁵

For a brief period in the spring of 1994, the international community seemed to have the upper hand in Bosnia. The improvement of the situation in Sarajevo created a feeling of optimism and the hope that the war in Bosnia had entered a new and less violent phase. There was talk of extending a NATO guarantee to other cities in Bosnia which had already been declared safe areas.

The Serb attack on Gorazde showed just how difficult the defense of the safe areas would be. The unexpected Serb offensive began at the end of March. Within a week, the Serbs appeared to be on the verge of overrunning the city. Serb artillery began shelling the city center. Several NATO air strikes followed,⁶ but the Serb offensive showed no signs of abating. Finally, on April 22, NATO issued an ultimatum. Serb forces were to withdraw three kilometers from the center of Gorazde and Serb heavy weapons were to be removed from a 20 kilometer TEZ around the city.⁷ The following day the Serbs ceased their attack and several days later withdrew their forces. On April 23, NATO, still convinced that the Serbs would not let up and fearful that NATO's continued inaction would undermine the credibility of the alliance, decided to launch a major air strike at Serb positions around the city.⁸ Yasushi Akashi, the UN's civilian representative in Yugoslavia, refused to give his consent to the operation. Akashi's decision was unpopular in NATO and lay the UN open to charges of being soft on the Serbs, but may well have prevented a Serb backlash against UNPROFOR which could have had disastrous consequences for the humanitarian effort in Bosnia.

The crisis over Bihac in the summer and winter of 1994 was precipitated by the defeat of the forces of Fikret Abdic, who had broken with Sarajevo the previous fall. The Bosnian government's Fifth Corps defeated Abdic's rebellious units in July. The Serbs countered with an offensive launched from Krajina, in Croatia, in September, which was repulsed by the Bosnians in an action in which General Mladic barely escaped capture by Bosnian troops. On October 26 the Bosnians launched an offensive southward from Bihac which overran

several Serb villages. On November 6 the Serbs launched a counterattack and within a week Bihac was under siege by Serb forces. Once again NATO was drawn into the conflict when the Serbs began to penetrate into the city proper, following a number of unsuccessful efforts by Akashi to arrange a ceasefire.

The situation was exceptionally delicate. The Croat Serbs had joined the conflict in July, and the Croat Defense Minister, Gojko Susak, had warned that Croatia would enter the fray if the city was at risk of falling into Serb hands. Serb planes based in Krajina (that is, in Croatia) attacked Bihac on November 18, leading to a NATO strike on the airfield at Udbina, located on Croat soil, on November 21. The Bosnian Serbs seemed determined to take Bihac, oblivious to warnings from NATO and accusations of adventurism by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. On November 24 NATO met but failed to issue an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw from Bihac due to disagreements within the alliance.⁹ On November 26 a NATO raid on SAM missile sites was vetoed by Akashi and General Rose, ending NATO involvement in the Bihac crisis. Serb forces, for their part, halted their advance into the city on the 26th, and the crisis passed.

NATO's failure to launch air strikes against the Serbs attacking Bihac was widely criticized as a blow to the credibility of the international community and NATO, and a signal that the Serbs could "do as they wished" in Bosnia.¹⁰ This would appear to be an oversimplification. NATO was ready to launch air strikes if the civilian population was seriously endangered, and this fact served as a deterrent to Serb forces at Bihac, who were careful, it appears, not to target civilians when shelling the city.¹¹ Gorazde, it later proved, suffered less damage than first reported.¹² This suggested at least a degree of Serb concern over the effects of the fighting on the civilian population and over the possibility of a NATO attack if the shelling of either Gorazde or Bihac continued.

In any case, the Serbs had not had a great deal of success in attacking well-defended Bosnian positions. The stalemate in the battle lines since 1992 lent credence to the charge that Serb tactics, which featured massed artillery fire against urban

targets, were not effective without a well-trained and motivated infantry to finish the job.¹³ The Serb army was also probably concerned not to suffer any more casualties than were absolutely necessary, both because the army was short of manpower and because it had close ties with the Serb people, who would object to young men losing their lives fighting for purely Muslim territory, no matter what the strategic importance of the objective.

The Bosnian Muslim forces, for their part, proved to be able successors to Tito's Partisans, moving through enemy lines to launch surprise attacks from the rear and arming themselves with weapons seized from the enemy. In frontal attacks against Serb artillery the Bosnian forces were ineffective, as the battle in the vicinity of Mt. Ozren demonstrated. (The Partisans encountered a similar setback when they launched an ill-considered infantry attack against the Germans north of Belgrade in the closing days of World War II.) In sum, the fighting during the first 3 years of the conflict gave no indication that the Bosnian army could seize and hold territory unless it was up against an ill-equipped force of irregulars, as was the case in the conflict with the Croats in central Bosnia in 1993.

Above all, the events of 1994 demonstrated the difficulties of employing air strikes in support of safe areas and TEZs. NATO and the UN, both of whom had to approve air strikes, could never agree on purpose of these operations—to punish the Serbs, or to send a warning to the Serbs that they should show restraint when attacking civilian targets. The absence of additional UN contingents to police the safe areas meant that both sides could violate the UN resolutions on protected zones with impunity. This was evident in Bihac, where, after the pull-out of French troops, the UN was left with a small force of poorly armed Bangladeshi troops. The Bosnian Fifth Corps used Bihac as a staging area for its offensive against the Serbs in early November, making it difficult to argue that the city and its environs should be turned into a TEZ, as the Americans suggested at the NATO meeting of November 24. When the fighting for Bihac began, the UN did not even have a map of the Bihac safe area.¹⁴

This did not mean that the policy of creating safe areas was wrong. But the events of 1994 suggested that it was not enough for the UN Security Council to adopt resolutions creating safe areas without assuring the presence of a sizable UN force to police these zones, and before gaining agreement between NATO and the UN over the circumstances under which air power could be used to defend these protected zones if they came under attack.

By the end of 1994 the situation in Bosnia appeared to have reached a stalemate. The Serbs had seized most ethnically mixed Serb-Muslim areas in eastern and central Bosnia and the Posavina region of mixed Serb, Croat and Muslim population in the north. The Croats were ensconced in Western Herzegovina, and the Muslims in central Bosnia. None of the participants in the conflict appeared to have the military means to take and hold territory outside their own ethnic strongholds, or to invest cities without risking civilian casualties that could bring a response from NATO.

The creation of a federation between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia could have had an impact on the military situation, judging by the success of joint operations carried out by the Croats and Muslims in 1994 and the successful defense of the corridor by a mixed Croat Muslim force. But the federation remained stillborn, and military cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims was limited.¹⁵ Consultation with an American military team lead by General Galvin in October 1994 failed to produce an agreement for a joint command which would coordinate and direct the Muslim and Croat war effort. Mostar remained a divided city (even after being put under EU administration) and the provinces where fighting occurred during 1993 remained under the control of the local paramilitary forces, despite efforts to create local government organs in which both Croats and Muslims would be represented.

On the policy front, 1994 was marked by growing agreement between the Americans and the Europeans on the need to find a political settlement to the Bosnian conflict. The catalyst for this change was the NATO ultimatum of February 9, following the market massacre of February 5. The American

position remained faithful to its original premise that the Bosnian Muslims were the aggrieved party. But for the first time, the Americans were seized with a sense of urgency about the Bosnian situation, and became actively involved in finding ways to end the fighting.

Under pressure from the Americans, the Croats and Muslims signed a ceasefire on February 23. On March 1, at a meeting in Washington, the Muslims and the Croats created the Bosnian federation. The Americans then agreed to participate in the work of the Contact Group of 5 nations (Germany, France, Britain, Russia and the United States) which held its first meeting on April 25, in London. With this step, the United States became directly involved in crafting a peace settlement for Bosnia.

The deliberations of the Contact Group marked the third major effort of the international community to mediate the Bosnian conflict. The group's proposal for a settlement was leaked to the press in June and formally presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the conflicting parties on July 5. The plan was rejected outright by the Serbs, and adopted only with great reluctance, on July 18, by the Bosnian government. Although both the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims were unhappy with the plan, it was clear that the Contact Group had crafted a proposal which the Bosnians would find easier to accept than the Serbs would. Above all, the plan left the constitutional status of the Republic of Serbs (RS) in limbo. The RS was not recognized as an independent state, nor was it allowed to confederate with Yugoslavia, as the new Bosnian federation had already done with Croatia.

The Bosnian Muslims were also upset, for the map of Bosnia proposed by the Contact Group gave a number of Muslim cities—Zvornik, Vlasenica, and Rogatica—to the Serbs. Bosnian approval of the plan, President Izetbegovic made clear, was a purely tactical maneuver, designed to bring the opprobrium of the international community down on the Serbs.¹⁶

The parties to the agreement were to be induced to sign by the prospect of rewards for agreeing to the plan or punishments

if the plan was rejected. If the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan, tighter sanctions were to be imposed on Serbia, and consideration was to be given to lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian federation. A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group held on July 30, following Serb rejection of the Contact Group plan, proposed tighter sanctions against Yugoslavia. Several days later, in a change of position, the United States signaled Belgrade that sanctions might be eased if Yugoslavia imposed its own embargo on the RS. The Yugoslav government reacted promptly, imposing an embargo on goods flowing to the Bosnian Serbs. The turnabout was complete when, six weeks later, the United Nations adopted Resolution 943, relaxing certain sanctions against Yugoslavia.¹⁷

The result of the aforementioned steps was the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs. The Yugoslav and Serb governments threw their weight behind the Contact Group plan, attacking Radovan Karadzic, the President of the RS, for refusing to agree to the settlement. Karadzic, for his part, undertook a purge of army and intelligence officers deemed to be loyal to Belgrade. While this was going on, General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb army, dropped from sight, leading to speculation that he had switched loyalties, and was now backing Belgrade. (His reappearance in the battle for the Bihac pocket ended these rumors.)

The continued refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to bow to pressure left the international community in a quandary. The only beneficiary of the steps taken to gain Serb consent to the Contact Group plan had been the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. Instead of harsher sanctions, the burden on Yugoslavia was eased by concessions, which, although largely symbolic, appeared to take the bite out of the sanctions policy.

The American response to this dilemma was to fall back on air strikes as a means of "focusing the mind" of the Serbs on the negotiations. The use of air strikes against the Serbs was authorized under UN Security Council Resolutions only when it was necessary to protect safe areas. The American position was that air strikes could nevertheless be employed in defense of these safe areas in such a way as to enhance NATO

credibility and impress the Serbs with the danger of their isolated position as long as they refused to accept the will of the international community.

There was widespread skepticism in the U.S. defense and intelligence communities that a strategy based on air power could work; one NATO officer was reported in the press to have wryly remarked that "the last guy that tried that [Nixon] just died."¹⁸ In defense of the policy of relying on air strikes to bring the Serbs back to the bargaining table, it was possible to point to the U.S. and NATO ultimatums of August 1993, and of February and April 1994, which appeared to have moderated aggressive Serb behavior.

The Bihac crisis brought home to the Americans the fact that they could not impose their policy of punishing the Serbs on the Europeans and the UN. The result was another reassessment of U.S. policy at the end of November.¹⁹ The United States decided it had to negotiate directly with the Bosnian Serb leadership. In a series of concessions, the Contact Group, with U.S. support, suggested that the Bosnian Serbs might be granted the right to confederate with Yugoslavia, and could seek changes in the map in direct negotiations with the Bosnian Muslims. But these offers were linked to Serb acceptance of the Contact Group map. Furthermore, the Contact Group's concessions to the Serbs brought an immediate response from the Bosnian government, which made it clear that it would not accept any modification in the plan which would allow the RS to enter into a confederal union with Yugoslavia.

Thus, by the end of 1994 efforts to find a political solution to the Bosnian crisis had ground to a halt. The tactic of producing a plan designed to fit most, if not all, of the demands of the Bosnian government had produced a backlash among the Bosnian Serbs. The position of the Bosnian government was also unclear. By approving the Contact Group proposal, the Bosnian government had apparently bowed to the inevitable and accepted the fact that Bosnia was to be partitioned. Yet, in all its pronouncements on the subject, the Bosnians insisted on the integrity of the state of Bosnia. And even when it was acknowledged that the Serbs were not apt

to join the new Bosnian federation, the Bosnians insisted that the Serbs could not be permitted to form a confederation with Serbia proper.

By the beginning of 1995 the options open to the international community in dealing with the Bosnian crisis seemed limited. The controversy over whether to arm the Bosnian Muslims or to try to reach a political solution to the crisis remained unresolved. While American policymakers came to accept the necessity of a political solution to which both parties would agree, the United States was also wedded to the argument that the Bosnians, as victims of aggression, had the right to defend themselves and to recover territory lost to the Serbs. The United States vigorously opposed attempts of the UN command in Sarajevo to punish the Bosnians for violations of the TEZ in the summer of 1994, and rejected the notion that Bosnian use of the Bihac safe area to launch an attack against the Serbs relieved the UN and NATO of the obligation to come to the Bosnians' defense when the Serbs counterattacked in November.

Options for the United States and the International Community.

It remains, then, to examine the options open to the United States and international community in seeking an end to the conflict.

The first alternative would be to press ahead with the search for a political solution. The Serbs may now be willing to negotiate, following the recent Bosnian government offensive in central Bosnia. But negotiations will be difficult because both sides are fighting in a restricted space over territory, possession of which determines whether one or the other will emerge as a viable state with a compact territory and access to the sea. The fate of the city of Sarajevo remains unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable. Meanwhile, the continuing flow of humanitarian aid to Bosnia makes it possible to continue fighting without a total collapse of the societies and the economies of the three state entities presently engaged in the conflict.²⁰

At the same time, the proposals for a settlement produced by the international community lack credibility because of their complexity and the extraordinary difficulties that would arise in implementing the Contact Group plan, even assuming the good will of the parties involved. Demilitarizing Sarajevo province would be an immensely difficult task, while monitoring the maze of choke points and ethnic enclaves contained in the Contact Group map would be a peacekeeper's nightmare.

If a political solution as presently envisaged may be difficult to achieve and even more difficult to enforce, what are the alternatives?

One is to support the Bosnian Muslims in their effort to regain territory lost to the Serbs with the expectation that at some point a true "balance of forces" will come into effect in Bosnia, creating the conditions for a more equitable peace settlement. Lifting the arms embargo, it is claimed by Bosnian supporters in the U.S. Congress, would be a step in this direction. A more sophisticated version of this argument opposes lifting the arms embargo and opts for a war of attrition against the Serbs, arguing that with time, and given the numerical superiority of the Muslims, the Bosnian federation could regain territory or at least wear the Serbs down to the point where they would be willing to make a settlement on terms more acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats. In this view, air strikes are counterproductive because they endanger the UN operation, which serves as a shield for the Bosnians until they can fight on more equal terms with the Serbs.²¹

There are a number of problems with this argument. Even with its recent military build-up, the Bosnian army seems most adept at guerrilla tactics. So far, these tactics have backfired when it comes time to consolidate Muslim gains. The Serbs, for their part, have not launched a serious offensive of their own since the summer of 1993, choosing instead to mass their forces against isolated enclaves such as Gorazde, Srebrenica, and most recently, Bihac, in this way keeping losses to a minimum. Properly speaking, the Bosnian conflict is not therefore a war of attrition, but of thrust and counterthrust, often in areas which are not of central concern to the combatants. (The battle for the corridor illustrates this point; since 1993, the

Serbs have largely given up trying to broaden this strategically vital front, and the Muslims have not repeated earlier efforts to cut this vital east-west link for the Serbs.)

The Bosnian government can undoubtedly call on more young men of fighting age than the Serbs, who clearly suffer from a shortage of manpower. Over the long run this could prove to be a decisive advantage to the Bosnians, who in any case now occupy only 13-14 percent of the territory of Bosnia and do not have to disperse their troops as widely as do the Serbs. Still one must not assume that the discrepancy in numbers is that great. The Bosnian claim that over half the population of the RS has fled overlooks the presence in the RS of Serb refugees from other parts of Bosnia.²² UNHCR estimates for the spring of 1994 put the population of the areas under the control of the Bosnian federation at 1.6 million (both Muslims and Croats), and the RS, at 1.17 million, not a decisive difference if one takes into account the fact that the Croats living in the Bosnian federation have yet to be integrated into the Bosnian army.²³

Still, of all the alternatives offered here, a Bosnian strategy which would put pressure on the Serbs to sign a peace agreement would seem preferable. The question is whether the Bosnian government is committed to such a strategy, that is, whether it is really willing to implement the Contact Group plan if the Serbs should finally decide to accept it.

The third alternative is to push ahead with efforts to arrange a permanent ceasefire along the present line separating the Muslims and Serbs. If a cessation of hostilities could be arranged, UN peacekeepers could be interposed between the two sides, artillery drawn back out of range, and a prisoner exchange arranged, much as occurred after the ceasefire between the Croats and the Muslims in February of 1994. Akashi, with the backing of the UN commanders in Bosnia, has repeatedly sought to effect such a ceasefire, most notably in June of 1994.

Unfortunately, the idea of a permanent ceasefire is an anathema to the Bosnian government. It sees this as an effort to impose the Cyprus model on Bosnia, freezing Serb gains.

Such an outcome also works against the Bosnian strategy of involving the West in the struggle on the Bosnian side. The only situation which might lead the Bosnians to accept a permanent ceasefire would be a withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers from Bosnia. This development does not seem likely for the moment, but could occur if the United States unilaterally lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian federation, or if the French or British, under domestic political pressure, decided to remove their peacekeeping forces.

The Bosnian Serbs have from the start urged a ceasefire of longer duration. Their interest in freezing the battlefield confrontation lines is obvious. This explains the Serbs' interest in getting former President Carter involved in the ceasefire negotiations; Carter, along with Akashi, was partial to the idea of a permanent ceasefire as a prelude to renewed political negotiations. Carter's efforts produced a compromise ceasefire agreement of four months, the maximum to which the Bosnian government would agree.

The best prospect for peace, for the moment, lies in putting continuing pressure on the Serbs to accept the Contact Group Plan. The defeat of Serb forces on Vlasic appears to have occasioned a confrontation between General Mladic and Karadzic. General Mladic is said to have attributed his defeat to a lack of munitions and fuel. If so, the embargo which the Milosevic regime imposed on Bosnian Serbia is having its effect. Of the two options—launching a major offensive, with possible high Serb casualties, or trying to make the best settlement possible, the Serbs may now have to choose the latter.

But even if the Serbs should agree to the Contact Group plan, a real settlement could be some time away. Repeatedly, Milosevic has urged the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the political settlements offered by the international community and then to string out the negotiations. Thus, negotiations could continue over the "details" of the plan for quite some time, accompanied by low-level conflict.

In this situation, there is always the chance that one side or the other, detecting what it thinks is a weakness in its foe, will

seek to gain a decisive advantage. The history of the Bosnian conflict reminds us to expect the unexpected. Most analysts failed to predict the Srebrenica crisis, or the Serb attack on Gorazde. The market massacre of February 5 caught the world by surprise. The UN did not even have a map of the Bihac safe area prior to October 1994.²⁴

Up to now, the policy of the international community on Bosnia has been crisis-driven, each successive crisis serving to "focus the mind" of the West on the Bosnian issue. This has proven especially true in the case of the United States, which has undertaken a policy reassessment after each of the major crises of the last three years. In the most recent case, that of Bihac, the United States was forced to reassess its policy of using air strikes to bring the Serbs to the bargaining table, and instead decided to offer the Bosnian Serbs the possibility of eventually forming a confederation with Serbia. This step was a major concession in light of the distaste of the American policymakers for a "Greater Serbia."

So far, the adjustments in Bosnian policy made by the United States have brought her closer to the European position. But this need not be the case if another humanitarian disaster strikes Bosnia. A war between Croatia and Serbia following the withdrawal and restructuring of the UNPROFOR force in Croatia could bring about another such reassessment. So could the collapse of the TEZ around Sarajevo if the Bosnians were to attempt to break the siege of the city.

The question is whether the United States would then opt for lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia, or make further concessions to the Serbs to win their support for a peace settlement.

The fact is that certain steps can be taken which are politically unpopular in the United States, but could encourage the Bosnian Serbs to reconsider their stand on the Contact Group map. If the international community were to give up its insistence on sanctity of Bosnia's present borders, there would be nothing to prevent Serbia from absorbing the RS. The advantage of this solution, from the point of view of the international community, would be two-fold: it would make the

Bosnian Serbs less opposed to the Contact Group map—since it would mean the realization of the Serbs dream of a “Greater Serbia”—and it would vastly simplify the now-impossible task of implementing the peace agreement, since the Yugoslav army could take over responsibility for policing the new border with the Bosnian federation, while UN peacekeepers could be concentrated in Sarajevo.

This is perhaps an extreme example of how a crisis situation might lead the United States to accept a settlement which it now rejects out of hand. For the foreseeable future, the efforts of the international community, with the support of the United States, will be focused on gaining Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan.

There is nevertheless the risk that if a new humanitarian crisis arises the United States and her European allies will feel compelled to punish the Bosnian Serbs by unleashing NATO. (As this account has noted, NATO strikes against the Serbs were narrowly averted on February 10 and on April 23 of 1994; the odds are that the third time around, NATO will not allow Akashi to stand in its way.) This would lead to an escalation of the conflict, and UN personnel would be exposed to retribution from the Serb side as well as provocations from the Bosnian Muslim forces. The result could be the withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia. American ground forces might then be needed to help extricate the UN contingents.

At this point, paradoxically, the United States might be compelled to turn to Belgrade for assistance. Faced with the prospect of U.S. troops engaged in fighting Serbs in the mountains of Bosnia, the United States might agree to the creation of a greater Serbia, providing its borders did not deviate greatly from the Contact Group map.

The most likely scenario is that a low-intensity war will drag on for some time to come. Under these circumstances the prospects of American troops becoming involved in Bosnia would be minimal. On the other hand, it is possible that the Bosnian Serbs will decide to adopt Milosevic’s strategy and accept the Contact Group plan. This would not mean the end of the crisis, but would put the issue of an American troop

presence in Bosnia on the front burner. By the same token, pressure for a UN pullout, or an unexpected humanitarian crisis such as the collapse of the TEZ around Sarajevo, could bring renewed American involvement in Bosnia.

If this is the case, then the United States will very likely have to confront the question of a troop presence in Bosnia in the years ahead, as well as the political alternatives to such a policy. Perhaps the best outcome, from the U.S. point of view, would be a no-war no-peace situation, a tailing-off of the fighting which would not involve a formal political settlement and a call for U.S. forces to implement a peace plan. But this is not up to the policymakers to decide. In the meantime, one can only hope that the parties to the conflict will decide that it is in their own best interest to reach agreement among themselves. Most nationally-inspired conflicts end only when this happens.

Perhaps, then, the best approach is to downplay the notion of a political settlement, and emphasize to all parties that the UN and the West will in the future play the role of facilitating contacts among the parties, but no more, leaving the settlement to the parties themselves. Unfortunately, the war in Bosnia has become too close to all of us to permit this kind of calculated indifference. We are, truly, prisoners of the Bosnian war, and no clear solution offers itself. We can only hope that the parties to the conflict show restraint, and that a peace settlement when it comes, is a reflection of the real will of all the parties involved, so that the U.S. role can be kept to a minimum.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Under the plan, 52 percent of Bosnia would go to the Serbs, 30 percent to the Muslims, and 17 percent to the Croats. Both Karadzic and Milosevic approved the offer.

2. *The Washington Post*, November 3, 1994, p. A31.

3. A radius of 20 kilometers from the city, from which Pale, the headquarters of the Serbs besieging Sarajevo, was excluded.

4. According to reports of the incident, the first intelligence reports of the Serb reaction to the NATO ultimatum suggested that the Serbs had launched a full-scale attack on the city. The request for a strike never reached the UN, and bad weather intervened. *The Washington Post*, February 12, 1994, p. A15.

5. The ceasefire agreement was reached on February 9-10, and the agreement on civilian passage in and out of the city on March 23.

6. The first strike took place on April 10; F-16s, after trying to locate Serb tanks, bombed what they thought was a communications center. The second strike took place the following day, when F-18s claimed to have destroyed a Serb tank. The third and final strike was launched on April 15 and included A-10s and British Harrier aircraft. One of the British Harrier craft was shot down without loss of life.

7. The April 22 ultimatum creating the TEZ around Gorazde was extended to four other safe areas on the morning of April 23 (Tuzla, Zepa, Srebrenica and Bihac).

8. See *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1994, p. A8, for the plan to "bomb the crap out of the Serbs." This account also suggests a political goal for such a move, to "force them [the Serbs] back to the bargaining table."

9. The French blocked an American proposal to issue an ultimatum requiring the Serbs to leave the city and create a TEZ, arguing that the United States should supply the troops necessary to police the agreement.

10. *The Washington Post*, December 12, 1994, p. A31.

11. *The New York Times*, November 21, 1994, p. 1, quoted UN officials as saying that for the most part the Serbs were honoring the safe area, and that "the odd shells fall in the safe area."

12. *The Washington Post*, April 30, 1994, p. A18.

13. See *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1993, p. C3, for the report of Captain J.P. Mackley. He notes that there was not much large scale combat in Bosnia. The Serbs depended heavily on tanks and artillery and did not have the stomach for infantry warfare, according to this account.

14. See note 24.

15. *The New York Times*, October 21, 1994, p. A8, notes the failure of the Croats to halt the Serb bombardment of Bosnian supply lines north of Mostar as an example of this lack of cooperation.

16. On July 20 Izetbegovic almost rejected the plan upon hearing that the Assembly of the Republic of Serbs had turned it down. Radio Bosnia July 21 as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) July 23 1994, quotes Izetbegovic: "I asked myself whether we made a mistake in this case, whether our positive reply was a good thing. Yes, yes, that was a good reply because, by opting for peace, we scored all these political points, and they lost them."

17. Civilian air flights, participation in international sports events, and the opening of the ferry to Italy from Bar were the principal—largely symbolic—steps taken. The resolution also froze the assets of the Republic of Serbs and forbade their leaders to travel abroad. *The New York Times*, September 24, 1994, p. 1.

18. *The Washington Post*, April 26 1994, p. A8.

19. *The New York Times*, December 4, 1994, p. 1.

20. The third mini-state, in addition to the RS and the Republic of Bosnia is Herzeg-Bosna, formerly Western Herzegovina. Herzeg-Bosna has ceased to exist under the constitution of the Bosnian federation, but in fact continues to function as a state.

21. See Martin Woollacott, *The Guardian*, December 7, 1994, p. 22.

22. *Oslobodjenje* [European edition], April 1-8, 1994, p. 32.

23. *War Report*, December 1994/January 1995.

24. On November 11, UN officials indicated that they considered the safe area to be restricted to the town of Bihac, and that there was no map of the area (*The New York Times*, November 12, 1994, p. 7). On November 14 the UN produced a map of the safe area but said they did not know when it had been drawn (*The New York Times*, November 15, 1994, p. A12).

CHAPTER 3

THE CONFLICTS OF BOSNIA: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

James A. Schear

Introduction.

In the months—now years—since the break-up of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the stage for a vast UN field operation.¹ This operation has a very uncertain future. The fragile ceasefire put into place in December 1994 is falling prey to a deadlock in negotiations on a political settlement, and a new round of fighting could well lead to the withdrawal of UN personnel from Bosnia. The questions addressed by this chapter, however, are more retrospective than prospective: How did this controversial operation come into existence? How has it evolved to date? And how should we evaluate its performance and impact?

The work performed by UN personnel in Bosnia is extraordinarily wide-ranging. Indeed, from the peace operations standpoint, practically every kind of mission that has ever been performed by a UN field operation *anywhere* is being undertaken somewhere in Bosnia: humanitarian relief, the care of refugees and displaced persons, human rights monitoring, peacekeeping, ceasefire verification, weapons supervision and control, mine clearance, safe area protection, civil police monitoring, reconstruction, preventive deployments, and even, to a small degree, enforcement.² Although a number of different agencies and programs are engaged in this effort—most notably the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP)—by far its largest and most visible field element is the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), whose

deployments in Bosnia include roughly 23,000 soldiers and civilians drawn from seventeen countries.

In other settings, the large scope and diversity of an operation might be regarded as a positive attribute, even a source of strength. In Bosnia, alas, it is a definite weakness. UNPROFOR in its present form is underfunded, understaffed and stretched far too thin. It does some jobs well, others poorly; but its fundamental problem is that it has too many tasks to perform. What is worse, it is being pulled in competing directions. Some of its assigned tasks are in serious tension, if not outright conflict, with each other.

Why UNPROFOR?

Why peacekeepers are in Bosnia at all is a good question. When local Serbs rebelled against the Muslim-dominated government of a newly independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most efficacious response would have been a conflict suppression campaign aimed at quelling the revolt, apprehending the ethnic cleansers, protecting innocents from reprisal, and prodding all the Bosnian parties to settle their differences. Whether this strategy could have worked is unclear; it was never tried.

The Western powers faced no easy options on Bosnia. To do nothing would have been morally unacceptable and strategically unwise. On the other hand, a partisan intervention with troops on the ground, or even throwing increments of weapons and aircraft into the fray, raised the specter of a proxy war, one in which the United States, the European allies and Russia would be drawn into the quagmire on opposing sides. No state was prepared to contemplate such an option or to sell that to a domestic audience. The option of impartial conflict suppression, though never really examined, probably would have failed the test of political resolve. Apart from the neo-imperialistic character of such an operation, the tactics and technology to perform this task on a large scale and without enormous bloodshed are not yet available.

Thus, the major powers settled upon a strategy of indirection. Working through the UN, they kept in place the

existing arms embargo on all the former Yugoslav states to limit the potential for competitive interventions, imposed an economic embargo to punish Serbia for its involvement in the fighting, established a war crimes tribunal to exact justice for victims, and agreed to a no-fly zone, safe areas and other steps in order to limit the intensity of the fighting. The major powers in the Security Council also prevailed upon a reluctant UN secretariat to dispatch elements of UNPROFOR into Bosnia from neighboring Croatia as an impartial, noncombatant operation, initially to do only things that *all* the Bosnian parties could agree upon, mainly sustaining civilians trapped in the fighting.³

These measures, it should be stressed, were not the result of any grand design. Indeed, the strategy took shape incrementally, as the product of crisis-generated actions by hard pressed governments over the long course of Bosnia's brutal war. It is, above all, the abiding desire of the major powers not to break ranks on Bosnia that drives this "lowest-common-denominator" strategy forward. Very few have defended this approach on the grounds that it is optimal, only that the alternatives to it are worse.

Conflict Dynamics in Bosnia.

Having been launched into Bosnia and Herzegovina by factors largely external to the conflict, the UN has faced extraordinarily difficult challenges stemming from the pattern of violence evident within the country. On the one hand, Bosnia is not a "failed" state in the sense of being afflicted by all the familiar symptoms of chronic poverty and underdevelopment. If peace broke out, Bosnia's economic and civic institutions could be restored rather quickly. Yet it is a society fractured along ethnic and cultural lines, and these cleavages impart to the fighting three characteristics that make outside involvement exceptionally difficult.

First, the dynamics of conflict tend to be highly localized. It is hard to exaggerate this point. Both in terms of its intensity and tactics, the fighting can vary considerably from village to village, or valley to valley. This is not to say that the warfare

itself is impervious to strategic direction; it clearly is not. But local commanders do enjoy, and tend to utilize, a good deal of flexibility and initiative. The discipline of command and control that we take for granted in modern warfare is not always apparent in Bosnia. There have been occasions in the fighting when the general officers of one or another faction have had to go to the front lines themselves to ensure that their orders were being carried out.

Second, the "grassroots" character of the conflict gives prominence to paramilitary groups and criminal elements, both in the initial stages of fighting, before military organizations can take over and impose a degree of order, and then during the latter stages of conflict, as the armies demobilize. This phenomenon has occurred in the newly established Federation between the Bosniac (Muslim) and Croat communities of the central and southern parts of the country. Criminal activity has returned in areas where the two armies have disengaged but local police have been slow or unable to reassert authority.

Third, ethnic communities embroiled in the fighting tend to become internally polarized as between the indigenous population and the displaced people of the same ethnic group who flow into that region. Within the UN protected areas in Croatia, for example, observers have witnessed a sharp rise in Serb-on-Serb crime during the past year. Crime within the Croat regions of the Bosnian federation has risen as well. Regrettably, the polarizing effects of this phenomenon tend to strengthen the hands of political extremists and hard liners. It also makes it very difficult to engage in local mediation or reconstructive work on any other basis than "separate but equal" local administrations and municipalities.⁴

All of these attributes—the grassroots character of the fighting, the presence of paramilitary and criminal organizations, and the polarization both within and between communities—pose substantial challenges to conflict management by outsiders. They place a premium on precisely those kinds of instruments that are not yet well-developed elements in international field operations—tactical communications with factions, civil policing, grass roots

mediation, and economic inducements to forge cooperation among erstwhile enemies.

The Evolution of UN Operations.

The conflicts of Bosnia to date have unfolded in three phases, and the UN-led operation has expanded and diversified in each phase.

Phase one played out between April 1992 and June 1993. This was the period of the Serb offensive. Bosnian Serbs withdraw their government representatives to the town of Pale, east of Sarajevo. They fomented revolt and, with outside support from Belgrade, their militia fighters laid siege to a number of cities and towns, brutally cleansing hundreds of thousands of non-Serb civilians out of large areas of the north and east of the country. The Bosniacs, meanwhile, were in disarray, falling back into urban areas. The Croats, for their part, were sitting on the sidelines, having declared their independence, but generally staying out of the fighting except within parts of southern Herzegovina where they cleansed local Serb populations south of Mostar.

At this stage, the UN's role was primarily that of humanitarian relief, control and operation of Sarajevo airport, support and protection of the land convoys, and monitoring the no-fly zone from the ground.⁵

Phase two of the conflict unfolded between June 1993 and February 1994. During this period, the Croats launched their attack against the Bosniacs, a reaction in part to the large influx of displaced Muslim people into areas of Croat predominance in the central and southern parts of the country. The Serbs, meanwhile, intensified their sieges around the enclaves, but otherwise consolidated their positions in more or less of a defensive posture. Despite its desperate situation, however, the Bosnian government was able to recoup and, to its great credit, turn a rag-tag group of fighters into a professional army.

During this period, the UN operation stepped up its humanitarian efforts, providing aid to roughly 2.7 million people. It also took on the job of safe area protection, under a

mandate established in Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836.⁶ To this end, UNPROFOR augmented its presence within the six designated safe areas—Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Bihac—and worked out procedures with NATO for the use of air power in support of ground operations.

Phase three of the conflict played out between February and October 1994. The Bosniacs slowly began to turn the tide of the war. The Bosnian Serbs stopped their bombardment, initially in Sarajevo and subsequently in Gorazde, under the threat of NATO air strikes and accepted UN-brokered arrangements on local ceasefires as well as the interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops in certain areas, heavy weapons controls, anti-sniping restrictions, and greater freedom of movement for civilians in Sarajevo.

Meanwhile, peace broke out between Croats and Bosniacs in the wake of the UN-brokered ceasefire agreement of February 23, 1994 and the U.S.-brokered federation agreement signed in Washington on March 1, 1994.⁷ Generally, the situation was characterized by a military equilibrium throughout the country with comparatively low levels of fighting. The Bosniacs were gaining strength, however, and were unwilling to accept a cessation of hostilities agreement in June.

During this third phase, the UN became not only a provider of aid and a protector of safe areas, but in more traditional terms, a peacekeeper and a peace-builder between Bosniac and Croat communities at the grassroots level. UNPROFOR also picked up, rather more tenuously, the heavy weapons control function in the exclusion zones, anti-sniping enforcement, and a host of other postures in high risk areas.

The third phase of this conflict is over. It ended with the Bosniac military campaign of October-November 1994, the Serb counteraction against Bihac, and the ceasefire brokered at the end of the year with the diplomatic intervention of former President Jimmy Carter. Notwithstanding their advances in western Bosnia, the Pale Serbs continue to be politically isolated, overextended, and vulnerable in spots. Their behavior would suggest that they are looking for military levers that

would pressure the Sarajevo government into a peace settlement, albeit on Pale's terms. Meanwhile, the Bosniacs continue to gain strength slowly, and their reversal at Bihac has not changed that very much. (Indeed, as of March 1995, they have pushed Bosnian Serb forces out of the Bihac safe area entirely.)

As for the Croats, they are nervous and internally conflicted. Their interests are best served by a quick end to the war that preserves a breathing space for them amid the larger Serbian and Muslim communities of Bosnia. A long war that radicalizes the Muslim population, or the precipitous loss by one side or another, would not work to the Croats' advantage and would undermine further their already tentative support for the Bosnian Federation.

Evaluating UNPROFOR's Performance.

In the midst of all this stands UNPROFOR. In Bosnia, it is a large operation, difficult to manage, and most of the countries contributing troops have a low tolerance for casualties. Its morale, to be candid, is not good. Its deficiencies are intensely magnified, while its accomplishments are ignored or unappreciated. It operates in many high-risk areas where there is no peace to keep. And, increasingly, it is being manipulated and abused by all sides for various purposes.

How should one assess UNPROFOR's performance in such a difficult situation? To answer this question, we should look closely at UNPROFOR's three basic missions in Bosnia: humanitarian relief, peacekeeping/peace-building, and safe area protection.

Humanitarian Relief. From a field operations perspective, UNPROFOR has done a very good job, under exceptionally difficult circumstances, in supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance. Despite the daily drumbeat of harassment, blockages, theft and occasional violence against the operation, humanitarian aid more often than not has gotten through, and it has been sufficient, thus far, to ward off life-threatening food shortages.⁸

A critical issue in this effort has been UNPROFOR's evolving relationship with UNHCR, the lead agency on the relief side. Initial efforts at cooperation were slow, high level coordination was lacking, and the effort was hampered by suspicion and occasional friction between civilians and military personnel unaccustomed to working together.⁹ Yet, there was an underlying complementarity between the two organizations. When fighting spread to Bosnia in early 1992, UNHCR already possessed the storage facilities, the distribution plans, and the analytical skills. What it lacked was a large staff, field experience in active conflicts, and good access into high risk areas. UNPROFOR, for its part, had equipment, logistics support, personnel, and access to high risk areas, but not the right analytical skills. Its corps of UN military observers, the so-called UNMOs, were trained to report on military activity, not on humanitarian needs.

Thus, UNHCR and UNPROFOR sought to offset each other's weaknesses. UNHCR trained UNMOs and others in the methodology of humanitarian needs assessment; it also used military personnel to assist in monitoring food distribution. For its part, UNPROFOR established a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to act as an information sharing, planning and coordination body. Over time, this CMOC also attracted a large number of Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) personnel. In Bosnia and elsewhere, NGO field organizations tend to be repelled by efforts at centralized coordination, yet in this case, they could not resist the lure of good field intelligence.

As for convoy security, UNHCR and UNPROFOR generally have agreed on when, and when not, to use force in the delivery of relief supplies. At times, UNPROFOR's reliance upon armored vehicles has been viewed as excessive by UNHCR, on the grounds that they raise suspicions and hostility among local people in areas through which convoys transit. Nonetheless, both organizations generally have preferred negotiations over force in getting through road-blocks, reserving force for instances of direct attack on convoys. This preference reflects two factors: first, the availability of inducements (i.e., the fact that civilians on all sides are being serviced by the operation) as well as disincentives (i.e.,

withholding aid to the side blocking the convoy) in overcoming blockages; and second, the inherent vulnerability to reprisal of convoy operations in the event that UNPROFOR were to apply force tactically.

Peacekeeping/peace-building. UNPROFOR has invested substantial assets in the forging of a fragile peace between the Bosniac and Croat communities of Bosnia, and the results to date have been highly successful. UN troops have interposed at critical points along the former Bosniac-Croat confrontation lines. These areas are being demilitarized and cleared of mines; forces have been thinned out or removed entirely; extensive joint patrolling has been conducted; most checkpoints are being "civilianized" or in many cases removed altogether. Freedom of movement is being restored. Generally, UNPROFOR units have sought to establish a measured tempo for the demilitarization process—fast enough to prevent the two sides from developing a Cyprus-like dependency upon the UN's presence, but not so fast as to trigger instability between the parties and a backsliding into war.

UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and the European Union (EU) in Mostar are also playing a vital role in brokering Bosniac-Croat agreements at the local level on issues such as infrastructure repair, freedom of movement, restoration of commercial activity, the cross-employment of workers, and pilot programs for the return of displaced people. This effort, in some cases, has included the provision of financing for reconstruction (in the case of the EU) as well as labor, materials, and engineering talent for the repair of roads and bridges, schools and public utilities. Throughout most parts of the federation, electrical power, water and commercial traffic have been restored.

It is unfortunate that UNPROFOR and its partners get so little credit for their efforts at forging the federation—"nation-building" by any other name—in the context of an agreement that is widely regarded as a major achievement of American diplomacy in Bosnia. Clearly, without an international presence on the ground in central Bosnia, the federation itself would be at risk.

One consequence of attempting to forge peace between two parties in a three-way conflict has been to incur the opprobrium of the third faction, in this case the Bosnian Serbs. Serb commanders have complained bitterly that UNPROFOR's work in the federation has strengthened the Bosniacs' military posture in a variety of ways.¹⁰ There is an irony here. At the diplomatic level, UNPROFOR has often been accused of showing excessive sympathy toward the Bosnian Serbs. Whether or not this proposition is true is a debatable point. What is not debatable is that UNPROFOR's work within the federation is viewed with hostility by the Pale Serbs.

Safe Area Protection and the Use of Force. UNPROFOR's third role—safe area protection—has embroiled the operation in controversy. Here, the performance of the force has been very uneven. UNPROFOR lacks more than a symbolic presence in most of the six designated safe areas. Its controls on Serb and Bosniac heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo and Gorazde are unacceptably loose. Most of all, its involvement in arrangements that tend on balance to benefit only one side, the Bosniacs, have given both sides certain incentives to abuse the force: the Serbs blatantly play upon the inherent vulnerability of the UN's operations as a way to inhibit UNPROFOR from calling in air strikes against them, while the Bosniacs at times have sought to draw the UN into the line of fire as a way of triggering air strikes against Serbs.

While UNPROFOR's qualms about resorting to air power are well known, it is not nearly as timid about using its own deadly force as its critics would suppose. In defending itself, UNPROFOR in Bosnia has inflicted more casualties upon Serb fighters than it has suffered at the hands of the Serbs. When UNPROFOR brokered a no-sniping pledge among parties in Sarajevo, it chose to enforce the deal with its own sharpshooters, forcing snipers to take countermeasures. As a result, the effectiveness of sniping against civilians has been cut (though not eliminated). When several dozen Serb militia reneged on a promise to clear out of Gorazde's outskirts last spring, UNPROFOR's units disarmed them coercively.

None of these examples change the fact that UNPROFOR's capacity to operate as an impartial,

noncombatant entity in Bosnia fundamentally depends upon its ability to induce the restraint of the parties with whom it has to deal. The application of deadly force beyond self-defense does not mix with this strategy of induced restraint. While some force may be necessary to prompt harassers to back off, too much force risks an overreaction. For this reason, UN personnel go to great lengths to show their nonthreatening intentions: painting their vehicles white to prevent being mistaken for a combatant; submitting to searches to show that they are not gun-running; and issuing warnings prior to opening fire so that fighters with itchy trigger fingers will not preempt with force when UN vehicles or personnel approach their positions.

Without question, actions such as these—absurd in conventional war-fighting situations—leave UNPROFOR open to abuse. They might not be necessary if deterrence were sufficient to ensure that UNPROFOR would not be harassed. Look at post-war Iraq: UN weapons inspectors are vulnerable to harassment and yet they perform their tasks unhindered for the most part because Baghdad is intensely vulnerable to coalition air strikes. This formula might have worked in Bosnia—if anyone had bothered to defeat the Serbs first.

But NATO has never been prepared to intervene as a partisan in this conflict, and it knows that a strategic air campaign would not sweep Bosnia's hillsides clear of fighters. The most that NATO members have been able to agree upon is to project air power into Bosnia in support of UNPROFOR and with UNPROFOR's specific approval. And that is the rub. While the threat of air strikes has helped to lower the level of violence, its actual use is very problematic.¹¹ It is a blunt instrument, and efforts to apply it in limited, proportionate way are hard to do without inviting charges that one is engaging in "pinpricks." Furthermore, the prospect of collateral damage to surrounding villages and towns (where Serb heavy weapons tend to be deployed) and the risks to NATO's aircrews are factors that weigh heavily in UNPROFOR's calculations of the costs and benefits of using air power for enforcement purposes.

UNPROFOR's limitations in applying deadly force represent only one factor affecting its capacity to conduct safe area-related missions. Three other issues are noteworthy. First, UNPROFOR was never given adequate forces or equipment to mount an effective defense. When the safe areas mandate was established, UNPROFOR commanders sought an additional commitment of 34,000 troops to carry out their new responsibilities; what they got was less than 7,000.¹² Even the Security Council conceded at the time that UNPROFOR could do little more than provide a symbolic deterrent within these safe areas, not enough to secure hundreds of kilometers from armed attack or to mount an active defense against incursions.¹³ A lack of manpower is also the critical factor in UNPROFOR's difficulty in holding off Serb efforts to raid designated weapons collection points around Sarajevo.¹⁴

Second, air power is only a limited offset to a lack of military capacity on the ground, even if UNPROFOR were prepared to use it as something other than a last resort option. In their attack on Bihac, for example, the Bosnian Serbs changed their tactics by stressing infantry assault over heavy weapons attack, depriving lucrative targets to NATO and trying to avoid situations where UNPROFOR could get caught in the cross fire.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the safe area mission has tended to cast UNPROFOR in a partisan light. These safe areas are not demilitarized zones within the meaning of the protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Some contain significant military targets: munitions factories, armed combatants, command posts, and weapons depots. Bihac's safe area, for example, includes the headquarters of the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army. And the Bosnian Serbs, by their recent behavior, have indicated that they do not intend to respect safe areas when there are military costs to them in doing so.

In short, while the impulse to establish specific safe areas was quite understandable, and while they have helped to limit harm to civilians in some cases, the concept has proved extraordinarily difficult to apply and enforce in light of the dynamics of this war and UNPROFOR's obvious limitations. In

retrospect, the idea of applying safe area concepts in situations of active fighting without the consent of both sides has proved inherently problematic.

Conclusions and Lessons.

UNPROFOR has faced enormous problems in Bosnia and its future prospects are unclear. An upsurge in fighting during the coming months would certainly stretch the operation, possibly to the breaking point. While the threat of renewed large-scale fighting in Croatia receded somewhat in early March, after President Franjo Tudjman chose not to expel all UN troops from Croatia, the future of the UN presence in Serb-dominated areas of Croatia remains cloudy. Continued pressure from Zagreb to trim or remove UN peacekeepers from these areas could induce the Bosnian Serbs to insist upon a corresponding reduction or removal of UN troops in the Muslim enclaves of eastern Bosnia.¹⁵

As for its performance, this analysis suggests that UNPROFOR's actual record, though mixed, is much better than its many critics generally acknowledge. Granted, the operation is afflicted by numerous weaknesses, especially in performing its safe area functions, and its assigned tasks are greatly in excess of its troop strength and resource base. Moreover, the disparate character of its national contingents, in terms of training, equipment and discipline, has been a serious problem.¹⁶ Even so, it would be a mistake simply to dismiss UNPROFOR as a failure in light of its valuable roles in supporting humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and in providing peacekeeping and "peace-building" services within the Muslim-Croat Federation.

A criticism frequently leveled at UNPROFOR is that its presence works largely to the benefit of the Bosnian Serbs by freezing the current status-quo (in which the Serbs hold most of the territory), inhibiting a lifting of the arms embargo, or fending off NATO air strikes against Serb forces laying siege to Muslim enclaves. To the extent that UNPROFOR's oft-cited vulnerability is proffered as a reason for refraining from forceful action, these criticisms have an element of validity. Whether

UNPROFOR itself is an appropriate target for these criticisms is doubtful, however. Ultimately, what shelters the Bosnian Serbs and indeed any of the factions from outside pressure is the predisposition among the great powers to favor a consensus-based strategy of indirection for dealing with the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. In this sense, UNPROFOR is more a symptom than a cause of the great powers' current approach toward the conflict.

It would also be a mistake to argue that UNPROFOR's impact is helpful only to the Serbs. Delivering aid to isolated Muslim enclaves is siege breaking by any other name. Had UN personnel not been on the ground delivering aid in 1993, while the Sarajevo government was desperately turning its militia into professional soldiers, the Bosnian Serbs might have achieved an early rout. UNPROFOR's units, as noted earlier, also have been instrumental in holding together the Bosniac-Croat Federation agreement, in effect, freeing up government forces to fight the Pale Serbs, using internal lines of communication (roads and bridges), repaired mainly by UN engineering units.

Ultimately, where one stands on UNPROFOR depends in large part on how one views the larger strategy of indirection adopted by the major powers at the outset of Yugoslav crisis. The operation's impact, for better or worse, must be viewed in light of the likely results of other options that could have been pursued as alternatives to UNPROFOR—namely, to do nothing, or to mount a forceful intervention, with the attendant perceived risks of quagmires and proxy wars.

What lessons should be drawn from this experience? For the moment, two stand out. First, if Bosnia is any guide, UN member states should be very careful about putting field personnel into situations of active conflict unless these personnel are either truly impartial or backed up by substantial military force, ideally applied at the strategic level. The notion of enabling or requiring nonpartisan peacekeepers to use deadly force in tactical situations beyond the case of self-defense is fraught with risk.

A second lesson is that in UN field operations, as in life, you get what you pay for. A weak and divided international response to a conflict, such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is going to breed a cautious, self-constrained field operation. It is unrealistic to expect that an operation like UNPROFOR could fill a void created by political disagreements among UN member states on how to maneuver the Bosnian parties toward a peace settlement. The operation was, and remains, a stopgap measure, not a solution to the conflicts of Bosnia.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. This chapter draws in part upon the author's presentation to a conference on "Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the 21st Century" sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, December 1, 1994. The views presented here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

2. UN personnel also are involved in a range of diplomatic ("peace-making") activities. These tasks include the mediation of local ceasefires, cessation of hostilities accords, and prisoner exchanges, as well as participation in negotiations on an overall settlement of the conflict, in concert with key outside states (e.g., Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States) and organizations (e.g., the European Union). This chapter, however, will focus on the field aspects.

3. In May 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, in his view, conditions in Bosnia were not ripe for deployment of a peacekeeping force, absent some kind of agreement among the parties on a workable mandate. See the Secretary-General, *Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)*, S/23900, May 12, 1992, p. 8.

4. Within the Bosnian federation, for example, the Croats seem very intent upon reconstructing Mostar as a twin municipality. The UN and the European Union (EU) oppose this arrangement for reasons of principle as well as cost efficiency, and the Bosniacs clearly are against it. Their quandary is simple. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Bosniacs were open to the idea of a fairly harmonious "twin cities" arrangement for East and West Mostar—a kind of Bosnian style "Minneapolis and St. Paul," if you will, on the Neretva River. How could the Bosniacs ever accept such an outcome without also ceding their position that the Serbs in Bosnia

should not be allowed to divide Sarajevo and turn it into a Cold War version of East and West Berlin?

5. The relevant Security Council resolutions are S/RES/758, June 8, 1992; S/RES/761, June 29, 1992; S/RES/764, July 13, 1992; S/RES/776, September 19, 1992; S/RES/786 (1992), November 10, 1992.

6. See Council resolutions S/RES/824 (1993), May 6, 1993, and S/RES/836 (1993), June 3, 1993.

7. For the Camp Pleso ceasefire agreement, see annex to the Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 900 (1994)*, S/1994/291, March 11, 1994. For the Washington agreement, see Security Council, *Letter dated 3 March 1994 from the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General*, S/1994/255, March 4, 1994.

8. United States General Accounting Office (GAO), *Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of UN Operations in Bosnia*, (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR), April 1994, p. 27. Nonetheless, the shortfalls in food requirements have been severe in some locations, and the average body weight of civilians in the war zones has fallen dramatically.

9. See, for example, discussion in *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

10. In fact, the federation gives the Bosniac forces access to the sea, strategic depth, internal lines of communication (roads and bridges), repaired mainly by UNPROFOR's engineering units. For a time, as a confidence-builder in the Bosniac-Croat context, UNPROFOR also was present as an observer at so-called "active" sites, where Bosniac forces could fire artillery at Serb positions so long as they did not turn their weapons on Croat positions. Serb commanders took a dark view of such a practice.

11. The problems are reminiscent of the hoary debates within NATO during the Cold War on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in support of conventional force operations in central Europe.

12. See the Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 844 (1993)*, S/1994/555, p. 1. Although 7,600 troops were authorized, less than this number were actually deployed.

13. For discussion, see Major General John A. MacInnis, "The Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Former Yugoslavia: A Response," *Orbis*, Vol. 39. No. 1, p. 99.

14. The weapons collection sites are controlled by French, Russian and Ukrainian platoons. On several occasions, when Serbs have surrounded these sites in an effort to raid them, UNPROFOR has managed to move in

other nearby units to prevent forced entry and to negotiate a withdrawal of Serb units. In other instances, UN forces have simply been faced with overwhelming force, too much for the platoon leader to prudently resist, and the Serbs have succeeded in removing their weapons. On one occasion, on August 5, 1994, when Serbs successfully removed five weapons from the Ilidza site, UNPROFOR authorized NATO air action, and the weapons were returned. Both the Serbs and the Bosniacs are known to retain heavy weapons hidden in the total exclusion zone.

15. General Ratko Mladic, of the Bosnian Serb Army, reportedly has made this linkage very explicit. See "Croatia Signs Anti-Serbia Military Pact with Bosnia," *International Herald Tribune*, March 7, 1995, p. 1.

16. See GAO, *Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 41-42.

CHAPTER 4

NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT: LESSONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS

Steven L. Burg

Introduction.

In this chapter I survey the efforts of international actors to mediate a negotiated solution to the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina, and suggest some of the reasons why these efforts have failed. I attribute failure to both the unwillingness of international actors to be drawn into direct involvement in armed conflict, and the lack of interest on the part of local leaders in negotiating a mutually acceptable compromise. I also suggest that this conflict, like the broader demise of the former Yugoslavia as a whole, raised important questions of political principle and practice for which there were few precedents and no agreed answers. If international mediators were to succeed, they would have had to have moved the warring parties, as well as the states and multinational organizations that sponsored their negotiations, away from old definitions of such principles as sovereignty and self-determination, and toward the acceptance of new definitions and innovative means by which to implement them, while also mediating agreements among the warring parties as to how such new definitions might be operationalized on the ground. The difficulties of these tasks, and the unfavorable local and international military and political conditions within which negotiators were compelled to work, doomed their efforts to failure. Current conditions offer no greater hope for a negotiated settlement. But, by identifying some of the reasons why past efforts have failed, I hope to provide both positive and cautionary lessons for the negotiation of a settlement at some time in the future.

Five Proposals for Peace.

There have been five major proposals for overall settlement of the conflict put forward by international actors: the Carrington-Cutiliero plan of March 1992, negotiated under the auspices of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia (CoY); the Vance-Owen Plan negotiated in late 1992 and early 1993, under the auspices of the joint UN-EC International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY); the package negotiated in September 1993 aboard the "HMS Invincible"; the European Union Action Plan of October 1993; and, the Contact Group plan submitted to the warring parties in July 1994. The United States provided the impetus for the conclusion of a separate, tri-partite agreement among the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats, and Croatia to establish a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia Herzegovina, and a confederation between Croatia and the Bosnian federation in March 1994 (the Washington agreement). This contributed to ending most of the fighting between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, and effectively allied them against the Bosnian Serbs. But it, too, failed to move the overall conflict closer to a negotiated solution, and may even have complicated efforts to do so.

The Conference on Yugoslavia and the Cutileiro Plan. The proposed settlement brokered by Ambassador Jose Cutileiro of Portugal on behalf of the European Community in negotiations in Lisbon and Sarajevo in February and March 1992 arose out of the principles articulated in the framework of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia (EC CoY), chaired by Lord Carrington. The EC Conference was itself the continuation of EC efforts to mediate a settlement of the Yugoslav conflicts that began with negotiations to end the fighting in Slovenia in June and July 1991. The EC approach involved direct assistance to the warring parties in the negotiation of a ceasefire (mediation), the provision of monitoring forces to oversee the ceasefire, and the facilitation of follow-on peace talks. An EC mediation team dispatched to Yugoslavia following the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia mediated the difficult negotiations among Yugoslav leaders that resulted in an agreement among all six Yugoslav republics signed on the

island of Brioni on July 7. The Brioni agreement ended the fighting in Slovenia, provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*, or JNA) troops and equipment from the republic, delayed implementation of Slovenia's declaration of independence, and initiated new talks on the future structure of the federation.

The EC approach sought to apply internationally-recognized principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and self-determination, to former Yugoslavia's internal and external borders. This position was articulated to Yugoslav leaders by EC leaders even before the outbreak of fighting.¹ However, conclusion of the Brioni agreement should not be seen as the acceptance of these principles by the Yugoslavs, or at least not by the Serbs. The ability of the EC to broker the Brioni agreement reflected instead the convergence of interests between the leaderships of Slovenia and Serbia on these issues.

Slovenian and Serbian leaders had been attempting on their own to negotiate a settlement between their respective republics for some time. Janez Drnovsek, the first popularly-elected Slovenian representative to the collective Yugoslav presidency, engaged in intensive negotiations with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and representatives of the Yugoslav military. Slovenian President Milan Kucan had held his own direct talks with Milosevic and, in January 1991, he and Milosevic appear to have worked out an agreement permitting the secession of Slovenia within its existing borders in exchange for Slovenian acquiescence to Serb efforts to re-draw other borders. In a joint statement, the two leaders noted that "Serbia acknowledged Slovenia's interests to secure unhampered realization of the right of the Slovenian people and the Republic of Slovenia to its own path and its own commitments concerning the form of ties with other Yugoslav nations" and that "Slovenia, on the other hand, acknowledged the interest of the Serbian nation to live in one state and that the future Yugoslav accord should respect this interest."² In keeping with this understanding, Milosevic declared at Brioni that those who wished to leave Yugoslavia should be permitted to do so, but that those who wished to remain part of a common

state were entitled to do so. The "right to self-determination," he argued, entitled Serbs outside of Serbia to remain part of a common state, and the Yugoslav Army should defend their decision.³

The success of the Brioni agreement in ending the fighting in Slovenia and facilitating the peaceful secession of that republic from Yugoslavia thus reflected an underlying political agreement between the conflicting leaderships. That agreement, in turn, was made possible by the distinctive ethnic and economic relationships between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia. Over 98 percent of all Slovenes lived in Slovenia, where they constituted almost 88 percent of the population. No other single group constituted as much as 3 percent of the population.⁴ Thus, Slovenia's assertion of a Slovene right of self-determination within the borders of the existing republic threatened neither to dis-enfranchise an internal minority nor to destabilize a neighboring republic. Moreover, the economy of the republic was largely independent of the rest of Yugoslavia, and hence easily separable, even if separation would impose certain short-term costs on both Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia.

Relations among the other republics, however, were quite different. None of them could be considered ethnically homogeneous. Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina encompassed large Serb minorities, each of which was already mobilizing to remain part of a common Yugoslav state, and to oppose to the establishment of a Croatian national state and a Muslim-dominated Bosnian state. Moreover, Milosevic's suggestion that the Yugoslav Army should defend the decisions of such minorities to remain part of a common state made it clear that Belgrade would be unwilling to allow the peaceful secession of either Croatia or Bosnia Herzegovina within existing borders. The EC approach to the Slovenian question was not, therefore, likely to succeed if applied to other republics. Nor was simple opposition to the break-up of the country, as articulated by the United States.⁵

With the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia, the United States modified its stance and moved more into line with the EC by accepting the possibility of autonomy or sovereignty for the

republics, but within existing borders. The EC continued to exercise the diplomatic lead with respect to the Yugoslav conflict, but as fighting broke out in Croatia, and Serbia refused to cooperate with EC efforts to treat this conflict in the same manner as it had treated the fighting in Slovenia, it appeared that EC efforts had reached a dead end. The collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991, however, eliminated a major source of international diplomatic support for Serbian efforts to hold the rest of Yugoslavia together. Despite the fact that the EC adopted a Declaration on Yugoslavia that once again characterized Serbian and Yugoslav army actions in Croatia as an attempt to alter borders by force, its call for convocation of a peace conference was accepted by all sides within days.

The EC Conference on Yugoslavia comprised negotiations among representatives of the federal and regional Yugoslav leaderships, and representatives of the EC, based on the principles of "no unilateral change of borders by force, protection for the rights of all in Yugoslavia and full account to be taken of all legitimate concerns and legitimate aspirations."⁶ By applying to internal Yugoslav borders a diplomatic formulation usually applied to international borders, and by inviting participation of regional representatives on an equal basis, the EC was reaffirming the *de facto* recognition of republic borders as the basis of dissolution that it had articulated in advance of the conflict and institutionalized with the Brioni agreement. And, it was defining the right of self-determination in administrative-territorial, rather than ethnic or national terms. Thus, the Western powers recognized the claims of Slovenian and Croatian leaders to their own independent states by virtue of their having acquired the status of federal units under the old regime, but made no provisions to ensure that these states would develop in democratic directions, or observe the fundamental human rights of ethnic minorities. At the same time, contrary to the assertion that "all legitimate concerns and legitimate aspirations" would be taken into account, by recognizing existing federal boundaries as international borders the Western states precluded recognition of the same claims to statehood when advanced by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina seeking to remain part of a common Yugoslav state.

Having thus foregone the opportunity to compel the parties to address the central question of the Yugoslav disintegration by prejudging the answer, it is not surprising that the EC Conference on Yugoslavia failed to secure either an end to the fighting or a political settlement. The road to a peaceful, negotiated dissolution of the country lay through the simultaneous renegotiation of the multiple border and constitutional issues among the republics and ethnic groups of the country which, by making it clear that change was possible and treating all actors equally, might have encouraged inter-group bargaining, compromise and moderation. The EC approach, in contrast, shut off such opportunities and rewarded intransigence on the part of both those whose aspirations had been recognized and those whose aspirations had been denied.

The harshness of the proceedings of the EC CoY, which convened in the Hague in September, made it clear that only Serbia and Montenegro favored continuing the federation. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia favored independence. The predominantly Muslim leadership of Bosnia Herzegovina favored federation only if both Croatia and Serbia were part of it. The Serbian delegation refused even to discuss most EC proposals, as it was unwilling to accept the assumption underlying them that Yugoslavia had ceased to exist. Although by October the EC had recognized that "the right to self-determination of all the peoples of Yugoslavia cannot be exercised in isolation from the interests and rights of ethnic minorities within the individual republics,"⁷ the EC approach did not allow for the redrawing of boundaries as a means of reaching peace. The leadership of the CoY viewed dissolution along republic boundaries as irreversible, and focused its efforts on developing options for defining political and economic relations among the successor states. The republics were expected to pick and choose the relations they wished to establish, with no expectation that each would choose the same relationship with all the others. The EC proposals thus amounted to little more than a common economic market, with each member state defining its own relationships to it, few common institutions, and weak central authority. The aspirations of ethnic minorities within the republics were

addressed by proposing the establishment of "a special status of autonomy," subject to international monitoring, for areas in which ethnic minorities constituted a majority of the population.

The EC proposal failed to resolve the conflict. Croatia was unwilling to accept such arrangements for its Serb populated territories. It was participating in the negotiations as a means to secure European ratification of Croatian independence, and support for regaining the territories under Serb occupation. Serbia was unwilling to accept parallel treatment of the Serbs in Croatia or Bosnia Herzegovina and the Albanians in Kosovo. It was participating in the negotiations as a means of securing European support for preservation of federal arrangements that would keep all ethnic Serbs under the ultimate authority of Belgrade. The EC proposals also alienated the Slovenes, who were unwilling to entertain any suggestion of association among the former republics, as this would have compromised Slovenian independence. The EC remained equally unable either to provide the military force that would be necessary to achieve Croatian objectives, or to oppose the Serbs' use of military force to overcome their political disadvantages. The EC turned instead to sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

The EC also "forcefully remind[ed] the leadership of the Yugoslav Peoples Army and all those exercising control over it of their personal responsibility under international law for their actions, including those in contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian law."⁸ This echoed a statement by the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in late October that had also raised the implicit threat of holding Serbian military and political leaders to account for accusations of war crimes. Neither the EC nor the CSCE, however, developed proposals for facilitating the JNA's peaceful disengagement from the conflict. By November 1991 the EC Conference on Yugoslavia once again reached a stalemate with respect to resolving the overall conflict.

Shortly thereafter, efforts undertaken by the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to negotiate a ceasefire in Croatia achieved success,

and led to an agreement to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission to Croatia. Serbia's willingness to accept a UN peacekeeping role, in contrast to its resistance to EC involvement, can be explained in terms of the constraints inherent in the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops. UN peacekeeping operations are primarily political and diplomatic missions, carried out by military contingents.⁹ They are intended to maintain, or keep, a peace or ceasefire agreed to by warring parties, and to facilitate further negotiation aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict. They do not by themselves represent solutions. Nor do they represent attempts by the United Nations to impose or enforce their own solutions. Where peacekeeping forces are interposed between conflicting parties who cannot agree on anything other than a ceasefire, it is likely that their deployment will at best mark the beginning of protracted negotiations, and effectively "freeze" the *status quo*. For Croatia, however, a UN ceasefire halted further Serbian advances, prevented Serbia from annexing Croatian territory outright, and at least held out the possibility that that territory might be regained. Acceptance of the Vance-mediated UN peace plan thus did not represent a commitment by either Serbia or Croatia to peaceful resolution of their conflict. It reflected the continuing efforts of local leaders to use international negotiations and mediators as instruments by which to further their own, conflicting goals. The lack of any apparent willingness on the part of warring parties to compromise their goals in the interest of negotiating a stable peace would continue to plague international mediators throughout the conflict.

By the time Secretary Vance had negotiated the deployment of peacekeeping troops to Croatia, Yugoslavia was in obvious dissolution. The arbitration commission under French jurist Robert Badinter, established as part of the EC CoY, rendered its decision to this effect in December. In a series of decisions handed down in January, the Badinter Commission provided belated, and weak, legal justification for granting international status to republic borders. It ruled that Macedonia and Slovenia satisfied the criteria for recognition. But it ruled that Croatia had not fully complied with the provisions of the draft treaty convention granting "special

status" to minority territories, and should not be recognized until it had done so. In the case of Bosnia Herzegovina, the Commission noted that the government's efforts to declare an independent unitary state within the existing republic borders were contradicted by the declarations of Serbs in favor of continued membership in a Yugoslav state. It therefore ruled that "the will of the peoples of Bosnia Hercegovina to constitute the S[ocialist] R[epublic of] B[osnia] H[ercegovina] as a sovereign and independent state cannot be held to have been fully established." It suggested "a referendum of all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction" as a possible means by which the popular will might be determined.¹⁰

Diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, extended by the EC member states in December and January, intensified the conflict among Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina, and increased the pressure on Western states to find a peaceful solution to it. The suggestion of a referendum as a means to establish legitimacy in Bosnia Herzegovina was based on a widely-accepted principle of democracy: majority rule. But it failed to take into account the need to accommodate ethnic identity in order to establish political authority and legitimacy in this region. The communist regime had been based on a form of consensual decisionmaking among representatives of the three major ethnic groups. This pattern was continued after the 1990 elections distributed power among the Croatian, Serb, and Muslim parties, when the tri-ethnic coalition government adopted its own principle of consensus. However, agreement among the coalition partners on this principle was already breaking down when the Badinter Commission called for a referendum. By establishing that international—if not internal—legitimacy could be won on the basis of a simple majority, the Commission's decision encouraged the Muslims and the Croats to forge an alliance of expediency through which they could establish an electoral majority to overthrow the old principle once and for all, and negate Serb opposition to separating the republic from Yugoslavia. The willingness of international actors to legitimate actions that flew in the face of established principles of inter-ethnic consensus encouraged each side in the conflict to

pursue its own, maximalist goals in the hope that they would eventually win international legitimacy.

The Muslim and Croat parties, over the objections of the Serbs, secured parliamentary approval for a referendum on independence, to be held February 29/March 1, 1992. This referendum was boycotted by the republic's Serbs. The Muslims and Croats participated, voting overwhelmingly in favor of independence. On the basis of this support, President Izetbegovic declared independence on March 3. Sporadic fighting broke out in the republic during the days that followed. While these events were unfolding, several rounds of talks among representatives of the three main political parties on the future of Bosnia Herzegovina were being conducted within the framework of the CoY, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jose Cutileiro of Portugal.

These talks produced an agreement among the three ethnic parties on a statement of principles for new constitutional arrangements in mid-March. Bosnia was to be divided into three "constitutive units" defined primarily in ethnic terms, but also taking into account economic, geographic, and other criteria. By early April, "other criteria" were defined as historical, religious, cultural and educational, and transport and communications, and the will of the inhabitants. The map produced by these negotiations, but never finally agreed to by the parties, reflected the complex pattern of ethnic settlement in the republic. Each of the three "constitutive units" consisted of noncontiguous regions: two Muslim, four Croat, and seven Serb. Thus, the republic was effectively divided into as many as thirteen regions. With only a few exceptions, borders were defined by the existing administrative borders of the communist-era counties, also called "municipalities."

Although details were never worked out, the general principles agreed to in March provided that the three units were to be represented by an equal number of delegates to the upper house of parliament, where key issues were to require a four-fifths majority for passage, thereby granting an effective veto to two-thirds of the delegates from each of the three major groups. Thus, the EC plan for Bosnia Herzegovina amounted

to the "Yugoslavization" of the republic, and its de facto partition along ethnic lines.¹¹

This approach attempted to preserve as much of the fiction of a unitary Bosnian state as was possible, while allowing for as much devolution of authority to the ethnically-defined units as possible. As Ambassador Cutileiro characterized it,

the constitutional principles recognized a central point for the Muslims, and for the EC: that existing borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be inviolable, but that inside those borders Serbs and Croats would be guaranteed autonomy from Muslims and from each other.¹²

Moreover, each "constitutive unit" was to be "allowed to establish and maintain links with other republics and their organizations providing their relations and links are in accordance with the independence and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats supported the plan, the latter having abandoned the tactical alliance established with the Muslims as a means of separating Bosnia Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, in favor of aligning themselves with the Serbs as a means to secure the de facto union of Croat-populated territories with Croatia. But the plan failed to satisfy the predominantly Muslim forces controlling the government and seeking to assert unified control over the whole of Bosnia Herzegovina. Some evidence suggests that the Muslim leadership was encouraged by the United States to believe that its demands would be met, and to reject the Lisbon agreement.¹³ After eight rounds of talks over a period of three months during which time armed conflict in the republic intensified, the EC effort to mediate a solution was suspended.

The failure of the EC plan for Bosnia Herzegovina reflected the fundamental clash of concepts and goals among the three soon-to-be warring parties. As the United Nations Secretary General put it in an April 24 report to the Security Council:

The current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is characterized by massive mistrust among the communities of the Republic; all the parties tend to blame each other; mutual recriminations abound;

the cycle of violence is escalating. . . . [T]he parties hold conflicting and contradictory views on almost all aspects of the conflict. . . .

In the absence of a political agreement among the internal actors themselves, no plan for peace would be likely to succeed, unless imposed by force.

In light of the failure of negotiated ceasefires to take hold, and the rapidly increasing level of force being used by the Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslav army to seize control over much of the republic, no international actor was prepared in spring of 1992 to intervene in Bosnia Herzegovina. Moreover, Western leaders made no effort to conceal their unwillingness to do so. Lord Carrington, for example, made it clear that "there is only one way of stopping them, and that is by intervening with military force and separating them, and I don't see any way in which anybody is going to do that. I don't see NATO doing it, I don't see the UN doing it, I don't see the Community doing it, I don't see the WEU doing it." The clear absence of any immediate threat to intervene encouraged the continued use of force on the part of the Serbs.

At the same time, however, Western governments came under increasing public pressure to "do something" about the mounting tragedy, and especially the siege of Sarajevo. The first in a series of tragic events that received extensive media coverage and thus grabbed the attention of Western publics and policymakers alike occurred in May 1992, when a Sarajevo breadline appeared to have been shelled. Although the explosion was attributed to Serb mortar fire, responsibility for it was, and remains, hotly debated. Such debate has characterized each in a series of "incidents" that helped to shape Western responses to the conflict. In response to the public outcry over the breadline incident and other pressures, the level of direct Western involvement in the conflict, in the form of a UN humanitarian relief mission to open Sarajevo airport to supply flights, was increased. This was accompanied by mixed signals as to the extent to which the West, including the United States, was willing to use force in support of its humanitarian mission, and thereby alter the course of the war. A statement by European leaders that they did not exclude the use of military means encouraged the Bosnian government in

the belief that it would eventually secure military assistance, if not direct Western intervention, in support of its goals. Hence, the Bosnian government formally rejected the EC plan for Bosnia.

The Western allies attempted to use diplomatic pressure to compel the parties to agree to a peace plan for Bosnia Herzegovina, and to deter outside forces from continuing to support dismemberment of the republic, by announcing on March 10 their intention formally to recognize the republic, which they did in early April. Recognition of Bosnia Herzegovina formally "internationalized" the conflict, allowing the Bosnian government and its supporters to characterize the conflict as a war of aggression by Serbia, the Yugoslav army, and the Bosnian Serbs, against the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina. But this formal elevation of the international status of the Muslim-led government did not alter the fact that the dissolution of the republic, and the inter-ethnic violence that accompanied it, mirrored the larger dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the unresolved domestic and international issues that surrounded it. It contributed instead to the growing intransigence of all three warring parties in their approach to negotiations.

The ICFY and the Vance-Owen Plan. Diplomatic efforts to bring the fighting to an end were stepped-up in July and August, when EC and UN efforts, as well as American diplomatic efforts, were integrated under the umbrella of a single organization, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Western governments were under increasing public pressure to do something decisive as the fighting in Bosnia Herzegovina continued, as the media began to report on widespread and horrific abuses of civilians in Serb-run detention camps, as the expansion of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions appeared to portend expanded—and open-ended—military involvement of Western forces, and as a presidential campaign unfolded in America. Convened in London at the end of August 1992, under the cosponsorship of the UN and the EC, the Conference produced a statement of principles for the negotiation of a settlement that included the cessation of fighting and an end to the use of force,

nonrecognition of gains won by force, recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and the inviolability of recognized borders. Significantly, the principle of national self-determination was not reiterated. Instead, the Conference stressed respect for individual rights as embodied in existing international conventions, implementation of constitutional guarantees of the rights of minorities, and the promotion of tolerance. Thus, the international community appeared to be moving toward the substitution of human rights and civil liberties protections for ethnic-based claims to national self-determination as a means of strengthening support for existing borders, although they retained the potentially problematic concept of "minority rights." The Conference explicitly condemned forced expulsions of civilian populations, and called for the closing of detention camps, safe return of refugees, adherence to the Geneva Conventions, and for questions of state succession to be settled by consensus or arbitration.

No consideration was given to redrawing borders as a means of encouraging a political settlement. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev distinguished between external borders, which he recognized as inviolable, and internal borders between republics. He suggested that a "moratorium" be placed on the latter. Although this may have been intended to signal a willingness to consider the opening of negotiations over borders as a means of bringing the fighting to an end, it was not given further consideration at the London Conference.¹⁴ Yet, de facto partition, and the identification of new, more stable borders to divide the warring parties in Bosnia Herzegovina, remained the focus of international efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting there.

The Conference also adopted a number of "Specific Decisions" to which all parties formally subscribed. These constituted measures designed to create the conditions for a successful ceasefire and conduct of negotiations. They included actions to establish an effective and durable cessation of hostilities in all of former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in particular (the lifting of sieges of cities and towns, the establishment of international supervision of heavy weapons, the withholding of

trans-border military assistance), cooperation in confidence-building measures (a ban on military flights and the deployment of observers to monitor heavy weapons and borders), full collaboration in the effective delivery of humanitarian relief by road throughout Bosnia, the return of refugees to their homes, and the dismantling of detention camps. They also called for the rigorous application of sanctions, for monitoring efforts, and for the enforcement of international humanitarian law.

In three separate documents, the leader of each of the three warring parties entered into the identical agreement with the conference co-chairmen on a program of action on humanitarian issues. Radovan Karadzic, Alija Izetbegovic, and Mate Boban each committed their respective parties (Izetbegovic appended the title president of the presidency of the republic to his signature, reaffirming his government's claim to represent all of Bosnia Herzegovina) to collaborate in efforts to deliver relief throughout Bosnia by road, to secure humane conditions for those in detention and to end unlawful detention of civilians, to provide for the safety of refugees, to comply with International Humanitarian Law including the Geneva Conventions, and to bring undisciplined elements in their respective areas under control. The refusal of the three leaders to sign a single document reflected the continuing and, as the result of the ongoing fighting, deepening mutual hostility among them, and signalled the great difficulties that lay ahead in the international effort to negotiate a settlement. This agreement imposed heavy demands on the Bosnian Serbs, and Karadzic's undertakings at London soon proved to be empty commitments. While Bosnian Serb violations of these agreements were by far the most frequent, most egregious, and most widely-reported, none of the parties was constrained by them. These agreements were not based on a political agreement that reconciled the conflicting goals of the warring parties. Their faithful implementation thus promised to institutionalize a situation that was unacceptable to each them; most of all, to the Bosnian government.

The ICFY attempted, through diplomatic efforts, to find a solution to the multiple conflicts in former Yugoslavia by balancing recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of the Bosnian state defined by former republic borders with respect for individual rights, implementation of constitutional guarantees of the rights of minorities, and the promotion of tolerance. From the beginning, negotiators recognized that the views of the three parties diverged widely. The Muslim-dominated government preferred a unitary, centralized state. The Serbs opted for three independent states defined by ethnic identity. Since negotiators determined that there was no way to create three ethnically homogeneous states without enforced population transfers, they rejected this model. But they also rejected the unitary, centralized state model, opting instead for a decentralized state consisting of 7 to 10 provinces whose borders would be determined on the basis of ethnic, geographical, communications, economic and other relevant factors. Negotiators attempted to address the concerns of ethnic groups by providing for the rotation of key offices among representatives of the groups, and by incorporating extensive provisions for the protection of group or minority rights. As a security and confidence-building measure, negotiators also provided for an indeterminate transitional period during which there would be extensive, direct participation in and oversight of domestic institutions by international actors.¹⁵ The ICFY approach thus attempted to achieve de facto territorial and political separation of the three groups without formally partitioning territory.

The negotiations were carried out bilaterally, between the ICFY and each of the three parties. The Muslim-dominated government delegation continued to oppose the decentralization plans put forward by negotiators, as well as the emphasis negotiators placed on ethnic factors in shaping their proposals. But their negotiating position was weakened by a series of severe military defeats at the hands of the Bosnian Croats, suffered in October, which led Izetbegovic to seek compromise and split the more hardline Muslim members of the government from him.¹⁶ The Bosnian Croat delegation insisted on demilitarization of the state, the establishment of three "constituent units" composed of ethnically-like provinces, and the introduction of consensual decisionmaking in state institutions among the three constituent groups. The Croats also opposed most of the provisions for international oversight

of Bosnian state institutions. The Bosnian Serbs continued to propose the establishment of three distinct, sovereign, ethnically-defined states with international legal status, loosely confederated to form the state of Bosnia Herzegovina, which also would enjoy a more limited international legal status. The Serbs also sought to impose consensual decision rules and to exclude international oversight.¹⁷

Although the parties remained far apart, all seemed to agree that a settlement would include some form of internal division of the republic. Negotiations became focused on defining these internal divisions. The ICFY considered competing government and Serb maps (the Croats submitted no map) and came forward in January 1993, at the first joint meeting of all the delegations, with a map of their own, as well as proposals for the future constitutional and political organization of the post-war state and an agreement for peace that included an ambitious schedule for the cessation of hostilities, separation of forces, demilitarization of Sarajevo, and opening of land routes to the city. The proposals were quickly labeled "the Vance-Owen Plan," after the co-chairs of the ICFY.

Most international attention was drawn to the map proposed by the ICFY. It called for the establishment of 10 provinces whose boundaries were drawn on the basis of ethnic, geographic, economic, and politico-military considerations. The map effectively created three "Serbian provinces," in territories where ethnic Serb majorities had been recorded in the 1991 census. Three were Muslim, and three were Croat. The tenth province, surrounding Sarajevo, was multi-ethnic. No province was to be given over to the exclusive control of one or another group. The plan called for the distribution of leading government offices among all three groups in each of the provinces for an interim period, in rough accordance with their proportion of the population in 1991. In Sarajevo province, each of the groups would enjoy equal representation. Interim governments would then be expected to draft local constitutions and prepare free and fair elections on the basis of proportional representation. While the final shape of the provincial and republic governments could be

determined in important ways by decisions yet to be made about electoral laws and other important details, it was clear that negotiators were seeking to end the conflict through the application of principles of extreme devolution and consensual decisionmaking, or further "Yugoslavization" of the republic. By applying to principles of proportionality to elections and to government offices, negotiators were seeking to establish "power-sharing" arrangements often cited by political scientists as effective means for ameliorating conflict over control of the state.¹⁸

The final arrangements also had to comply with international human and civil rights standards as defined by 17 international conventions and agreements specifically enumerated in the "proposed constitutional structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina" proposed by the ICFY Co-Chairs.¹⁹ The plan called for extensive international involvement in local police and judicial institutions to instill popular confidence in their impartiality, as well as in the reconstruction of infrastructure throughout the country.

The provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan represented an attempt to forge a compromise among contradictory international principles and values, as well as the conflicting interests of the warring parties. They also represented an attempt to create internal borders that might satisfy demands for ethnic autonomy, yet make further attempts at secession more difficult. However, the warring parties were able to agree in Geneva only on the cessation of hostilities provisions and on the general constitutional principles for construction of the post-war state. They could not reach agreement on the number or boundaries of the provinces, the definition of their character, or on the division of authority between them and the central government. The Serb delegation continued to press in Geneva for the simple partition of the republic into three ethnically-defined units that enjoyed international recognition and would enter into a loose confederative relationship with one another.²⁰

When the provisions of the plan became public, it was attacked in the United States for allegedly having given away too much to the Serbs. A former U.S. Assistant Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning in the Bush administration, Zalmay Khalilzad, argued that the plan "amounted to appeasement." *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis warned "beware of Munich."²¹ Although there were serious deficiencies in the Vance-Owen Plan, if parallels to the infamous Munich agreement of 1938 were to be found in the contemporary situation, they were to be found in European acquiescence to German insistence on the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, not in the Vance-Owen Plan.²² It was clear that some of the deficiencies of the plan could be corrected through further negotiation, and some were.²³ But the most important deficiency was the continuing absence of any provision for enforcement of the territorial, institutional, and legal provisions of the plan against those who might not comply with them. This reflected the realization of the negotiators that the international actors capable of providing such support remained unwilling to commit themselves to intervention. Most of all, the negotiators remained hampered by the unwillingness of the United States to support any form of intervention, or even the Vance-Owen negotiation process itself.

During the 1992 Presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton had urged more forceful action directed against the Serbs. The Bush administration, while continuing to reject direct involvement of American troops, was reported in October to have been considering providing the Muslims with additional arms as a means of counterbalancing Serb military superiority. But this could not be done unilaterally without violating the UN arms embargo that the United States had helped to establish. President Clinton ordered a full policy review by his principal foreign policy advisors immediately upon taking office in January 1993. The review was animated by doubt that the ICFY negotiations could, in the words of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "find an agreement, find a solution that's peaceful that the parties would, in fact, agree to."²⁴ A long list of options—some new, but most already well-known and rejected—were considered. These included the lifting of the UN arms embargo to allow the United States and other nations to arm the Bosnian government, enforcement of the UN flight ban over Bosnia, more aggressive delivery of humanitarian aid, establishment of safe havens for refugees within Bosnia,

tightening economic sanctions on Serbia, punitive air strikes against Serbian forces, establishment of a military cordon around Serbia to enforce sanctions, and differing levels of direct military intervention.²⁵ Key administration officials were divided on the issue. The Secretary of Defense is reported to have supported the use of air power against the Serbs, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have argued that this would not be effective. The use of air power was also opposed by the European allies. Administration officials opposed the Vance-Owen plan, because they viewed it as partitioning the republic along ethnic lines, and ratifying what they viewed as Serb gains.²⁶ In the end, the six-point plan announced by Secretary Christopher in mid-February did not substantially change American policy. It remained clear that the Clinton administration was unhappy with the Vance-Owen Plan, was reluctant to become militarily involved on the ground in Bosnia, and could offer no viable alternative of its own.

Resistance to the Vance-Owen plan by the new American administration produced an immediate hardening in the positions taken by the Bosnian government in the ICFY negotiations. Nonetheless, the co-chairs continued to mediate among the warring parties. The proposed map was modified to accommodate some, but by no means all of the concerns of the Bosnian government, thereby alienating the Bosnian Serbs further. By March, the Serbs were arguing to negotiators that Bosnia Hercegovina had never existed as a state, that they did not accept it now, that as long as the international community was going to compel them to remain a part of it they wished to minimize the powers of that state and maximize the powers of the provinces, and that Serbian provincial territories should therefore be contiguous. They opposed reconvening the republic parliament elected in 1990 as this would amount to affirming the legitimacy of that state, a position shared by the Bosnian Croats.²⁷ The Bosnian Serbs thus appeared intent on creating conditions that would enable them to use a negotiated settlement as a stepping stone to secession. By this time, the Serb positions found little sympathy from negotiators.

The Bosnian government, meanwhile, agreed to all elements of the Vance-Owen plan, but entered a series of

formal reservations that amounted to a repudiation of the political logic underlying it, and automatically voided their agreement in the event that either of the other parties rejected the plan.²⁸ The latter, of course, could have been considered a certainty, in light of the consistent Serb refusal to agree to the map or to the plans for interim governance put forward by negotiators. Indeed, despite Karadzic's signature of these documents at a hastily-arranged meeting in Athens in early May, and a declaration of support for them from Milosevic, the Vance-Owen Plan was rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament.

Ironically, by rejecting the proposed settlement the Serbs could prevent Western intervention. Secretary Christopher had declared in February that:

the United States is prepared to do its share to help implement and enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. If there is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the United States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, NATO, and others in implementing and enforcing it, including possible U.S. military participation.²⁹

In the absence of such an agreement, it was clear that the United States would not become involved, thereby precluding an expansion of the scope and goals of Western involvement. Indeed, despite reports that the United States was urging NATO to prepare for a large-scale intervention,³⁰ no specific actions were taken as the Bosnian Serbs mounted a new military offensive in March and April and overran besieged Muslim towns in eastern Bosnia.

The Clinton administration went on to propose lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and using air power to protect the Bosnians while they received the weapons and training necessary for them to defend themselves. This was opposed by the British and French, who were concerned on the one hand about the vulnerability of their peacekeeping troops to retaliatory attack, and on the other about the impact on the war. If such actions failed to deter the Serbs, or encouraged the Muslim-led government to launch new offensives, they would prolong the war, contribute to its

escalation, and increase the likelihood of spillover to neighboring countries. As a result, outside powers, including NATO member states, might be drawn into the fighting. The European Community appeared willing to accept the status quo rather than become more deeply involved militarily or risk such escalation and spillover. In the face of British and French opposition, the Clinton administration abandoned its attempt to win allied support for arming the Bosnian government. Instead, it shifted toward a strategy of containment,³¹ signaling its willingness, following a meeting of the U.S., Russian, British, French, and Spanish Foreign Ministers in Washington, to accept the territorial gains achieved by the Serbs, rather than impose a reduction in those territories, as called for by the Vance-Owen Plan.³² It also appears to have decided, in the words used by Secretary Christopher during a nationally televised interview and repeated in a confidential letter to U.S. Ambassadors, that the conflict in Bosnia "does not involve our vital interests."³³

The August Confederation "Agreement." The failure of U.S. efforts to win support for arming the Bosnian government, the apparent withdrawal of U.S. interest, and the signal that the Bosnian Serbs would not be compelled to give up territory they then controlled, were followed by an initiative by Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman to move negotiations toward the de facto confederalization of Bosnia Herzegovina on principles similar to those drafted as part of the Lisbon agreement. On the basis of this initiative, ICFY negotiators reported, "the leadership for the three sides negotiated for the first time intensively, cordially and in a constructive manner,"³⁴ and "intense and detailed bilateral and trilateral talks" made "a great deal of progress"³⁵ on developing an agreement on de facto partition of Bosnia Herzegovina into three units, including movement toward an agreed map. On August 20, 1993, the co-chairs of the ICFY reported that the three sides had reached agreement on a complete set of documents, including a map defining the borders of the three "constituent republics."³⁶

As was the case with the Lisbon Agreement negotiated in February-March 1992, however, the agreement negotiated in July-August 1993 fell apart as the result of the refusal of the

Bosnian Muslims to accept partition. In the course of negotiating the agreement, splits had developed within the Bosnian government, dividing Croats and Muslims willing to negotiate a partition from more hardline Muslim members of the leadership, including President Izetbegovic, Vice-President Ganic, and the Bosnian Army leadership, who were unwilling to accept such an outcome.³⁷ Izetbegovic presented the plan to an assembly of the remaining (mostly Muslim) members of the Bosnian parliament and several hundred Bosnian public figures, but opposed its adoption. Members of parliament voted 65-0 against accepting it.³⁸ Resistance to the settlement was undoubtedly also strengthened by continuing American efforts to secure NATO agreement to carry out extensive air strikes against Serb positions around Sarajevo, driven by extensive Western media coverage devoted to the siege of Sarajevo.³⁹

Izetbegovic returned to Geneva on August 31 with a set of demands for additional territories, east of Bihac, in eastern Bosnia, and southward to the Adriatic, to be included in the proposed Muslim-majority constituent republic. These demands appear to have been couched in terms of specific towns that the government insisted were predominantly Muslim before the war, or that were economically or geographically essential to the viability of the proposed Muslim-majority republic.⁴⁰ The former argument is only partially supported by census data, which show the populations of most of the towns specifically cited by the government closely split between groups, and some populated by a majority of Serbs or surrounded by largely Serb territory. The latter argument was more consistent with what appeared to be the "logic" of the partition: recognition of the existing frontlines, with additional territories assigned to the Muslim republic. But the borders of the proposed republics corresponded only imperfectly to what might have been expected to emerge from a division of the republic along "natural," or economically "logical" lines, as they seem to have been shaped primarily by the lines of confrontation.⁴¹ Muslim demands proved unacceptable to both the Serbs and the Croats. An ICFY proposal that the parties commit themselves to later negotiations over the possible exchange of territories between

the Serb-majority and Muslim-majority constituent republics, and between the Serb and Croat republics, in order to address these demands was rejected by Izetbegovic, who also rejected the settlement package as a whole.⁴² Shortly thereafter, President Izetbegovic appeared before the Security Council to call for NATO air strikes, and the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia Herzegovina, and travelled to Washington to lobby Congress for more direct American military involvement in defense of his government.⁴³

These developments suggested a number of important factors that affected the negotiation of a settlement to the Bosnian conflict. The unwillingness of Western states either to become directly involved in ground combat or to contribute to its escalation by ending the arms embargo was not matched by efforts to discourage Bosnian Muslim expectations of such developments. Indeed, repeated American efforts to secure Allied support for military efforts to defend the government and to attack the Serbs worked at cross purposes to European-UN efforts to convince the parties to negotiate a settlement. When the United States signalled, at least temporarily, its abandonment of efforts to arm the Bosnian government and its willingness to accommodate Serb territorial demands, ICFY negotiations began to make progress.

The prospect that agreement on a partition plan might be within reach also contributed to the effectiveness of negotiators' pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and their Serbian supporters to come forward with a proposed map that addressed Muslim concerns. While Bosnian Serb demands for de facto partition had to be accommodated, it quickly emerged that accommodation of the political dimension of these demands could be used to extract territorial quid pro quos that addressed some of the concerns of the Bosnian government. An approach that simultaneously disavows the Muslims of their conviction that they can pursue a military victory and compels the Serbs to relinquish key territories thus seems essential to any effort to reach a negotiated solution.

The threat of force may have been an important factor contributing to Serb willingness to relinquish territories and to enter into the agreement concluded August 20. Karadzic's

initial acceptance of the Vance-Owen Plan in Athens in early May came against the background of a Clinton administration campaign that included open congressional testimony by military planners,⁴⁴ consultations with congressional leaders,⁴⁵ and leaks to the press asserting that the President had "decided in principle today to commit American airpower to help end the fighting in the Balkans."⁴⁶ These were clearly intended to add credibility to the threat that American air power might be used against the Serbs. Following the American signal in May that Serb territorial gains would be substantially accepted, the Clinton administration mounted another public campaign, this time to increase the threat of NATO air strikes against Serb targets in the event that the Bosnian Serbs continued to interfere with UN operations and to "strangle" Sarajevo. This threat was reflected in a formal NATO statement in early August, and amplified by administration officials.⁴⁷ The NATO debate revealed, however, continuing divisions among the allies over the escalation of their involvement, and the procedures adopted for authorizing air strikes promised to limit their impact. UN officers in Sarajevo reported that the Bosnian Serbs concluded from these developments that the threat of air strikes had receded.⁴⁸ But, their impact on Serb negotiating behavior cannot be entirely discounted.

At the same time, however, the record of negotiations under the auspices of the ICFY make it clear that the Muslim-led government could not be encouraged to seek all its territorial goals simultaneously if a negotiated settlement was to be achieved. It could not simultaneously demand that the Serbs relinquish territories in the West (east of Bihac), North (to create access to the Sava), East (in the Drina region), and in the South (to create access to the Adriatic). For the government to do so, and especially for any international actor to encourage them to do so, would constitute a transparent attempt to prevent an agreement. Yet, any settlement would have to address the legitimate demand to protect the rights of refugees driven from their homes. Thus, a negotiated settlement would seem to require both the imposition of limits on Muslim demands for territory, and extensive implementation and enforcement guarantees with respect to the rights of all individuals, but especially those whose homes wind up on the

“wrong” side of ethnic boundaries. Settlement would seem to require, in short, an intrusive, extensive, and prolonged international involvement in the internal administration of the successor regime(s) in order to reestablish social peace.

The “HMS Invincible” Package. International efforts to mediate an agreement continued in the form of bilateral talks among some of the parties, as well as between the co-chairs and each of the parties. Direct multilateral negotiations were resumed in September aboard the HMS Invincible in the Adriatic Sea. The “Invincible” negotiations produced an amended version of the August agreement, providing the Muslim-majority republic of the future Union of Republics of Bosnia Herzegovina with access to the Adriatic Sea.⁴⁹ This required the Croats to grant the Muslim-majority republic guaranteed use of, as well as uninspected access to and transport from, a port to be constructed under a 99-year lease arrangement at the Croatian town of Ploce, located at the mouth of the Neretva river. It also required the Serbs to cede territory on the Neretva river to the Muslim-majority republic, previously slated for inclusion in the Serb-majority republic, for construction of a new, permanent port facility. These concessions, while significant, were far outweighed by the political gains to be achieved by the Croats and the Serbs as the result of the de facto partition still called for by the package. Like the immediately preceding agreement, however, this was rejected by an assembly of Bosnian public figures and by the remaining members of the 1990 parliament. Each group formally voted to accept the package, but made their acceptance conditional on the fulfillment of additional territorial demands.

Refusal to accept this version of the ICFY plan could be attributed to its failure to accede to government demands for the inclusion in the Muslim constituent republic of the cities and towns alleged by the government to have been predominantly Muslim in 1991, to the reluctance of participants in the assembly and members of parliament to give up on the idea of a multicultural Bosnia, to what one government minister called their unwillingness “to sign their own death sentence,” and to the hope that “the tide in the war was beginning to shift.”⁵⁰ But

it could also be attributed to continuing American support for Muslim demands. U.S. envoy to the ICFY, Charles Redman, for example, was reported to have attended the Bosnian parliamentary session that considered the package, and to have expressed approval of the vote as "democracy in action."⁵¹

Additional negotiations took place over the next three months concerning possible exchanges of coastal territories among the three parties.⁵² Additional Croatian, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb concessions tabled in Geneva in January 1994 partially addressed the Bosnian government's demand for access to the sea, and for additional territory, but failed to satisfy President Izetbegovic. He again demanded that territories in eastern and western Bosnia, where he insisted Muslims had been in the majority before the outbreak of fighting, as well as territory in central Bosnia, be included in the Muslim-majority republic. Earlier Serb proposals also were accompanied by some key demands of their own. The map they proposed,⁵³ for example, broadened the strategic northern "corridor" assigned to the Serb-majority republic, an element certain to be rejected by the Muslims. Although both the Serbs and Croats accepted an ICFY proposal to submit further territorial disputes to an arbitration commission that would make recommendations to the Security Council following implementation of the agreement and withdrawal of forces to provisional boundaries, this was rejected by the Muslims. Izetbegovic argued that this provision left the fate of too many important areas unresolved, and that the Muslims were unwilling to allow Serb or Croat forces to remain in disputed territories. However, it was also clear that the Muslim-led government was pursuing a delaying strategy with respect to negotiation of a settlement.

The Bosnian government strategy appeared to consist of more than the "neither war nor peace" (*necemo rat, necemo mir*) articulated by President Izetbegovic in October.⁵⁴ On the one hand, despite the embargo, the Bosnian Muslims continued to secure significant quantities of arms in preparation for offensive operations of their own.⁵⁵ On the other hand, they also continued to push for direct Western military

intervention on their behalf. The hope of such intervention was sustained by the continuing bickering among the NATO allies, and between NATO and the UN, over the use of air power against the Serbs.⁵⁶ It was undoubtedly strengthened by the dramatic response to the February 1994 shelling of a central Sarajevo marketplace.

The origin of the mortar shell that wreaked bloody havoc upon the marketplace in central Sarajevo on February 5 is still in dispute.⁵⁷ There can be no dispute as to the fact that the extensive and distorted media coverage devoted to this event pressured Western, and particularly American policymakers into increasing the level of their involvement in the conflict.⁵⁸ Despite carefully-hedged statements by the President that avoided assigning blame for the conflict to any single side, and clear indications of continuing indecision among the President's advisors as to precisely what political goals to pursue, the United States pressed for the use of NATO air power, or at least the threat of NATO air power, to compel the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. The establishment of a NATO-defined heavy-weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo injected NATO, and the United States, directly into the conflict. The progressive expansion of NATO commitments to enforce so-called safe areas and exclusion zones eventually resulted in the reluctant, and limited use of NATO air power against the Serbs, reinforcing the de facto political alignment between the West and the Bosnian government.

From ICFY to Great Power "Concert." The limited engagement of NATO military power represented by these developments eroded the ability of the West to assume the role of neutral peacemaker, peacekeeper or, eventual peace enforcer in the Bosnian conflict. While NATO states contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia, might have wanted to retain at least some semblance of balance in their approach to a settlement, American diplomacy undertook open advocacy for the Muslim-led Bosnian government. Despite claims by U.S. and European officials that NATO pressure against the Serbs would be paralleled by U.S. pressure on the

Bosnian government to accept the ICFY-negotiated plan, Deputy U.S. Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff was reported to have told European allies that the United States would not pressure the Bosnian Muslims to sign an agreement that they were unwilling to accept.⁵⁹ The U.S. Special Envoy, Charles Redman, declared at a Bosnian government press conference in Sarajevo within days of the NATO decision that the United States intended "to reinvigorate the negotiations and produce the kinds of results the Bosnians have been looking for."⁶⁰ Against the backdrop of NATO preparations for an expanded role in the conflict, such statements removed any incentive for compromise on the part of the Bosnian government.

The February 1994 marketplace bombing occurred as the Bosnian Serbs were assuring UN representatives that they were prepared to go ahead with demilitarization of the Sarajevo district and its subordination to UN administration, as called for in the latest version of the ICFY-negotiated plan. The Bosnian government declined to agree and, in light of the improved prospects for Western support, hardened its positions, refusing to compromise further.⁶¹ The Serb side countered the American and NATO tilt toward the Muslims by agreeing to the deployment of Russian troops as part of the UN peacekeeping operation around Sarajevo, thus further "internationalizing" negotiations over a final settlement. By the end of the month, American, Russian, and European diplomats were meeting directly to map out the pursuit of a settlement, effectively circumventing the ICFY and ending its role as the focus of efforts to mediate a settlement.⁶²

The formation of a "Contact Group" consisting of representatives of Russia, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the latter three formally designated by ICFY) transformed the international effort to achieve a settlement. It would no longer consist of direct, multilateral negotiations among the parties themselves, and bilateral negotiations between mediators and the parties. Instead, it would consist of negotiations among representatives of the great powers to find a plan that all would be willing to impose on the parties.

The Group produced a map in July 1994⁶³ and presented it to all three parties along with a "peaceful ultimatum" to accept it. The map expanded the territories assigned to the Muslims and Croats (now formally in federation) over those allocated to them under the August agreement. The additional territories appeared to be a direct response to the Muslim demands articulated in August and September, which were rejected by the Croats and Serbs and thus scuttled hopes of an ICFY-mediated agreement. Although the Muslim-led government remained dissatisfied with the territorial division, Izetbegovic made it clear that the government would accept it so as to throw the onus of rejection onto the Serbs. "If we evaluate that the Serbs will say no," he stated, "then we will say yes. So I emphasize that we will be saying yes, since the Serbs will be rejecting it."⁶⁴ Predictably, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan, and no credible threat of the use of force to compel acceptance of the plan by the Serbs was forthcoming, due to the continuing opposition of the Europeans and Russians to the use of force.⁶⁵ The result was a continuing stalemate between the American-led Contact Group and the Bosnian Serbs.

The Contact Group ultimatum was paralleled by U.S. efforts to facilitate establishment of a Muslim-Croat military and political alliance designed to isolate the Bosnian Serbs and pressure them into an agreement. Such an alliance was first negotiated by Tudjman and Izetbegovic in July 1992, but failed to prevent repeated outbreaks of fighting between Croat and Muslim forces, or the emergence of joint Croatian-Serbian proposals for de facto partition of the republic. The renewal of intense Croat-Muslim fighting in central Bosnia in April 1993 divided the Bosnian Presidency between Muslim hardliners and others,⁶⁶ and complicated efforts to mediate a tripartite agreement on the Vance-Owen Plan.⁶⁷ From the very outset of the conflict, the strategic goals of the Bosnian Croats, to partition the republic and achieve union with Croatia, were closer to those of the Serbs than the Muslims. But, under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States, the Croats agreed to a U.S.-brokered plan calling for formation of a joint Muslim-Croat federation out of Bosnian territories held by Muslim and Croat forces. This revived an earlier ICFY

attempt to secure implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan by the Muslims and Croats as a means of isolating the Serbs. Under the American plan, the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation would then enter into a confederative relationship with Croatia, further isolating the Bosnian Serbs.

The Washington Agreement left the most difficult territorial and political issues unresolved. It repackaged proposals put forth in the ICFY context, applying them to those areas of the republic in which the Bosnian Muslims (called "Bosniacs" in the documents) and Bosnian Croats constituted the majority of the population. It established a Yugoslav-like set of federal institutions, applied unspecified principles of proportionality to elections for representative office, established "consensual" principles of decisionmaking on unspecified critical issues, and allocated the federation access to the sea by adopting arrangements similar to those developed as part of the "Invincible" package. Most important, it made no effort to provide for the eventual inclusion of Serb-majority territories. Indeed, the whole initiative seemed to reflect an American decision to ignore Serb interests.⁶⁸ Following the signing of the Washington Agreement, the American National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, chose to ignore the diplomatic record by characterizing the positions of Serbia and Bosnian Serbs as intransigent.⁶⁹

The main consequence of the Washington Agreement was to end, for the most part, Muslim-Croat fighting, and establish a common Muslim-Croat military effort against the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia became an open conduit for the Bosnian government's circumvention of the arms embargo, and Bosnian military commanders appeared to be encouraged further in the belief that they would eventually defeat the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian government came forward with a series of demands for an increasing share of territory. Tensions persisted, however, in the political relationship between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, and between Croatia and the Muslim-led Bosnian government. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that the Croatian-Muslim federation will not disintegrate in the face of the next credible opportunity to partition Bosnia, just as every previous Croatian-Muslim

alliance has disintegrated. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, in an interview conducted at the time of the ceremonial signing of the agreement in Washington, made it clear that he conceived of the plan as the first step toward partition, to be followed by a "logical" agreement to permit confederation between Bosnian Serb territories and Serbia.⁷⁰

The Agreement was based on fundamentally flawed premises: that the conflict can be ended by meeting Croatian and Muslim demands, without consideration of Serb interests; that the Bosnian Serbs can be subjected to unequal treatment; that the Bosnian conflict can be settled in isolation from the conflicts in Krajina and Kosovo; and, most important of all, that international actors can impose solutions in the absence of a credible threat of force. This last flaw was shared by both the Contact Group plan and the Washington Agreement.

Lessons of the Search for Peace.

Beginning with the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, and continuing with the ICFY, international negotiations and the plans they produced were treated by the warring parties as instruments for advancing their respective military and political agendas rather than as means by which to end the war. Accession to the initial Vance-Owen Plan by the Bosnian government, for example, was explicitly seen as a way to gain political advantage in light of the calculation that the Bosnian Serbs would reject it.⁷¹ Indeed, as early as January 1993 it was reported that government participation in such negotiations was motivated primarily by the desire to "avoid alienating the West," and that Muslim hardliners hoped to continue the fighting until the West was compelled to intervene.⁷² At each moment when a negotiated settlement appeared possible, the government side came forward with additional territorial demands or used some particularly egregious example of alleged Serb misconduct to shift international attention from negotiation to the use of force as a means of settling the conflict.

The ICFY process constituted an attempt to bring warring parties largely disinterested in compromise to a negotiated

agreement. It was an attempt to facilitate the discovery of an equilibrium point among their competing interests and goals. The record of that effort demonstrates that these warring parties could, in fact, be brought at least to the brink of compromise, as long as each believed that it could not expect to gain support from outside forces for its maximalist objectives. If the ICFY was less than even-handed, it was in its treatment of the Bosnian Serbs, upon whom negotiators exercised understandable pressure in the interest of achieving agreement. Contrary to public excoriation of the process and of the co-chairs personally, it is clear that the ICFY made considerable progress against great odds up until February 1994. After that date, the increased possibility that NATO military force might be used against the Serbs, and the unmistakable U.S. diplomatic intervention in support of Muslim objectives, ended Bosnian government interest in negotiations. The formation of the Contact Group ended the negotiation process and, against a background of limited NATO engagement and continuing violations of the arms embargo, pushed the Bosnian conflict toward an eventual, but distant, resolution on the battlefield.

In late October, the Bosnian Army launched a major offensive out of the Bihac pocket, scoring substantial territorial gains against the Bosnian Serbs. These were subsequently reversed by a combined Croatian Serb, Bosnian Serb, and antigovernment Muslim counteroffensive. Even the limited use of NATO air power failed to protect the gains made by government forces. The events in Bihac made it clear that neither side enjoyed a decisive advantage over the other, and that a very long and bitter struggle lay ahead. Confronted by this reality, and by the onset of another winter, the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb leaderships agreed in late December to a ceasefire facilitated through the mediation of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the United Nations. That ceasefire brought most of the fighting in the republic to a temporary halt.

Conclusion.

None of the conditions that might be conducive to the negotiation of a political settlement in Bosnia Herzegovina are now present. Despite the partial implementation of the Carter/UN ceasefire agreement, it does not appear likely that this war will be ended through diplomatic means. Fighting resumed in March 1995, six weeks before the scheduled expiration of the ceasefire, with an offensive by Bosnian government troops. It is likely to intensify over the coming months, and to end only when one party emerges victorious over the other(s), or when the warring parties reach a genuine stalemate. Stalemate may provide a context within which renewed diplomatic efforts to end the conflict may have an effect. But stalemate requires the Bosnian government to become convinced that it cannot achieve the military victory, or gain the political control over all territories of the former Yugoslav republic that it desires, and to accept at least de facto partition of the republic. There is at present little prospect of such a dramatic change in the government's position. On the contrary, the progressive erosion of the international arms embargo, and the prospect that embargo may soon be lifted, has increased the Bosnian government's commitment to military victory.

The prospect that negotiations had reached a dead end in late 1994 increased political pressure in the United States to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. But France, Britain, and Russia remained opposed to such action, making it unlikely that any effort to lift the embargo would pass the Security Council. The United States, for its part, would not be likely to act unilaterally; at least, not openly. In February 1995, UN military observers reported flights of aircraft that suggested a major, covert operation to supply arms to the Bosnian army at Tuzla airport was underway.⁷³ And, in April, the American media revealed that Iran had for months, if not more than a year, been delivering "hundreds of tons" of weapons and ammunition to the Bosnian army via Croatia, "with the Clinton administration's tacit acceptance."⁷⁴ As early as November 1994, the United States was prompted to send Deputy Secretary of State Tarnoff to Paris to deny reports that

it was secretly arming the Bosnians.⁷⁵ The more recent revelations lent new credence to such reports.

Military success on the part of the Bosnian government, of course, will permit the victors to impose their own solution on the conflict, leaving little role to international actors. But such success may engender the escalation, and widening, of the fighting in former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, as past episodes of perceived crises have demonstrated, merely the prospect of military success on the part of the Bosnian Serbs will increase media-led pressure on governments, and especially the American government, to become more directly involved and will push policy debates in Western capitals from the diplomatic to the military arena. With the United States entering another presidential campaign, however, neither a President seeking reelection nor an opposition candidate will likely be willing openly to commit American power to a conflict in which the American interests that are at stake are difficult for the electorate to discern. Given the military balance on the ground as the fighting resumes, the most likely prospect is for a prolonged period of fighting at varying levels of intensity, and little opportunity to negotiate a settlement of the conflict.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 24, No. 5, 1991, p. 63.
2. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report-Eastern Europe*, January 25, 1991, p. 70.
3. See Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping*, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984; Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1990; Indarjit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek, Eds., *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects, The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience*, London: Macmillan, 1991; and Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993, pp. 451-464; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report-Eastern Europe*, July 8, 1991, pp. 56-57.
4. Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, *Opinion No 4 on International Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and Its Member States*, January

11, 1992, as translated by the services of the Commission of the European Communities.

5. Text of the agreement can be found in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report-Eastern Europe*, March 19, 1992, pp. 21-22. Later information was secured from EC Conference on Yugoslavia, Background Documents Pack (mimeo).

6. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 24, Nos. 7/8, 1991, pp. 115-116.

7. *International Herald Tribune* August 16, 1992.

8. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Vol. 24, No. 10, 1991, p. 86.

9. For an account by the then-U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia of his advice to the Bosnians, see *The New York Times*, August 29, 1993, p. 10.

10. International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *The London Conference, 26-27 August 1992*, Verbatim record (mimeo).

11. United Nations Security Council document, S/24795, November 11, 1992.

12. *The New York Times*, October 30, 1992, p. 1.

13. United Nations Security Council document, S/23836, April 24, 1992, p. 5.

14. E.g., Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach" in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 491-509.

15. Published as Annex VII of S/24795.

16. United Nations Security Council document, S/25015, December 24, 1992, pp. 6-8.

17. See the Op-Ed essay by Khalilzad in *The New York Times*, January 7, 1993, p. A23, and the essay by Anthony Lewis, *Ibid.*, January 8, 1993, p. A25.

18. On the international politics of recognition, see John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round: Dodging the Problem," *New Yorker*, August 24, 1992.

19. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *A Workshop on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Co-Chairs' Report*, Washington, DC: International

Research and Exchanges Board and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 1993.

20. *The New York Times*, January 22, 1993, p. A1.

21. *The New York Times*, January 28, 1993, p. A7.

22. *The New York Times*, April 4, 1993, p. 1.

23. United Nations Security Council document, S/25479, March 26, 1993, pp. 4-5.

24. United Nations Security Council document, S/25479, March 26, 1993, Annex V, pp. 42-43.

25. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, *Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher*, February 10, 1993, p. 4.

26. *The New York Times*, March 11, 1993, p. A1.

27. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Christopher reported that "containing the conflict in the Bosnian area is one of the prime goals of President Clinton." *The New York Times*, May 19, 1993, p. A10.

28. *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1993, p. A1.

29. *The New York Times*, June 4, 1993, p. A12, and June 16, 1993, p. A13.

30. United Nations Security Council document, S/26233, August 3, 1993, p. 7.

31. United Nations Security Council document, S/26260, August 6, 1993, p. 8.

32. United Nations Security Council documents, S/26337, August 20, 1993; S/26337/Add.1, August 23, 1993; and S/26337/Add.2, August 23, 1993.

33. For reports of these splits, see *The New York Times*, June 23, 1993, p. A1; June 25, 1993, p. A3; June 30, 1993, p. A6; and August 1, 1993, p. 14.

34. *The New York Times*, August 28, 1993, p. 4; and, August 29, 1993, p. 10.

35. On U.S. efforts, see *The New York Times*, August 1, 1993, p. 15; August 3, 1993, p. A1; August 4, 1993, p. A1 and, August 6, 1993, p. A8. On distortions in media coverage and their effect on policymakers, see Nik Gowing, "Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?" *Working Paper Series*, No. 94-1, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 1994, pp. 59-66.

36. For the articulation of these positions, see comments by Haris Silajdzic, reported in *The New York Times*, August 25, 1993, p. A6.

37. For an example of an attempt to define logical borders, see Stjepko Golubic, Susan Campbell, and Thomas Golubic, "How Not to Divide the Indivisible," in *Why Bosnia?*, Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Stony Creek, CT: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993, pp. 209-232.

38. United Nations Security Council document, S/26395, September 1, 1993, pp. 2-5.

39. *The New York Times*, September 8, 1993, p. A3, and September 10, 1993, p. A3.

40. *The New York Times*, April 29, 1993, p. A1; and *The Washington Post*, April 29, 1993, p. A35.

41. *The New York Times*, April 29, 1993, p. A1, and May 1, 1993, p. 5.

42. *The New York Times*, May 2, 1993, p. 1.

43. Compare the NATO statement reported in *The New York Times*, August 4, 1993, p. A8, and the briefing by an unnamed administration official in *Ibid.*, August 6, 1993, p. A8.

44. *The New York Times*, August 11, 1993, p. A3.

45. United Nations Security Council document, S/26486, September 23, 1993.

46. *The New York Times*, October 3, 1993, p. 10; see also reports in *Ibid.*, September 22, 1993, p. A12; September 29, 1993, p. A3; and September 30, 1993, p. A1.

47. *The New York Times*, September 30, 1993, p. A1.

48. United Nations Security Council document, S/26922, December 29, 1993.

49. United Nations Security Council document, S/1994/64, January 21, 1994, Appendix I.

50. *The New York Times*, October 11, 1993, p. A1.

51. *Boston Globe*, December 5, 1993, p. 1.

52. *The New York Times*, January 22, 1994, p. 4; January 24, 1994, p. A5; and January 28, 1994, p. A6.

53. David Binder, "Anatomy of a Massacre," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 97, Winter 1994-95, p. 70-78.

54. Gowing, "Real-Time Television Coverage," pp. 69-76; and *The New York Times*, February 6, 1994, p. 13; February 7, 1994, p. A1; February 8, 1994, p. A1; and, especially, the retrospective account of U.S. decisionmaking in *Ibid.*, February 14, 1994, p. A6.

55. *The New York Times*, February 11, 1994, p. A1.

56. *The New York Times*, February 12, 1994, p. 5.

57. United Nations Security Council documents, S/1994/173, February 14, 1994; and S/1994/811, July 8, 1994. See also *The New York Times*, February 11, 1994, p. A6.

58. On the meeting of diplomats, see *The New York Times*, February 23, 1994, p. A8. On the reduced role of the ICFY, see United Nations Security Council document, S/1994/811, July 8, 1994, pp. 13-16.

59. United Nations Security Council document, S/1994/1081, September 21, 1994.

60. *The New York Times*, July 7, 1994, p. A1.

61. *Izvestia*, August 3, 1994, as translated in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 46, No. 31, August 31, 1994, p. 21.

62. *The New York Times*, June 23, 1993, p. A1; June 25, 1993, p. A3; and June 30, 1993, p. A6.

63. The Presidency is reported not to have met for 14 months preceding June 1993, when it convened at the request of Vance and Owen. That request may have represented an attempt to exert pressure on the hardliners by mobilizing the support of Muslim and Croat members of the Presidency inclined to accommodation at least with the Croats, but excluded from government decisionmaking until then. For the role of Vance and Owen in convening the Presidency, see United Nations Security Council document, S/26066, July 8, 1993.

64. For a detailed examination of the American view, see *The New York Times*, March 13, 1994, p. 10.

65. *The New York Times*, April 8, 1994, p. A1.

66. *Balkan News & East European Report*, March 27, 1994, p. 14.

67. The BBC reported on January 5, 1993, for example, that Izetbegovic challenged Karadzic by agreeing to the political agreement and demanding that the Serbs say yes to the principle that provinces could not secede, thereby throwing the onus for any failure to reach agreement onto the Serbs.

68. *The New York Times*, January 23, 1993, p. 5. See also *Ibid.*, February 3, 1993, p. A8.

69. *The New York Times*, March 1, 1995, p. A5.

70. *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1995, p. A1. See also *The New York Times*, April 15, 1995, p. 3.

71. *The New York Times*, November 26, 1994, p. 7.

72. *The New York Times*, January 23, 1993, p. 5; February 3, 1993, p. A8.

73. *The New York Times*, March 1, 1995, p. A5.

74. *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1995, p. 1; *The New York Times*, April 15, 1995, p. 3.

75. *The New York Times*, November 26, 1994, p. 7.

CHAPTER 5

NO BALM IN GILEAD: THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE WAR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE

Adolf Carlson

... from the least to the greatest everyone is greedy for unjust gain;
from prophet to priest every one deals falsely. They have healed
the wound of the people lightly saying "peace peace," when there
is no peace. Is there no balm in Gilead? Is there no physician there?
Why then has there been no healing?

Jeremiah 8:10-11, 22

Introduction: The Lack of Military Focus.

One of the largely unexamined circumstances surrounding the war in former Yugoslavia is the fact that hostilities began while the West's military staffs were suffering a lapse of direction. The fall of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Soviet Union removed the threat which had driven military planning for 40 years. With the danger of general war removed, European states entertained the notion that they had outgrown the need for the United States to provide for their security. The American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seemed inconsistent with the self-reliant spirit of European integration. Consequently, the European Community sought to delegate security responsibilities to institutions more in line with its enhanced political authority.

In February 1991, the foreign and defense ministers of the Western European Union proposed a security concept organized around three complementary levels:

- A European level currently based on the Western European Union and the Twelve of the European Community;
- An Atlantic level based on the Atlantic Alliance, the only organization binding North America to the defense of Europe;
- A pan-European level based on the CSCE bringing together all European countries as well as the United States and Canada.¹

The military's role in this concept was characterized as "crisis management,"² which postulated that a modest application of military force could act as oil on troubled water to "de-fuse" a crisis to the point where diplomatic and economic incentives could resolve it. Since there was no agreement as to what crises should be classified as European, Atlantic, or pan-European level security concerns, however, military staffs were reluctant to assume the operational planning responsibilities required to plan detailed military responses. As a result, the notion of crisis management was never refined into an operationally useful doctrine.

Unable to plan for contingencies, military staffs became exclusively introspective, concentrating on the more pressing institutional challenges of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and national budget cuts. Analysis of force-on-force capabilities went out of fashion, regarded as a vestige of Cold War mentality. In the near term, at least, no one saw the need to plan for the imminent outbreak of conflict.

The Road to War.

There were perceptive commentators who recognized the possibility of conflict in post-Cold War Europe. For instance, Lawrence Freedman, of London's King's College, warned that:

State formation at the moment tends to be based on a keen sense of nationhood, but this can never be complete. People of some nations will be at the same time minority members of one state while

being a majority in another. This is, probably correctly, seen as one of the most likely sources of conflict in post-communist Europe . . .³

Freedman aptly described the conditions that would lead to war in Yugoslavia, but, at the beginning of the 1990s, it was by no means certain that Yugoslavia was on the verge of ruin. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indexed performance factors suggesting Yugoslavia could "expand the country's large unexploited export potential. The recent surge in applications for joint ventures is encouraging in this respect."⁴ To be sure the country had problems, but these problems seemed to be no worse than other countries emerging from communism would have to face. To some, the view was that Yugoslavia was the country most likely to make a "soft landing" from communism to capitalism.⁵ Economic reforms, establishing the Dinar as the first convertible eastern European currency, and programs to attract western investment and eliminate the inequities of the internal economy suggested that "what is needed is patience and perseverance."⁶

Unfortunately, patience and perseverance were lacking. The Yugoslav citizen paid for his government's attempts to manage the economy in the form of a wage penalty, which was unevenly distributed across various levels of education and qualification. The most productive were the most severely punished.⁷ A Yugoslav commentator of that period wrote that "democracy can be loosely defined as the right at least to ask—why are we living so badly?"⁸ Yugoslavs answered that question differently in different regions of the country.

Yugoslavia had delegated to the republics and autonomous provinces the authority to make their own economic decisions, the system known as "self management" or "market socialism." Some of the regions had prospered under this system, others had not. In line with the Marxist theory of "surplus value," the central government imposed an annual levy on each republic and autonomous province (AP) to support the less-developed regions. The resentment caused by this system dominated the politics of the 1980s.

Republic/Autonomous Province (AP)	% Donated	% Received
Bosnia-Herzegovina	7	25
Montenegro	1.5	25
Croatia	22	-
Slovenia	19	-
Serbia Proper	29	-
Macedonia	5	18
Kosovo	2	48
Vojvodina	11	-

Figure 2.
Percentage of Aid to the Less Developed Republics and APs,
Donated and Received.⁹

Slovenes and Croats blamed their troubles on a theory which the rest of the world had repudiated. The vision of Europe 1992, with its single market and free movement of labor, had great appeal to these republics. When in 1989 the EC announced that Yugoslavia was ineligible for membership because it did not meet EC standards, Slovenes and Croats faced the dim prospect that European integration would shut them out, leaving them to make do in an internal Yugoslav market which "milked" their success.¹⁰ A Slovene commentator wrote that the price of secession would be high, "but still a lot lower than the price Yugoslavia will have to pay sooner or later."¹¹

A countervailing view was that the system required tighter control. This theme became a major issue in Serbian politics. It was closely associated with resentment directed against the Kosovars, those most dependent on aid, because of their demands for closer ties to the ethnically kindred Albanians. Because Serbia was the biggest contributor to Kosovo's welfare, the Serbs felt that they had been subsidizing the growth of separatist tendencies and, worse, the suppression of the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosovo.¹² This wave of anti-Kosovar populism brought Slobodan Milosevic to power, but while his call for more centralized government was tremendously popular in Serbia, it had little support elsewhere.¹³ As a result, Milosevic unified Serbs in a way that

would have been unthinkable under Tito, but that was a decisive factor in Yugoslavia as a whole. The debate over secession versus centralization sharpened the divergence of attitudes between Slovenia and Croatia, on one side, and Serbia on the other. As one writer described it, the result was that "the Yugoslav state move[d] ever closer to a Lebanese rather than a Swiss model of governance."¹⁴ Aggravated by a stream of hateful ethnic propaganda, the old "Yugoslav idea" of a multi-ethnic state gave way to a Hobbesian vision:

... men without a common power to keep them in awe, ... in that condition called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man.¹⁵

The Yugoslav Military Factor.

In contrast to its Western counterparts, the Yugoslav military was very cognizant of what economic and political developments might portend for their country. Further, the military was in a position to influence those developments in pursuit of its own institutional objectives, for in Yugoslavia the armed forces had become a functioning political constituency.

Since the 1960s, the percentage of seats allocated to the professional military in Yugoslavia's party and governmental bodies was higher than in other communist states. For example, the proportion of military personnel in the party's Central Committee varied, but was consistently two to four times higher in Yugoslavia than in the German Democratic Republic.¹⁶ In addition, since 1967, every Yugoslav federal defense minister had been a professional general, with no civilian political background.¹⁷

When the newly elected governments in Slovenia and Croatia raised the question of the military's role in a pluralist, democratic Yugoslavia, the reaction was hostile. The military was not interested in adapting; it saw its mission as the defense of the 1974 Federal Constitution against "recent unconstitutional changes."¹⁸ Since the threatened destruction of the federal structure would destroy the armed forces as well, the military found it had interests in common with the nationalists in Serbia. Slovenes and Croats complained that the armed

forces' hostility stemmed from the large proportion of Serbs within the officer corps (Serbs made up 39.7 percent of the population but provided 60 percent of the officers).¹⁹ In reality, however, at this juncture the armed forces became the sole remaining bastion of Titoism.²⁰ Their motives were to defend the regime, and not any of the nationalities, and the alignment with the Serbian nationalists was due not so much to an inherent pro-Serb bias as a common interest in preserving some semblance of the federal structure (albeit a reduced one).

This is not to say that all the military were content with the Serbian connection. Non-Serbs were torn by loyalties to their home regions, but even some Serbs were uncomfortable with anti-Titoist ethnicism. Most of these officers resigned, increasing the already high proportion of nationalistic Serbs in the officer corps. For those that remained, the fact that the Federal Republic's structure could only be preserved by betraying the political principles on which it was founded seemed to pose little ethical discomfort.²¹ The military's motives were opportunistic, not ideologic. The post-Tito collective presidency was in a state of paralysis; the armed forces were prepared to act. If military action comported with Milosevic's policy, it didn't mean that the officers owed him any sincere or lasting allegiance.²²

The military controlled a defense establishment that had been designed for two contingencies. The first was a general European war. As an armed neutral, Yugoslavia's strategy was to deter an attack by either bloc by pledging to declare for the other. Yugoslav defense expenditures, measured as a percentage of GDP, were commensurate with those of the country's Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO neighbors.²³ Figure 3 illustrates a rough balance as measured by various indices of military power. The other contingency which shaped the military establishment was a Warsaw Pact attack directed only against Yugoslavia, similar to the attacks against Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this case, Soviet groups of forces would not be diverted to other missions, and would participate with non-Soviet Warsaw Pact units. This was the scenario that the Yugoslavs feared the most. After seeing what

	Italy	Greece	Yugo- slavia	Bul- garia	Romania	Hungry
Main Battle Tanks	1220	1879	1850	2149	2875	1482
Combat Aircraft	396	375	489	266	465	111
Regular Ground Forces	234,000	113,000	129,000	75,000	161,800	66,400

Figure 3.

Yugoslav Order of Battle Holdings Compared to its WTO and NATO Neighbors.²⁴

they had done to Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavs could easily imagine what the Soviets would do to them. The Tito regime realized that it could never build a conventional army equal to this threat, so in 1968 it devised the doctrine of "Total National Defense," which called for all Yugoslav citizens to participate in the country's defense with or without the direction of Belgrade. The idea was that once the Yugoslav armed forces were defeated, an invader would still face the prospect of a long guerrilla war based on the World War II partisan model. Accordingly, the federal government directed each republic and autonomous province to recruit, equip, and field its own territorial defense force. These forces became the basis for the armies of the breakaway republics.²⁵

In 1991, Yugoslavia's defense minister, Colonel General Veliko Kadijevic, tried to disestablish the territorial defense forces in anticipation of military action to restore federal authority in the republics threatening to secede. In 1991 he criticized the total national defense doctrine as "a big swindle."²⁶ Then he ordered the disarmament of "all formations outside the unitary armed forces."²⁷ When war broke out this process was roughly 60 percent complete in Slovenia. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, virtually 100 percent of heavy weapons were confiscated at the outset of hostilities.²⁸

Mediation and Intervention.

The short war of Slovenian independence in June 1991 demonstrated the efficacy of the doctrine of Total National Defense. Federal authorities seemed to think that a mere show of force would intimidate the Slovenes, but Slovenian territorial forces²⁹ were able to overwhelm the 3000 troops deployed to put down "illegal secession."³⁰ Embarrassed, the Yugoslav government was willing to submit to the mediation of the European Community (EC). It was at this juncture that Western security institutions were forced to confront the contingency for which they were not yet prepared.

EC mediators negotiated a 90-day ceasefire. When hostilities did not resume after this 90-day period, the EC was tempted to claim that it had been able to resolve the crisis. Luxembourg's foreign minister Jacques Poos boasted that "This is the hour of Europe."³¹ What actually removed the Slovenian issue from the table was the impending war in Croatia. Most Yugoslavs viewed Slovenia as a distant, selfish republic, which had forsaken the Yugoslavian idea for the sake of profit.³² There were no minority interests in Slovenia, so it could be written off with little domestic dissent. The stakes in Croatia were much higher. Over 40 percent of the considerable Yugoslav armaments industry was located in Croatia, and a large number of Yugoslav army personnel came from Serb-inhabited areas of this republic.³³

To its credit, especially after its humiliation in Slovenia, the Yugoslav army exercised restraint at the outset of violence in Croatia.³⁴ Croatian hostility eventually compelled the army to align itself with the Serbian minority, however, and over time the war became more brutal than the war in Slovenia. This was a dismal time for the Yugoslav army. It was wasting its strength in places like Vukovar and Dubrovnik, significant as objectives of ethnic politics but militarily indecisive, on behalf of parties who had no command authority.³⁵ When the ceasefire went into effect, in January 1992, the Yugoslav army, in concert with the Serbian militias, controlled 90 percent of Serbian territory in Croatia. This outcome was costly for the officer corps. Approximately one third of the army's casualties were officers.

In return for that sacrifice, the effort earned the opprobrium of the international community, left the military open to criticism from all points along the Yugoslav political spectrum, and failed to preserve the federal political structure.³⁶ One suspects that the army was not sorry to turn the Serb enclaves over to peacekeeping forces and leave Croatia.

Appalled by the brutality of the Croatian war, the WEU Council of Ministers issued a statement in November 1991 expressing "dismay" at the "violations of cease fire agreements" and emphasized that "under no circumstances will territorial changes brought about by force be recognised (sic)."³⁷ The WEU realized that it was powerless to enforce this pronouncement, and therefore "expressed the readiness of WEU countries to give practical support"³⁸ to a UN peacekeeping force. EC president Jacques Delors lamented that "the EC is a little like a child confronted with an adult crisis."³⁹

Because none of the European security institutions were prepared to act, the WEU's concept of European levels of security suggested no settlement to the Yugoslav situation. In contrast, a more activist United Nations was willing to risk intercession to maintain a cessation of hostilities. On January 1, 1992, UN negotiator Cyrus Vance announced that he had successfully brokered a peace plan calling for the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Serb inhabited areas of Croatia. In their place blue-helmeted UN troops deployed in four sectors: Sectors East and West, for eastern and western Slavonia, and Sectors North and South, for northern and southern Krajina. The mission of these troops was to disarm the Serbian militia in Croatia and to protect the inhabitants from Croatian reprisals until the parties could arrive at a diplomatic solution. The UN force took the designation of UN Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, from the protective nature of its mission. From January to April 1992 about 14,000 troops deployed into the four sectors.⁴⁰ Of all UN troops in the former Yugoslavia, these are the only ones who were assigned a traditional peacekeeping mission.

The ceasefire in Croatia did nothing to reduce tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a prosperous republic like Slovenia or Croatia. It did not have the

same potential for economic viability and in fact had been one of the main beneficiaries of the aid program. Now the government in Belgrade proposed to devote up to 80 percent of the national budget to prepare for the expected resumption of hostilities in Croatia.⁴¹ Bosnia's choice was to remain dominated in a Serbian-led Yugoslavia, which could no longer provide for its welfare, or to follow Croatia's lead and seek independence.

Serbia could not accept Bosnian independence because a separate Bosnia would isolate the Serbian inhabited areas of Croatia. Accordingly, Serbian nationalists influenced the Serbs in Bosnia to declare independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fighting between the Bosnian government and the Serbian rebels broke out in earnest in April 1992. In the early summer Sarajevo came under siege, and it appeared that the city would face starvation. In July UNPROFOR dispatched 1100 troops to establish the force known as Sector Sarajevo, under the command of Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie. This was a stopgap measure at best. The demands of humanitarian aid required a bigger force, but UN resources were spent. Some other institution would have to step in.

In a July 10, 1992, meeting at Helsinki, the WEU Council of Ministers decided to take action to support the United Nations. Specifically, the WEU would monitor the UN-imposed embargo⁴² on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with "at least 5-6 ships . . . in international waters in the Oronto Channel and other points off the Yugoslav coast . . . following close consultation with UNPROFOR."⁴³ This was the first instance of a support relationship between Western European security institutions and the United Nations in Yugoslavia.

Also at Helsinki, the Council of Ministers discussed UN Security Council Resolution 770, which called upon all member states, "either individually or through regional arrangements," to "take all necessary means" to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ministers set up an ad hoc group to study the problem, but unlike naval forces, the WEU could deploy no land forces without some sort of military structure. Accordingly, the ministers directed the group to "consider, in consultation

with NATO, the need for contributions by other allies."⁴⁴ In this atmosphere, Western Europe remitted the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina to NATO.

Accordingly, NATO's North Atlantic Council, the NAC, assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) a specific planning task: to determine the resources necessary to secure a route over which humanitarian aid could be delivered from the Adriatic Coast to Sarajevo without the interference of factions fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. SACEUR delegated this task to his subordinate staffs, who developed an operational concept designed so that NATO forces would at no point be weaker than the forces that might oppose them. The result was an estimate, which no competent military authority has ever taken exception to, that the mission would require a heavy corps with a reinforced logistical element, or a total of about 100,000 troops.⁴⁵

The 100,000-man option exposed the wide divergence of views between NATO and the WEU on how to accomplish the humanitarian aid mission. The French government favored a smaller force to escort convoys rather than to secure a corridor, under "some form of ad hoc command set up . . . under the authority and within the framework of the Western European Union."⁴⁶ Further frustrating NATO, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against a large commitment of American troops in former-Yugoslavia for any purpose. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 11, 1992, Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey cautioned that operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina would involve the "tremendous challenge" of controlling "the most mountainous and inaccessible fortresslike" heartland against an enemy strategy that "borrows more from (Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen) Giap than from classical Western military thinking."⁴⁷ The allusion to Vietnam essentially eliminated the only country with the resources to implement the 100,000-man option.

Accordingly, the NAC instructed NATO's military to revise their plans to accommodate a 6000-man force to escort humanitarian aid convoys.⁴⁸ A 6000-man force could provide escorts of platoon size, which would provide adequate security against theft and small scale renegade action only. For this

option to succeed, the warring factions would all have to accept the convoys as a benign, neutral presence. Passage along the routes would depend on negotiated access through checkpoints, which meant that the escorts could not control the rate of travel. There would be no way to assure aid delivery in the quantities and at the frequency required by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Ironically, as this assessment was being made a convoy with just the sort of escort envisioned in the light option was underway. A platoon of Ukrainian troops, reinforced with French engineers, escorted trucks carrying food and medicine from Sarajevo to the beleaguered town of Goradze. The distance between the two towns is about 60 miles. The journey took four days, illustrating the point that with light escorts any commander of a local checkpoint, and not the UNHCR, could dictate the rate of humanitarian aid delivery.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, the Alliance announced its support of the convoy escort concept.⁵⁰ NATO countries (except for the United States) volunteered troops to operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the command of French MG Philippe Morillon. In order to provide more capable command and control, NATO offered to form a multinational headquarters from elements of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), programmed to be disestablished as part of NATO's force reductions.⁵¹ Upon their deployment this element became an element of UNPROFOR and lost its NATO affiliation.

As this force deployed, a downcast mood hung over NATO Headquarters, the effect of misgivings about the operation and embarrassment over the discord between NATO and the WEU.⁵² In contrast, at the WEU optimism reigned. French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe declared that "in a few months the WEU has become a military planner for the UN at a time when NATO was proposing unrealistic plans of 150,000 (sic) men."⁵³ The French claim that the WEU was a credible military actor was intended for Western European consumption. Any comfort it provided to the United Nations was short-lived, and the Yugoslav factions seem not to have been impressed at all.

Operations of UNPROFOR II—The Bosnia-Herzegovina Command.

UN military operations in Bosnia were shaped by the situation which resulted from the division of military assets of the Yugoslav defense establishment (Figures 4 and 5). From the outset, the Serb advantage in tanks and heavy weapons gave them rapid control in areas favoring maneuver. Once the fighting closed into more rugged terrain or built up areas, however, the Bosnian advantage in manpower kept the Serbs from consolidating their gains. This is the reason for the Bosnian war's long, agonizing sieges, with Serbian forces shelling civilian-occupied built up areas. This is also why the front lines have been so stable, barely moving over the course of 2½ years, which has made UN humanitarian aid operations possible.

By November 1992, the deployment of forces from NATO countries into Bosnia-Herzegovina was complete, but not all deployments went according to plan. Despite international agreements, the Serbs would not allow Canadian troops into the sector around Banja Luka, the most rabidly nationalistic

	In Serbia	In Croatia	In Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnian	-	-	40
Croatian	-	173	75 (HVO)
Serbian	639	240	330

Figure 4.
Disposition of Main Battle Tanks.⁵⁴

	In Serbia	In Croatia	In Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnian	-	-	110,000
Croatian	-	99,000	50,000 (HVO)
Serbian	90,000	50,000	80,000

Figure 5.
Disposition of Ground Forces.⁵⁵

area in all of Serb-held Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁶ Banja Luka is near the most notorious of the Serbian detention camps—Prijedor, Trnopolje, and Omarska. UN forces operating near those camps would not have served Bosnian Serb interests. Consequently, the Canadian battalion languished for months in Sector West with their UNPROFOR colleagues.

As the Bosnia-Herzegovina Command began operations, it was evident that agreements reached in London or Geneva could not guarantee the passage of convoys. At the checkpoints the warring factions obeyed only their local commanders. Accordingly, General Morillon instituted a forum called the Mixed Military Working Group, where the UN worked out agreements with local commanders for the movement of convoys and, later, the evacuation of refugees, the administration of “safe havens,” and ceasefires.⁵⁷

For a time, at the end of November through about mid-January, convoys were largely unimpeded in Bosnian and Croatian controlled areas. Convoy operations experienced some delays going to Moslem enclaves surrounded by Serb forces, but generally got through to their destinations. As shown in Figure 6, the convoy delivery system was and as of this writing remains the highest-volume means of aid delivery.

The Military Situation Deteriorates.

As the year 1992 approached its end, the parameters which had governed NATO's support to the UN were changed. On December 27, 1992, NATO Headquarters published a

Convoy:	2000 ST
Airlift:	200 ST
Airdrop:	50 ST

Figure 6.
Typical Aid Delivery Per Day,
Bosnia-Herzegovina Command. ⁵⁸

statement on the former Yugoslavia, which echoed the earlier position of the WEU, saying "we reject any unilateral changes in borders, territory, or populations. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be restored." But the NATO statement went beyond the WEU in taking sides. NATO laid "primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina" on the "present leadership of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs." NATO accused the Serbs of seeking "territorial gains by force" and of "systematic gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law," including the "barbarous practice of 'ethnic cleansing'," "rape of Muslim women and girls," and the "harassment and delay" of relief convoys. NATO said that "those individuals responsible for atrocities, whatever party they belong to, are accountable for their actions, and liable to be judged accordingly. To this end we welcome consideration of the creation of an ad hoc tribunal."⁵⁹ This declaration conflicted with the earlier judgment that UN military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina required all warring sides to view them as benign, and made future military cooperation between NATO and the UN problematic.

These complications arose as UNPROFOR was about to face some critical challenges. In mid-January 1993, the relatively permissive environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina disintegrated. First, the alliance between Bosnians and Croats, which had begun to show strain in December, finally broke into outright war. Convoys now had additional ethnic front-lines to cross. The first of the "NORTHAG" troops to die in Bosnia-Herzegovina, LCPL Eddie Edwards of the British Army, was killed in January in a cross-fire between Bosnian Croats and government forces.⁶⁰

As if the situation in Bosnia were not bad enough, fighting also broke out in Croatia. For a year, the patience of the Zagreb government had worn thin waiting for the UN to resolve the issue of the protected areas. On January 22, the Croatian military forces took matters into their own hands by launching an attack against Serb-held positions in UN Sector South. Krajina Serb militia brushed French and Kenyan peacekeepers aside to take their weapons out of UN supervised storage sites.⁶¹ In the face of international condemnation, Croatia

halted its advance, but President Tudjman made it clear that the UN had not lived up to his expectations, and he demanded the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. Since the sectors in Croatia were bases for the units in Bosnia, their removal would render the aid effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina infeasible.

The attack into the Krajina raised the possibility of a larger war. On January 24, Colonel General Zivota Panic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav army, wrote to Indian Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, Commander of UNPROFOR, claiming that events in Croatia indicated that UN forces were not fulfilling their obligations to protect the Serb population in Croatia, and he was initiating measures to provide assistance to "the imperiled Serb population."⁶² Yugoslav army troops deployed to the frontier⁶³ and closed checkpoints on the Hungarian border.⁶⁴

These events posed a dilemma for Hungary, because since October 1992 NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) aircraft had been flying surveillance missions on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Hungarian air space with the consent of the government in Budapest.⁶⁵ If the Serbs perceived that these missions were providing tactical information to the Croatian military, they might be tempted to intercept them. When Hungary raised the question of NATO air defense assistance, SACEUR attempted to assuage them,⁶⁶ but Budapest was interested in a more specific commitment than SACEUR could provide. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner told the Hungarians that if they were attacked, "the world would come to their defense."⁶⁷ He stopped short, however, of giving them a security guarantee.

A crisis on the Danube River might also have led to a wider war. WEU and NATO naval forces had cut off the flow of embargoed goods on the Adriatic, but allegedly ships still plied the Danube with cargoes destined for Serbia. UN sanctions obliged the governments of Romania and Bulgaria to enforce the embargo on the Danube, but neither country had the means to stop river traffic. Since the Danube's main channel is an international waterway, Romanian and Bulgarian security forces are lightly armed police, equipped to enforce customs laws in ports and not to impede traffic.

In late January 1993 Romanian police detained a number of Yugoslav tugboats that had entered the Danube from the Ukrainian port of Reni. These tugs towed barges suspected to contain 30,000 tons of petroleum products.⁶⁸ They were released when they promised to return to Reni. Then, in mid-channel, they changed course toward Serbia, precipitating a crisis.

The United States urged the Romanians and Bulgarians to intercept these vessels, but both countries raised objections. First, the Yugoslav captains had threatened to dump their cargoes and set them on fire, which would have been an ecological disaster.⁶⁹ Second, Romania and Bulgaria were being asked to do something that the West had not yet resolved to do on the Adriatic. As Bulgarian Prime Minister Berov said, the West cannot put the blame on Bulgaria and Romania for failing to "cut the umbilical cord between Kiev and Belgrade."⁷⁰

On January 28, Bulgarian Prime Minister Berov met with EC and U.S. ambassadors, who expressed the view that the UN embargo superseded the international status of the Danube.⁷¹ The Bulgarian's response was unenthusiastic, for it seemed that Bulgaria and Romania were being dragged into a confrontation by countries who would not be there to face the consequences. Romanian media opined that "the United States shrinks from its responsibilities" and that "the Western world is throwing a dead body in our garden."⁷²

The onus of the issue was on Romania, since construction near the Iron Gates hydropower plant forced vessels to use the sluice on the Romanian side of the river. On January 31, Romanian authorities refused to let the Yugoslav tug *Bihac* pass. The Yugoslav captain retaliated by dropping anchor, blocking the river for all commercial traffic.⁷³ Eventually the *Bihac* abandoned its barges and fled into Yugoslavia, but to secure the passage of the other tugs the Yugoslavs detained four Romanian vessels carrying cargoes into Hungary.⁷⁴

In what was to prove an empty gesture, WEU Secretary General Van Ekelen proposed to solve the problem by dispatching a naval task force, similar to the one in the Adriatic, to patrol the mouth of the Danube,⁷⁵ which ignored the fact that

embargoed goods came overland to Reni. This project was abandoned when the governments of Russia and Ukraine announced that security of the mouth of the Danube was the responsibility of the Black Sea Fleet. The fleet commander, Vice Admiral Edouard Baltin, stated that "If the governments of Ukraine and Russia decide something on this subject, we will control the area and we don't need the help of France, Spain, or Italy to do that."⁷⁶

The issues raised by Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria shattered a number of illusions. Western governments had negligently overlooked the Central European security implications of their Yugoslav policies. The notion that the Yugoslav crisis could be contained within limits set by the international community collided with the refusal of the warring parties to accept those limits. The expectation that Central and Eastern European states would participate in the isolation of Serbia without regard to their own security was demonstrated to be spurious. The concerns expressed by Western governments concerning peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe were not matched by their actions. As a result, the security relationship between these countries and the West was in danger of being combat tested before it was worked out diplomatically—a test the West was reluctant to face.

New Missions.

In March 1993, as the fighting in Croatia subsided, Bosnian government began to despair for the eastern enclaves of Zepa, Cerska, Srebrenica, and Goradze. These areas had always been beyond the pale of the UN aid effort. Now they were the targets of deliberate attacks. With increasing frequency, the Bosnian government reported air bombardment of these towns, which contradicted NAEW reports of no air activity over Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁷⁷ To assess the situation for himself, General Morillon took his headquarters to the eastern enclaves, arriving on March 10 in Srebrenica.⁷⁸ He convinced the Serbs to stop their attacks and permit the passage of UN aid convoys, probably the most that could be achieved by means of the UN commander's courage and persuasion.

The subsequent agreements required the UN to disarm Bosnian troops as a prerequisite for the delivery of aid. To protect the now defenseless civilians, General Morillon directed the deployment of Canadian troops to Srebrenica.⁷⁹ On June 4, the UN Security Council declared Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo to be "safe havens,"⁸⁰ an unfortunate term because it implied that the blue helmeted troops could defend those areas. In fact, the safe havens resulted from a convergence of Serbian and humanitarian interests, because in the next three weeks, nearly 5000 Bosnians were evacuated to Tuzla,⁸¹ accelerating the process of ethnic cleansing. Also, UN-supervised disarming of the Bosnians relieved the Serbs of the burden of caring for prisoners of war and freed them to fight elsewhere.⁸²

Another consequence of General Morillon's expedition to the eastern enclaves followed his staff's eye-witness confirmation of Bosnian Serb air activity in violation of UN-imposed restrictions.⁸³ This demonstrated the futility of mere monitoring of air activity, and resulted in the decision to deploy tactical air elements from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands to enforce the no-fly zone under the command of AFSOUTH's 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF).⁸⁴

With so many NATO forces deployed ostensibly for the support of UNPROFOR, the separate command lines going to the UN and to NATO proved inefficient. Since the end of 1992, NATO staffs had been feverishly planning for various contingencies in former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1993, NATO felt ready to assume command of the entire UN military operation, with the NAC receiving broad guidance from the UN Security Council. NATO's Commander in Chief, South (CINCSOUTH) would become the commander of UN forces in former-Yugoslavia. Five multinational elements—the naval forces in the Adriatic, the air forces in Italy, and the commands in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia—would serve under his control.⁸⁵

France, which does not participate in the integrated NATO structure, objected to this expanded role for a NATO command. The French had previously expressed dissatisfaction with the

choice of UN commanders in Yugoslavia (heretofore the Indian General Nambiar and the Swedish General Wahlgren),⁸⁶ and argued that there should be an intermediate French commander over all land forces. The French argument prevailed; in the spring of 1993, the UN announced that General Cot, commander of the First French Army, would replace General Wahlgren as the commander of UNPROFOR.⁸⁷

For the moment, French actions squelched NATO's ambition to play a greater role in former Yugoslavia. As the country with the biggest commitment, the French exerted an ever growing influence over UN operations. The United States, the only country with the potential to counterbalance the French, had not participated to any appreciable degree in military affairs relating to operations in former Yugoslavia. With the inauguration of the new president in Washington in January 1993, however, Western European countries anticipated a change in American policy.

More Actors and Dashed Hopes.

In the spring of 1993, the countries of the European Union had high expectations that more participatory American and Russian policies would provide the diplomatic clout necessary to bring about an end to the fighting. The Clinton administration announced its support of the Vance-Owen peace plan, reversing a previously held position. At the same time, Russian diplomats expressed a desire to become participants in peace negotiations, which implied a possible lever on the recalcitrant Serbs and a source of troops for peace operations.⁸⁸ The circle of major actors dealing with the war had expanded to five, and those five became known as the "Contact Group." The Vance-Owen peace plan gave way to a less ambitious, three-sided division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but to date no one has been able to devise an incentive to convince the Serbs to agree to the implementation of this plan.

In March 1994, the United States persuaded the Bosnians and Croats to reconcile. The Americans put great faith in this accord because it seemed to stack the odds against further

Serb aggression. That summer, some analysts opined that if the Serbs were made to suffer a military reverse, they would acquiesce to a cessation of hostilities.⁸⁹ In October 1994 the Bosnian V Corps launched an attack in the Bihac area. Unfortunately, the Serbs struck back with unexpected strength. The mood of the international community shifted dramatically, as UNPROFOR proved to be unable to prevent Serb aggression against UN-designated protected areas. The ensuing debate shattered the pretense of comity among the governments of the West.

As the United States and the Europeans argued over the advisability of NATO air action and lifting the UN-imposed Bosnian arms embargo, dissensions and resentments that had been papered over were exposed for all to see. The ensuing insipid responses and empty threats enhanced the contempt in which the Yugoslav factions held the United Nations. Rather than deterrence, the issue became the evacuation of UN troops, which raised the Bosnian crisis on the American agenda. Without American support such an evacuation would be impossible (see Figure 7).

After the mid-term elections in November 1994, the issue of Bosnia became a factor in American domestic politics. On November 11, the new Republican-led Congress compelled the administration to withdraw naval forces from the Adriatic embargo. NATO viewed this unilateral move as "breathhtaking," an expression of contempt for the Alliance. The move particularly offended the British. *The Times* (of London) commented that "President Clinton has now turned America into the unreliable member of the team."⁹⁰ France was the only party gratified. As *The Times* put it, the French "enjoyed the spectacle of the stubbornly pro-American British finding themselves unwanted in Washington."⁹¹

The Alliance's disarray raised Bosnia's significance as a factor in the formulation of post-Cold War European security. The discord between the United States and Europe was fully exposed, and the exposure caused a strain on the links between the United States and Europe which for so long had been the bedrock of trans-Atlantic security. The stakes of the

Bangladesh	1235	Norway	663
Belgium	276	Pakistan	3016
Canada	863	Russia	506
Denmark	286	Spain	11259
Egypt	426	Sweden	1051
France	3646	Turkey	1462
Jordan	100	Ukraine	581
Malaysia	1544	United Kingdom	3390
Netherlands	1650	United States	5
New Zealand	249	TOTAL	22,208

Figure 7.

UN Military Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina as of January 1995.

Yugoslav crisis now involved much more than the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Prospects.

Forecasting the outcome of the situation in former Yugoslavia poses insurmountable difficulties, because the political variables interact among indigenous and external actors in a way that defies prediction. At this writing there is a tentative ceasefire, brokered in the *mise-en-scène* surrounding ex-President Carter's visit. History may record this as the first step toward a lasting peace, but past experience cautions against optimism. The chief prerequisites for a lasting peace are still absent: the sincere commitment on the part of the warring parties and the long-term presence of a multinational force strong enough to safeguard, impose, or enforce the provisions of a peace agreement.

The current U.S. National Security Strategy states that the United States must be willing to:

act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake;
in alliance or partnership when our interests are shared by others;
and multinationally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community.⁹²

It follows that the deployment of a multinational force must accommodate the interests of all the participating countries. The Contact Group countries have expressed a number of interests in the case of former Yugoslavia, of which the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina is only one. Others include the containment of the war, the future role of the United Nations and various security institutions, the degree to which Europe will rely on and follow the leadership of the United States, and the integration of Russia into European diplomacy. Each Contact Group member gauges these interests in accordance with its own national priorities, and there has never been an alignment of priorities that satisfies all concerned.

Rather than trying to predict the outcome, it may be more useful to describe various possible outcomes, assess the degree to which each would serve the interests of the parties concerned, and then outline measures to either bring about the most promising outcome or to avoid the most risky. An attempt at such an exercise follows.

Alternative Outcome 1—Military Exhaustion. Military operations tend to be entropic—without periodic infusions of resources and motivation they eventually grind to a halt. After thirty months of warfare, the factions fighting in Bosnia are showing varying signs of exhaustion. A time may come when each party decides that it no longer has the capability to pursue its military objectives, and agrees to cease hostilities without resolving the political issues. The resulting ceasefire line would be defined by the disposition of forces at the time of the armistice.

Pursuant to the armistice agreement, a combined United Nations/European Union effort could produce a peacekeeping force built around UNPROFOR, to capitalize on the rapport already established with the commanders of the warring sides. Peacekeepers would establish a demilitarized demarcation zone along the ceasefire line, with adjustments made for the sake of enforceability. Since no party will be satisfied with this outcome, it will be important to enact Confidence and Security Building Measures to minimize the possibilities of revanchism or radicalism. Actions might include UN-administered exchange visits and verification inspections so that each

faction could see with its own eyes that their former enemies were not conspiring against them.

This appears to be the outcome toward which the Europeans have been working. In the United States it has been the target of much criticism, but American criticism is unlikely to exert much influence. Americans profess to deplore outcomes which allow aggressors to retain the spoils of their aggression, but at the same time are noticeably reluctant to make the commitment necessary to reverse those gains. Moreover, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina never had control over most of the areas which would be ceded, and the Serbs would win only that territory for which they have paid a battlefield price. The sacrifice may discourage further aggression. Since this outcome would allow UNPROFOR to continue the aid effort, in the long run it would probably save Bosnian lives. It would also contain the violence and avoid both a divisive, acrimonious debate within NATO and an untimely confrontation with the Russians.

Alternative Outcome 2—Serbian Objectives Achieved.

In this outcome, the aggressors would define the ceasefire line. It may not mean the eradication of the Bosnian state, because the Serbs may not want to support another impoverished, unstable Moslem region. Serbian toleration for UN troops would likely decrease as the prospect of victory nears, meaning that UNPROFOR would have to withdraw. These conditions would handicap peace operations because there would be no presence on the Serbian side. On the Bosnians' part, lingering resentment may drive the struggle underground to emerge in some other form, such as terrorism.

Although this would be the most regrettable outcome, paradoxically, the international community sometimes tends to make it more likely. The Serbian refusal to accept the most visible aspect of the Contact Group's peace plan, the map, tempts negotiators to offer them non-terrain concessions in exchange. These concessions hold out the promise of a quicker end to the war in Bosnia, but increase the risks of a larger future war as the Serbs become emboldened. The most dangerous concession of all would be to legitimate the ties between the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs in Belgrade,

because this would raise the issue of the Serbs in Croatia. Any question about Croatian authority over Serbs in Croatia risks a resumption of Serbo-Croatian hostilities, in which a Bosnian ceasefire might be swept away (see below).

Alternative Outcome 3—Roll Back. A third possible outcome involves the provision of large measures of foreign support to assist in the recapture of Bosnian territory lost to the Serbs, either all the way to the internationally recognized frontier or a more limited effort, perhaps to the line specified in the Contact Group's peace plan.

Variation 3a—Roll Back to the International Frontier. This outcome is the least likely and most problematical. It would require the greatest degree of external assistance, to include lifting the arms embargo and possibly foreign tactical air support. Realistically, however, the Bosnian army will not be able to benefit from either without proper training. The United States has such a training capability, but may lack the will to sustain the undertaking over the long term. There are others who are also willing; the Bosnian situation has become a cause among Islamic nations. If radical elements provide the trainers, they may introduce a Hamas-like movement into Central Europe.

Even with a better equipped army and foreign air support, however, this effort may be beyond Bosnian capabilities. The requirements of local defense, hunkered down in built-up areas and difficult terrain, are orders of magnitude less demanding than the requirements of operational maneuver coordinated throughout the Bosnian theater. Further, if current battlefield trends were reversed, with the Bosnians on the offense in Serb-inhabited areas, then they would be confronted with the doctrine of Total National Defense. The image of Serbian villages targeted by Bosnian forces would undermine international support. Finally, the Serbs are unlikely to wait passively while the Bosnians prepare to take the offensive. If they perceived that a resurgent Bosnia was in the offing, they would probably turn to Belgrade for compensatory aid. At that point they could raise the tempo of their operations to a level that would spoil Bosnian preparations and accelerate an outcome more favorable to the Serb side.

Variation 3b—Roll Back to Areas Allotted in the Peace Plan.

This variation would require the arming and support of the Bosnian military as they attack to the line specified as the limit of Serbian control. It would have a number of advantages over the unlimited variation discussed above. It would correlate more realistically to Bosnian capabilities and would minimize operations against Serb-inhabited areas. Since the operation would be aimed at areas the Contact Group had already agreed should be under Bosnian control, it might enjoy a modicum of sustained international support.

As in the previous variation, however, the Bosnians will require time to prepare for offensive operations, and will not be able to conceal these preparations from the Serbs. Once the offensive is in motion, it will be virtually impossible to ensure that the limit of advance corresponds to the internationally agreed line. Disputes over little parcels of land could prolong the conflict and strain the comity of the Contact Group. Even if the Bosnians were successful, a limited offensive would permit many Serbian forces to escape, meaning that the settlement would be short-lived unless the international community made provision for long-term Bosnian security.

Variation 3c—An Imposed Settlement. This outcome envisages the intervention of a multinational force capable of coercing the Serbs back to the line specified in the peace plan. Its legitimacy would depend on a diplomatic distinction that perhaps would not be credible: that the aim is not to support the Bosnians but to demonstrate that aggressors cannot flout the mandates of the international community.

This outcome would depend less on Bosnian military capabilities or on the Bosnian willingness to comply with internationally imposed constraints. Success would rather be a function of consensus on the part of the participating countries, a consensus that may be unachievable. The numbers of troops and need for an integrated military command suggest NATO involvement, and of course not all NATO countries are committed to the Bosnian cause. To put these obstacles in perspective, however, it should be remembered that NATO is already planning a large commitment of troops for the evacuation of UNPROFOR,

should it be necessary. If military operations of this scale are an option, European security might be better served by an operation which reasserts the primacy of the international community rather than one which highlights its disarray.

Roll Back of the Serbs—Concluding Thoughts. Any variation of this outcome might preserve a marginally greater degree of Bosnian sovereignty; however the pursuit of this objective would put ever increasing stresses on NATO, not all of whose members are equally committed to the Bosnian cause. Compounding the problem, this course of action would increase the risk of confrontation with the Russians. Finally, this is the course of action most likely to introduce into Europe radical elements uninterested in long-term stability.

Alternative Outcome 4—Bosnia Consumed in a Larger War. Since the January 1993 attack into the protected areas, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has periodically called for the removal of UN forces from Croatian territory. To date, the international community has been able to convince him to withdraw this demand, but Tudjman has little to show for his cooperation. Indeed, as the Contact Group implies that it would accept ties between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia proper in exchange for territorial concessions (discussed above), Tudjman is no doubt coming under domestic pressure to establish beyond question Zagreb's authority in Slavonia and the Krajina. Accordingly, for over 2 years Croatian troops have been preparing for war. The Contact Group now faces the very real and dangerous possibility that in trying to resolve the war in Bosnia, they are bringing on a greater war between Serbs and Croats.

During the fighting of early 1993, some of the worst atrocities in Bosnia were committed by Bosnian Croat forces as Croatian army forces battled the Serbs in the Krajina. Those events suggest that when the Croats wage war against the Serbs, the Bosnians fall victim to both sides. A renewed Serbo-Croatian war would therefore present the most likely set of circumstances leading to a partition of Bosnia, which the international community would be powerless to prevent. Further, as the events of January 1993 also point out, a new

Serbo-Croatian war could involve the states of Hungary, Romania, or Bulgaria, and perhaps spread even wider.

Policy Implications.

Frustrating as it may be, there appear to be no likely outcomes of the situation in former-Yugoslavia which are more promising or less risky than the one currently being played out. Interested parties, it would seem, should formulate policy based upon an unflinching acceptance of that reality. The following are offered as reasonable guidelines for developing policy in the region.

To begin, the United States should not participate in ongoing convoy operations. American troops deployed into a war zone, especially this war zone, would influence expectations and attitudes in a way that non-American troops would not. Even in blue helmets and UN livery, an American presence in Bosnia would raise suspicions on one side and hopes on the other. From another perspective, if European security is enhanced by a credible perception of American power, the Alliance should avoid circumstances where American troops engage in humiliating dealings with local commanders to obtain passage for convoys. Rather than criticize the United States for its nonparticipation, the Europeans should reflect that they and the United States have a common interest in maintaining the image of a strong American military.

At the same time the United States should resist the urge to push other nations into activities which those nations perceive to be imprudent. Americans should remember that, by regional standards, Yugoslavia retains the military capability to intimidate its neighbors, to whom neither the United States nor NATO have offered credible security guarantees. The criticism to which the United States should be the most sensitive is that it presses for actions for which someone else will face the consequences.

The United States should be more assertive in making the case that it will not stand idly by while the forces of its closest allies or forces implementing UN resolutions are threatened.

The United States has promised to assist the forces currently deployed should they require evacuation. National honor requires that promise be kept. Similarly, the United States has pledged troops to the Bosnian peacekeeping force if a peace is ever concluded. No doubt the prospect of a ceasefire will raise a debate over when a cessation of hostilities becomes a peace, but the United States should not be too pedantic on this point or it will place still another strain on the Alliance.

Finally, NATO and the WEU should not pursue their institutional agendas at the expense of the Bosnians. In their haste to demonstrate their relevance, both have taken actions which have proven imprudent or ineffectual. A high priority for both should be to devise a cogent division of labor so that military staffs can get on with the quality of operational planning demanded by Yugoslav-type crises.

Concluding Thoughts.

The West's military actions in former-Yugoslavia merit high marks in some areas and low marks in others. In land operations, UNPROFOR has accomplished just about everything for which it was designed. In Croatia it has kept the peace as long as the indigenous parties were willing to keep the ceasefire. In Bosnia it has materially eased the suffering of large segments of the population. UNPROFOR has not been able to prevent deliberate aggression in either country, but that failure results more from poor design than a lack of effort. Western governments were wrong to conclude that they could provide military forces tailored to specific, limited missions without raising expectations that those forces could do more. The experience should serve as a caution when dealing with future crises, but not as grounds for criticizing the troops who actually deployed.

UNPROFOR's critics also tend to understate the value of the military-to-military negotiations begun by General Morillon and continued by his successors. The rapport established, though not always cordial, has produced tangible benefits for the people living in the war zone. General Morillon's expedition to Bosnia's eastern enclaves, for example, illustrated that

military officers can occasionally resolve issues when diplomatic-level talks are stalemated. If a ceasefire agreement is ever concluded in former Yugoslavia, military agreements will constitute a critical component.

Other military operations have not been so successful. The UN-sponsored embargo has not been enforced uniformly and seems to have done little to minimize the level of violence. Moreover, the associated dissent has undermined Western diplomacy. Likewise, dissent has dissipated the deterrent value of air operations. Finally, the experience of the countries bordering Serbia was an unseemly episode, which has done nothing to convince them of the West's sincerity concerning their security. Overall, the Western military experience in former Yugoslavia highlights the dangers of multinational military action by countries with divergent interests, based on an underdeveloped doctrine, and without consideration of long-term ramifications.

But even more broadly, the question of how the military can contribute to a lasting peace in former Yugoslavia is really asking how the military can play a weak hand. To address the security dimension alone is to treat only the symptoms of the Yugoslav malignancy, not the underlying causes. As long as the diplomatic community fails to come up with a more profound cure, there will be no end to the security requirement. The UN's soldiers have already paid a price for this failure, over 300 battle casualties, including 100 killed in action. For the numbers of troops involved, UNPROFOR's fatality rate is higher than the DESERT STORM coalition's. If the international community concludes that it should continue operations, then it is also obliged to bring about the conditions that would render the mission unnecessary.

Whatever the military outcome, the long-term emphasis should be placed on winning the peace. That can only be achieved by invalidating the premise that led to the war, in other words, by demonstrating that Croatian and Bosnian Serb interests can be accommodated in a non-Serb regime. Yugoslav history from the death of Tito to the outbreak of war suggests that ethnic tensions vary directly with economic hardship, and Bosnia-Herzegovina has no history of economic

viability. The military can do little about that; it calls for an enlightened assistance program on the part of the EU.

There appears to be a clear choice here. Either Bosnia-Herzegovina will be an island of democracy and tolerance, secured by the forces of countries where such things are held to be worth defending, or Bosnia-Herzegovina will become another Gaza strip, an abandoned breeding ground for radicalism and resentment—contagions which, unfortunately, tend to erupt wherever the political conditions have decayed.

There are no guarantees that any of the ideas in this chapter will produce a favorable outcome, but this writer is convinced that they are worth the effort. It is inconceivable that with its collective wisdom, wealth, and strength, the international community can do no more for the Bosnians than say:

. . . teach your daughters to mourn, and to each her neighbor a dirge. For death has come up into the windows, it has entered the palaces, cutting off the children from the streets and the young men from the squares.

Jeremiah 9:20-21

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

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8. David A. Dyker, *Yugoslavia, Socialism, Development, and Debt*, London: Routledge, a division of Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc., p. 171.
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18. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
19. Zametica, p. 41.
20. The phrase is taken from *Ibid.*
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22. *Ibid.*
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26. Bebler, "Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav Professional Military," p. 137.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

28. Zametica, p. 43.

29. *Ibid.*. Zametica claims that the Slovenes mobilized 165,000 militia.

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69. Bucharest ROMPRES 0935 GMT 28 January 1993, *FBIS* Vienna 281028Z January 1993.

70. Sofia BTA 1758 GMT 31 January 1993, *FBIS* Vienna 311816Z January 1993.

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73. Bucharest ROMPRES 1710 GMT 31 January 1993, *FBIS* 311728Z January 1993.

74. Bucharest ROMPRES 1710 GMT 3 February 1993, *FBIS* 031817Z February 1993.

75. AFP, 5 February 1993.

76. AFP, 10 February 1993. It should be noted that the WEU instituted a program of sanctions enforcement on the Danube using member nations' police forces equipped with speedboats. As the author left Europe in July 1993, this effort was getting underway.

77. Two examples would be on Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina 1800 GMT 2 February 1993, *FBIS* Vienna 022030Z February 1993 and Zagreb Radio Croatia 1200 GMT 10 February 1993, *FBIS* Vienna 101338Z February 1993.

78. Reuter Wire Service, dateline Paris, March 14, 1993.

79. Reuter Wire Service, dateline Ottawa, February 16, 1993.

80. Reuter Wire Service, dateline United Nations, June 4, 1993.

81. In a March 20, 1993, Reuter Wire Service Report, dateline Paris, General Morillon is cited as having coordinated the evacuation of 700 wounded people from Srebrenica. A March 23 report, dateline Sarajevo, revealed that the Serbs had agreed to a UN air link connecting Srebrenica to Tuzla. By April 4 Reuter reported that nearly 5000 people had been evacuated from Srebrenica. On April 7, 1993, Reuter reported that 150 Canadian troops were being deployed into Srebrenica.

82. Reuter Wire Service, dateline Sarajevo, April 19, 1993.

83. Reuter Wire Service, dateline United Nations, March 17, 1993.

84. Reuter Wire Service, dateline Brussels, March 21, 1993.

85. Reuter Wire Service, dateline Brussels, May 12, 1993.

86. French Defense Minister François Leotard, quoted by Reuter Wire Service, dateline Paris, April 28, 1993.

87. Announced in Paris, as reported by Reuter Wire Service, June 23, 1993.

88. See Reginald Bartholomew's comments, Reuter, dateline Brussels, February 11, 1993 and Manfred Woerner's comments, Reuter, dateline Brussels, February 17, 1993.

89. See, for example, Roger Cohen, "New Strife in Bosnia?", *New York Times*, June 28, 1994, p. A9.

90. George Brock, "Clinton's Contempt for NATO, *The Times*, November 12, 1994, p. 18.

91. *Ibid.*

92. The White House, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994, p. 7.

CHAPTER 6

YUGOSLAVIA'S WARS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Stephen J. Blank

Introduction.

The wars in the former Yugoslavia have greatly aggravated at least four dangerous trends in European security. The first is that the Serbs' triumph amid NATO's and the UN's disarray has vindicated the use of force against small states. The members of the Contact Group—Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States—cannot devise a purely negotiated settlement other than to ratify Bosnia's demise as a state. Yet each member rules out the sole alternative that can bring about any other settlement, namely large ground and air forces.

The second trend is that the ongoing warfare is steadily unravelling the fabric of European security among individual states and Europe's humiliated security agencies: NATO, EU/WEU, and CSCE, as well as the UN. The breakup of the Contact Group meetings with the Bosnian Serbs on January 27, 1995 when German and Russian diplomats went home and left British, French, and U.S. diplomats in Pale, the Bosnian Serbs' capital, illustrated Europe's inability to reach a solution and the danger of renewed fighting.¹ This danger has caused even some Russian analysts to fear that failure to terminate the wars is undermining the foundations of European security.² Thus, either continued warfare or ratification of Serbia's victory with no consequences to Europe's overall security is a delusion. These wars cannot be detached from Europe's security thereby insulating the West from them. That approach has been tried and found wanting.

These first two trends stemming from Yugoslavia's wars lead to a third. The continuing utility of using force for aggressive purposes and the growing divisibility of European security while the great powers drift fosters a dangerous trend towards the renationalization of security agendas among individual states.³

Fourth, it is now impossible to build a European order without Russia even if it is incompletely reformed, revisionist, and unstable. Policies manifesting these trends occur at the pan-European level, among the Balkan states, NATO allies, Russia, and Yugoslavia's other neighbors, Italy and Hungary. To the extent that states' policies continue to reflect these trends, threats to Europe's security will persist and even multiply.

The Human Dimensions of the Crisis.

We must also consider the moral and human aspect. Since 1991 the world has witnessed numerous scenes that no one believed could ever recur in Europe. By November 1994, an estimated 140,000 to 300,000 people had died, 20,000-50,000 women had been raped as premeditated acts of policy, and there were 2.7 million refugees. Those figures omit the deliberate destruction of many jewels of Balkan and Western civilization (e.g., the city of Dubrovnik, the bridge of Mostar) and a lasting legacy of more hatred.⁴ That the world witnessed this carnage for 3 years without invoking international law and conventions is a frightful commentary on the current state of morality in international relations. As Europe is either increasingly unable or disinclined to resolve such wars, it seems all too likely that such thresholds of deliberate terror and atrocities, once crossed with impunity, will surely be breached elsewhere. But then there will be even less inclination or means to deal with those new threats. Let us consider that when Russia invaded Chechnya in December 1994, breaking accords signed at the preceding Budapest meeting of the CSCE (afterwards the organization changed its name to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE), the West responded by wishing that the problem simply would go away.⁵ Having accepted Yugoslavia's carnage, few states

are eager to challenge Russia's defiance of international norms.

Yugoslavia's Wars and the Threat to European Security.

If it were possible to "insulate" European security issues from these wars, that is no longer the case. The U.S. Government announced, on November 11, 1994, that it had authorized its ships to cease blockading arms shipments to Bosnia and Croatia and sharing intelligence about such shipments with its NATO allies. This announcement underscores the unraveling process in NATO that had begun earlier, partly due to these wars, and which has not yet been healed.⁶ It also intensified alarm that the Contact Group might break up.⁷ As a result there ensued intense but futile efforts to devise a common policy on the wars, "heal the breach" in NATO, and proclaim NATO's basic soundness. The Bosnian Serbs exposed the futility of these "damage control" efforts by calling the U.S., NATO's, and the UN's bluff. They intensified the fighting, regained ground lost in earlier Bosnian offensives, and persuaded an outside negotiator, former President Jimmy Carter, to offer them better terms. The Serbs incurred only minimal NATO retaliation: so-called "pinprick" air strikes. Unfortunately this scenario was repeated in May 1995. This time the Bosnian Serbs took prisoners from the UN forces (as they had done before) and derailed allied plans for bombing raids to punish them for violating the ceasefire agreements in Sarajevo and elsewhere. Once again the Bosnian Serbs did not pay a price for their defiance of the UN and NATO.

Meanwhile, the Contact Group members have ruled out any major military action against the Serbs, revealing themselves to be hopelessly divided. Nor will the UN counter the Serbs or let NATO do so. And Washington is leading the Contact Group to back out of its prior accord to enforce a Croatian-Bosnian confederation and assign 51 percent of Bosnia's lands to the government in Sarajevo.⁸ NATO's utility and unity in the face of threats to security are now in question. Seen as an organization adrift that failed to meet the only real threat to European security, NATO came under attack from France and U.S. Republican congressional leaders.⁹

The Republicans' challenge has placed the Clinton administration under intense congressional pressure to lift the UN arms embargo against Bosnia. This pressure has grown as the new Congress took power in 1995. Speaking on two different segments of the "This Week With David Brinkley" news program in late 1994, Speaker of the House, Congressman Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader, Senator Robert Dole, expressed their lack of support for NATO allies and the UN's interests in these wars. Senator William Cohen (R-Maine) even accused England and France of trying to evade their responsibility in the Balkans and called for the resignation of UN special envoy, Yasushi Akashi. He argued that if the UN did not change its strategy, then NATO should withdraw before the UN's "political impotence" further undermined NATO's credibility.¹⁰ All three advocate cutting off much U.S. support for UN operations and a unilateral withdrawal from the UN arms embargo.

Instead, Republican lawmakers are pressing the United States to supply arms to Bosnia. What many have overlooked, however is the possibility that must be considered if the embargo is ended. Ending the arms embargo to Bosnia may still lead to the evacuation of the Anglo-French UN troops, perhaps widen the wars, and bring about the reentry of regular Serbian forces into Bosnia. Nor can future U.S. military involvement be ruled out, either unilaterally, or via NATO. Indeed, the United States promised to maintain a force of up to 25,000 heavily armed troops to participate in any extrication of UN forces from Yugoslavia.¹¹

The NATO bombing campaign that began in August 1995 may or may not offer a better solution. Although an outline of a peace accord was signed on September 8, 1995, partly due to the bombing, the success of that operation also was due to its coordination with a U.S. peace plan and the successful Croatian recapture of the Krajina in July 1995. These events provided the opportunity for a rough coordination of land, air, and diplomatic efforts which many maintain are necessary before true peace can emerge. Therefore, it is not clear that bombing alone can offer a better solution. And since it is unclear what goals proponents of U.S. intervention are

proposing, any U.S. intervention solely to punish the Serbs and rescue Bosnia also risks hitching U.S. military power to Sarajevo's wagon. Since bombing alone has never been a decisive instrument of warfare or achieved decisive outcomes, it is difficult to believe that history will be overturned in Bosnia. If force is to be used in Yugoslavia it must be applied massively on the ground to achieve a specified objective. As NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes said, "It is very difficult, maybe impossible, to reconcile a peace mission on the ground with a kind of peace enforcement from the air."¹² Advocates of bombing as a panacea must be seen for what they are: strategists fantasizing in an intellectual void.

Arguably, the continuing lack of inter-allied consensus on Yugoslavia's wars and on the remedies to them endangers NATO's cohesion. The domestic challenges here in the United States to NATO's role in Yugoslavia show that erosion of cohesion. At the Munich International Defense Forum meeting in February 1995 there were particular acrimony and divisions. NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes even admitted that he was worried that differences over Bosnia and integrated structures in NATO might bring about a situation where the Atlantic Alliance "might get bogged down."¹³ Likewise, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe stated that the November 1994 U.S. decisions indicated that Europe would always be a political dwarf until it created its own European defense identity, a long-standing French objective. He also accused the United States of conducting clandestine military operations in support of Bosnia.¹⁴ All these challenges to the NATO status quo reflected states' growing interest in demanding unilateral or purely self-interested policies for European security. This "renationalization" distorts even initiatives originally set up to bring about more unity among European states. For example, when Great Britain and France agreed, in November 1994, on joint Air Defense operations, it was widely viewed in the press as London's response to fading ties with Washington and as Paris' reply of "I told you so" even though it was not tied to Yugoslavia's wars.¹⁵

Inter-allied and internal domestic differences over the former Yugoslavia are a threat to the most basic issues of

Europe's defense and security. If this divisive trend continues, Europe's most durable security structures might break down. The result could be European anarchy and a renationalization of security policies across the continent.¹⁶ Eroding allied cohesion went a long way towards undoing any mutual confidence that the Contact Group process had created in 1994.

Washington's ties to its European allies are also at stake. By 1993, inter-allied recriminations had already reached a critical point. *The Economist*, a sounding board for elite British opinion, then urged President Clinton to fire his foreign policy team, a clear vote of no confidence.¹⁷ It was also clear that Washington and its allies no longer had a common threat assessment for Yugoslavia or, if they did, could not agree on measures to meet perceived threats. Indeed, Jim Hoagland of *The Washington Post* asserted that there was the danger of a breakdown of the allied force planning process, NATO's real glue, into independent, if not rival national exercises.¹⁸ He wrote, "Bosnia has demonstrated that American and European security interests no longer coincide as fully as they did during the Cold War, European officials argue."¹⁹

These dangers are risky enough. But more recently, writing about the incompatibility of U.S. and allied Bosnia policies, Hoagland reported a British diplomat's observation that "the lack of comprehension that now exists between us and Washington is greater than at any time in my experience."²⁰ Still worse, Hoagland cited charges of presidential and administration incompetence and amateurishness and concluded:

To be blunt about it, some of America's best friends in Europe have concluded that they cannot work constructively with this administration and are resigned just to endure it. They will not say so publicly. But they no longer bother to hide that attitude in private.²¹

However, perhaps the most revealing sign of fading mutual confidence is a British diplomat's revelation that developments in Yugoslavia confirmed London's private expectations.²² This implies that London either did not share these expectations

with its allies or did not act according to its public statements. Either way, this reveals considerable allied friction.

Finally, we cannot complacently assume that the wars will not spread further into the Balkans. Already the Balkans are a tinderbox. Greece and Turkey almost went to war in late 1994. Both states also publicly talk of war as they organize rival Balkan blocs.²³ Such a war would break NATO apart and give Russia a pretext for meddling in the Balkans. Russia supported Greek anti-Turkish policies by offering Greece arms so that it could equal Turkey's capability.²⁴ Thus Yugoslavia's wars have devastating security implications for Europe, especially its smaller states. The Supreme Commander of Sweden's Armed Forces, General Owe Wiktorin, observed:

As a result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have come to accept war on European territory. The message is, in particular for a small nation, that if you do not take care of your security no one else may care.²⁵

Wiktorin's observation means that despite guarantees to the contrary, small Central European states remain at risk because they are alone and can count on nobody. European security, rhetoric aside, is divisible. Still more frightening is the fact that large sectors of the world community cannot or will not distinguish the nature of the threat to these states and rely on that incapacity as an excuse for inaction. In Yugoslavia, EU proved to be incapable of distinguishing a war for land, an ethnically pure, and undemocratic 'greater Serbia' from a civil war. Thus EU and its members have been unable or unwilling to decide how to ensure the survival of their own creations, Bosnia and Croatia. The EU, by its mistakes, even helped instigate and prolong the wars, suggesting a failure to perceive realities that can only augur future crises.

Wiktorin's lesson is precisely what the revolutions of 1989-91 should have overcome. The belief that European security is divisible means that it is not menaced by these wars. These wars could therefore continue, so it is argued, without wider repercussions outside the former Yugoslavia or the Balkans. The acceptance of the divisibility of European security also signifies that we have no compelling interest in any

particular resolution of Balkan issues. To date, Western policy has been executed on the basis of the principle that "European security" means only Western Europe's security.²⁶ Hence European security is divisible and Eastern European security is a very low priority on the Western agenda. Thus Western diplomatic and political strategy has "insulated" Western Europe from this or any Balkan or East European crisis.²⁷

Advocates of this posture or strategy of insulation argue that no Western state will risk its security for an issue of lesser importance to them like Yugoslavia or Balkan security.²⁸ The Balkans are supposedly of little interest and entail too great a risk for any intervener. That is the nucleus of the "insulationist" argument. Supporters of that stance, like the noted expert on European affairs, Simon Serfaty of Old Dominion University, contend that for all the horrors these wars have produced, they have not incited the rest of Europe to go to war as in 1914. The wars remain limited to their original locales and outside diplomatic and military intervention led to Muslim-Croat federation. Furthermore, he contends that a Europe anxious to defend Bosnia might be worse (i.e., more war-torn or strife ridden) than one that refuses to act.²⁹ But he omits the fact that this federation has no provision for local Serb minorities' civil rights, the triggering issue that set off these wars in 1991-92. Nor is this Federation much of a federation. Neither Bosnia nor Croatia has shown the slightest willingness to compromise on issues inside the Federation. Both sides also have profoundly divergent and possibly irreconcilable visions of what the Federation should become.³⁰ According to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic:

The difficulties concerning the Federation stem from and are nowadays of the following nature: One side sees the Federation as a way for Bosnia-Herzegovina to disappear as a Republic, while the other side—our side—sees it only as a path toward the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.³¹

If this Federation is an achievement of Western policy, it hardly signifies competent diplomacy or a policy that takes Central and Eastern Europe seriously.

Insulation has been both a political and diplomatic strategy. Its military analogue was the strategy of attrition for Yugoslavia's wars that the Western alliance developed after 1992.³² This strategy intended to maintain allied cohesion, bring intense diplomatic efforts to bear, and deploy incremental and limited displays of force.³³ Western supporters of attrition repeatedly said that its aims were to confine the wars to their present territories, limit the violence by banning certain kinds of weapons and targets, e.g., creating UN safe havens, and mitigate the fighting by offering civilians UN-mandated humanitarian actions.³⁴

But this strategy entailed disproportionate costs upon Bosnia and its civilian population, and inhibited Sarajevo's ability to counterattack and force a favorable or acceptable termination of the conflict, i.e., its assured survival within reasonably secure boundaries. Moreover, this strategy made the UN's relief operation hostage to Serb intentions and policy which the UN still cannot fathom but which has prevented allied military action. Finally, because the belligerents were not compelled to abide by the attrition strategy on the ground, heed Western diplomacy, respect the UN's operations, and accept an outside negotiation, they have defied the UN and NATO with impunity, exposing NATO's and the UN's inability and reluctance to act. Bosnia has become expendable, civilian casualties and atrocities have multiplied with impunity, and the allies' strategy has fallen apart. The initiative remains, even now, in either Belgrade's or the Bosnian Serbs' hands. Therefore the belief that Balkan crises can somehow be "insulated" from European security is profoundly misplaced. As the foregoing shows, this argument does not hold. The cohesion of NATO is now tied to Western decisions in the former Yugoslavia. No security system can work if the West divides Europe *a priori* and excludes the Balkans from it.

Since force and diplomacy are still not effectively integrated, neither has achieved its aim. Crisis management and conflict prevention have failed as allied cohesion and European security have eroded. Indeed, the insulation strategy was set up precisely because no Western consensus existed. The commitment to a military strategy of attrition in Bosnia was

based upon a combination of factors, ranging from lack of agreement among the powers about the end-state to be achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rest of Yugoslavia, and the Balkans as a whole, to divergent assessments of the military-political character of the struggle and the appropriate military-technical means to be applied.³⁵

However, even before 1994, insulation had shown its bankruptcy. Since no consensus yet exists either on a military strategy to beat the Serb forces, or on a political condition to be established thereby, the allies can only mount ineffectual and purposeless shows of limited force but cannot maximize diplomatic pressure due to their internal discord.

Unfortunately the only remotely effective Western solution involving force remains one of massive, long-term consensus, commitment, and annihilation of Serb forces or their capability to wage war. But absent a shared, coherent, political objective among the allies, any force would quickly go out of political-strategic control for lack of coherent political guidance or confront the risk of insufficient domestic support. If the allies cannot agree to a sensible goal then it is pointless to commit troops to an operation that is sure to fail.

Because nobody has been able to think of an alternative, the insulation and attrition strategies have remained in force though they represent an effort to reconcile incompatible approaches to conflict resolution. As Stanley Hoffman pointed out, the international community has, at once, sought to isolate the conflicts from broader European issues and pursue a limited policy of collective security against aggression. The international community's "objective" was to limit brutality (or "shape" the Serbs' expected victory) and negotiate with all parties being treated as morally equivalent. Worse yet, the UN and Europe ruled out the use of force to back up negotiating outcomes. Therefore, collective security never truly materialized, while sovereign Bosnia was sacrificed to aggression, and constrained from self-defense. Meanwhile, Britain, France, and the United States "remained faithful to the sellout spirit of Munich."³⁶ Indeed, Secretary of State Christopher asserted that the problems of Bosnia are entirely

separate from NATO (and implicitly broader European security issues).³⁷

In other words, leading Western policymakers still fail to see that the insulation strategy itself ensures failure. Thus the newest idea of augmenting UN forces with a rapid reaction force fails to come to terms with the fact that any UN force in Bosnia or Croatia is hostage to the actions of the most resolute and capable of the belligerents, i.e., the Serbs. If we remember that the insulation strategy's operating premise was that the West could not agree about outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe, its perpetuation reflects an ongoing abdication of political will to engage those regions seriously. Instead of lodging the blame squarely on their own policies that failed to build any consensus, Western statesmen persist in believing that failures are due to the defects of Europe's security mechanisms, including the UN. Yet many of them also argue circularly that if NATO had included the former Yugoslavia, the wars would not have occurred.³⁸ This is true but is at odds with the notion that the institutions and not their members' policies are at fault. NATO does not take in new members, NATO members do so.

The absence of clear Western thinking about security structures and pursuit of the will of the wisp of a European "security architecture" has traumatized the Balkans. Clear thinking about that "architecture" would have shown that the West's will to use power to shape desirable outcomes in Europe and Yugoslavia specifically was the key to a solution. Instead, we have pursued incompatible objectives with means that are insufficient. This fruitless policymaking rejected the insight that any effectively functioning OSCE or collective security system in Europe presupposes a security regime, i.e., widespread consensus on basic principles, the prior resolution of major problems, and a diminished role for military force.³⁹ In turn, creation of such a regime presumes the preexisting political will to solve problems and create new norms or institutions. Since these prerequisites were absent in Yugoslavia, no functioning security system could be built. There was no will to devise a solution that could be made durable and enforced by a functioning system.

These wars, like many previous examples, point out the basic fallacy of collective security systems, namely that the condition they are supposed to enforce must actually predate their institutionalization. Furthermore, in the absence of these conditions for collective security, a sophisticated security architecture is unnecessary, possibly even undesirable, because states can do what they need to do with the available instruments of consultation (or force if need be). Pretending that there is such a sophisticated system of security when there is no prior consensus on goals fosters the dangerous illusion of having achieved a greater degree of security than actually is the case. In that case, as the gap between the pretense and the reality becomes evident, so great a degree of disenchantment can ensue that public support is weakened, hopes for a long-term architecture decrease and even available instruments for building security become blunted.⁴⁰

Accordingly, we must remember what the implications of a divisible European security are. Yugoslavia and Chechnya illustrate that Western insulation of those wars and of East European problems from their own policies is now a key component of Western policy even if there is acute discord over what to do in the region.⁴¹ The insulation strategy means and accepts that European security is divisible and that the East, especially the Balkans, remain outside any legitimate European system. Insulation separates states into those having security and those lacking it.⁴² Naturally those lacking security will act on their own to get it, especially as they see themselves as victims of those who have cut them adrift. Or, those states seeing the vacuum at the center of Balkan and Central European security will try to fill it. In this case it means that the Balkan states and Russia (and Italy under Berlusconi) have acted consciously and unilaterally to advance their security and/or their national interests, i.e., they are renationalizing their security policies.

Thus insulation fosters renationalization of European security agendas. It reflects leading NATO members' discord on how to organize a pan-European security "architecture" and duly perpetuates a new form of the old division of Europe.⁴³ Insulation failed precisely because it was implemented. In

reflecting the lack of consensus and inaction in the West while Yugoslavia burned, it signalled others that they could pursue their own initiatives—Greek blockades of Macedonia, Italian efforts to renegotiate Italian minorities' rights in Croatia and Slovenia in 1994, and Russian unilateral peacemaking. Implementing the insulation strategy only aggravated the Western discord and unwillingness to think seriously about the Balkans that had led to it, rendering it even more useless for conflict termination.

Renationalization of security policy creates still other problems. It has generated "an equal and opposite reaction," namely Central Europe's desire to expand NATO to avert that process before the region explodes. Even Russian analysts such as Sergei Karaganov concede that Yugoslavia's wars and the vacuum created thereby are legitimate reasons for expanding NATO.⁴⁴ But every Russian political figure regards NATO expansion as a mortal military-political threat to Russian interests and a process that isolates Russia in and from Europe. Therefore, Moscow opposes NATO's expansion and will react by trying to undo or revise the status quo—most likely first in the Caucasus, then in Ukraine and then throughout the Balkans. These considerations vindicate the precept that the insulation strategy only works if Russia is stable and satisfied.⁴⁵ But since Russia is unstable and vocally revisionist, insulation breaks down and Yugoslavia's agonies must be dealt with in a concerted European-American forum and by a new strategy. For outsiders to influence Balkan end games, they must sustain a military-political outcome over a long time, and not be hostage to Russian domestic politics. The latter is only possible where Moscow is not a key player in the Balkans. That objective cannot be realized unless the West is willing to override Moscow's continuing resistance to NATO's presence in the Balkans, a most unlikely decision.

The dead end into which insulation leads is directly attributable to its fundamental concepts. As Richard Betts phrased it, Europe was a "post-Hobbesian pacific anarchy."⁴⁶ No major military or general threat to European security existed. Rather, possible or actual conflicts threatened small states while the absence of great power conflicts or threats

reduced small states' importance and their problems. These states or conflicts in and among them evidently could not ignite rapid strategic changes in the balance of power and posed little threat to big powers who could safely ignore them. In this analysis:

Regional conflicts are now decoupled from the earlier linkage with superpower rivalry. Regional conflicts may be less critical, but they may be freer to escalate to higher levels of violence.⁴⁷

That freedom to escalate reflected and caused superpower and great power indifference to these wars. Serbia's escalations with impunity of the Yugoslavian wars in 1991-93 confirm that finding. And as a result of such wars European security and peace became divisible. Since the West and Russia are not visibly or immediately threatened, the stakes of gain and loss from intervention were both respectively low and potentially high. Therefore Western intervention was precluded.⁴⁸

However, this strategy worked only if Russia, which is too large a factor to be ignored, was satisfied. "Russian satisfaction is a prerequisite for the ability to insulate Western security from other problems."⁴⁹ But Russia is neither stable nor satisfied. As a sign of Russia's expanding interests it sent peacekeeping troops to the war zones and intervened diplomatically in Yugoslavia in 1994, successfully leveraging its position to become a member of the Contact Group. Now, no solution to these wars or to broader issues of security east of the Elbe other than massive unilateral NATO force is possible without full Russian participation. Thus, despite strong Central European pressure to enter NATO, this will not happen until Russia is in some way satisfied with its security. Furthermore, once Russia becomes a potential threat to European security or an unpredictable factor, small states and their conflicts are once again relevant.⁵⁰ Moscow's intervention in Yugoslavia's wars also indicates Russia's willingness to use its presence to revise the post-1989 status quo that had marginalized it in the Balkans and Central Europe. This consideration should have led the West to reconceptualize its policy.

Yugoslavia's Wars as a Modern Form of the Eastern Question.

The failure of the previous strategy should force statesmen and analysts to reconceptualize what is really taking place. When we undertake that process we find that today's Balkan crisis resembles the European crises inherent in every explosion of the Eastern Question since 1774. Only by studying this history will we gain insight into the challenges posed by today's Balkan wars. We see that previous Balkan crises were always linked to Europe's broader security. Local challenges to the status quo in the Ottoman Empire would quickly flare into warfare. Often the local protagonist(s) deliberately counted on either preexisting support of one or more of the great powers or on their ability to draw the great powers in to defend their interests. When the great powers intervened they did so mostly to undo the general European status quo that they regarded as unfavorable to their interests and to gain a more equal place in Europe's security process. Any dispassionate study of Russian policy will show that Russia did exactly what these other states did (e.g., France between 1815 and 1860). Furthermore, a factor common to many of these crises is that each great power had a local favorite or client state whom it supported. These rival patron-client or alliance chains often complicated the situation still further (as in 1914), making conflict resolution still more difficult. This is also true today.

As insulation and confinement of the wars to Yugoslavia continued, the vacuum created thereby became intolerable to neighboring states. Since nobody could stop the wars or offer a better solution, Moscow exploited the situation to gain a veto over future regional security. Whether or not it was reasonable to try to organize the Balkans and Central Europe without Russia, it is now impossible to do so. The prerequisite of a stable and satisfied Russia broke down because insulation provided a vacuum which Russia could not resist filling in conformity with the classical dynamics of the Eastern Question.

Therefore, Yugoslavia and European security are now intertwined. If these wars are not terminated, any hope of a European security system goes by the boards.⁵¹ The insulation

strategy has materially abetted the most dangerous trend in European security affairs, the renationalization of the security policy of the main states or groups of states in Europe.⁵² This renationalization trend shows up in diverse places. It appears in the crisis within NATO and is also present in the Balkans. In the Balkans, the renationalization of security agendas reflects growing tensions among states and the formation of local blocs based on these rivalries in expectation of crises. As a result, major European states, like Italy (in 1994) and Russia, acting in uncoordinated fashion have intervened for or against Yugoslavia's successor states. These states, like Balkan ones, acted to gain more freedom of action since unilateralism now makes more sense.

This trend also signifies that Central European efforts to integrate with the West will come under increased scrutiny and encounter more skepticism as the West seems unwilling or unable to guarantee Central European security. This is particularly true with Hungary. In late 1993, after Secretary of State Warren Christopher briefed Hungary's government on the Partnership for Peace program, he was asked about U.S. guarantees to Hungary. He said:

Certainly if there were aggressive designs—by other countries within this region, I think the [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process as well as the whole international community would take great note and express deep concern.⁵³

Given such Western perspectives, how can Hungary realistically be expected to run risks to its own security on behalf of the West or NATO? Thus it is not too much to say that these wars expose NATO's increasing unwillingness to face Europe's real security challenges. Nor is it odd that Hungarian leaders like Laszlo Kovacs, then (1993) Chairman of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, and now Foreign Minister, reacted by noting:

The security risk we now face stems from the instability of the region rather than a traditional military threat. We have a feeling that the leaders of the NATO countries don't understand the real situation in this region.⁵⁴

Paradoxical as it may seem, these considerations have impelled Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to push still harder for NATO membership to secure the safety of an Article V commitment. What these states want is the old NATO, not the one subordinate to UN direction over the use of military power which cannot then respond directly to a non-Article V contingency. But the old NATO is in transition to an as yet undetermined status and the allies are busily demilitarizing even as they expand their formal commitments. This situation evokes memories of the 1920s and 1930s when the allies hid behind the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty, and collective security even as they made sure they could never act on those expanding commitments. Thus the West is acting as if a system or architecture was in place even before the necessary consensus and true security have materialized. The predictable results of such actions can be seen in Yugoslavia.

Though to date the wars have been militarily confined; politically the breakdown of consensus on European security and eroding allied unity means that outside states, Hungary, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the other Balkan states, cannot easily stay out of Yugoslavia's wars and that their security is in question if not at risk from those wars, as Wiktorin said. Hungarian security analyst Laszlo Valki also observed:

When Hungary became concerned about the possibility of Serbian provocation or retaliation against the country, and when Hungarian politicians were looking for some sort of guarantee from the major western capitals they were told by NATO headquarters that in case of an attack 'the Charter of the United Nations will provide the proper defense to Hungary.' Thus a new stage has been reached in the war; the West was so far proud of containing the crisis within the old Yugoslav borders. Now that goal has been abandoned.⁵⁵

Accordingly the progress of these wars and the prospect of their continuation has mocked U.S.-European efforts or non-efforts to build a functioning system of European security. Yugoslavia's wars may be a slow-burning flame. But that does not obscure the fact that the ensuing fire, if not put out, will burn a lot of territory and ignite no less of an explosion.

Yugoslavia's Wars and European Security Organizations.

Europe's much vaunted "interlocking institutions" of security: CSCE and now OSCE, NATO, WEU, the UN, EC, and now EU, have also performed abysmally. But this ineptitude only reflects the inability of the states comprising these institutions to devise coherent political consensus and guidelines or to frame credible military and political objectives to justify the use of force. Meanwhile, the occasional commitments these organizations have made to use or threaten force are consistently misconceived. Essentially none of these agencies or individual governments, our own included, has met the first tests of crisis management, let alone war, namely to formulate political objectives that can truly guide military action in the theater, and second, the coherent matching of military force to policy.⁵⁶

Indeed, it is almost impossible to discern what U.S. objectives and interests are in the Balkans other than the oft-cited empty mantra of "stability" or of containing the war. It is not yet clear from the peace accord of September 8, 1995, if the U.S.' policy is to underwrite an integral Bosnia or to support purely ethnic states in the former Yugoslavia and the consequences thereof. Nor is it clear that the United States has thought through the consequences for Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Macedonian issue even though the United States has led in trying to bring Greece and Turkey and Greece and Macedonia to a negotiated settlement. If either the move away from the embargo or the insertion of U.S. forces to help the UNPROFOR "reposition" itself is the first step in a sequence leading to open military intervention for Bosnia, we have yet to find out what goal U.S. forces will have other than permanently guaranteeing a Bosnian state that can only exist in dependence upon another neighboring state or as a ward of the international system. In December 1994, when the UN mission showed that it could not stop ceasefire violations and was unable to defend itself against the Bosnian Serbs, it appeared that U.S. forces might have to extricate them. That option was rejected because to withdraw the UN and to send in U.S. and allied forces would have forced the hand of the

Contact Group members, none of whom has any coherent domestic or political reason or consensus to commit their troops to a specific objective.⁵⁷ Little has changed since then.

Should the United States intervene to extricate the UN forces, it will face rugged terrain and a lack of political support from any combatant. There is no clear political objective and the troops will confront Bosnian—perhaps Serbian and Croatian—opposition. As currently planned the U.S. forces would evidently amount to 25,000 men among the allied rapid reaction corps to rescue 24,000 spread out lightly armed peacekeepers. The potential for disaster in such an operation is very great.

Since 1991, Western policies on Yugoslavia have been lacking in foresight. From the beginning, in 1990-91, Western leaders closed their eyes to Yugoslavia's crisis and did nothing to avert it or resolve it peacefully until war broke out. At best, like Secretary of State James Baker in 1991, they piously opined that Yugoslavia should stay united even when there was no political basis for that outcome without an external impetus.⁵⁸ But at worst some, like Germany, actually connived to dismantle the state. Already in June-July 1991, when the fighting had just begun, German diplomats and policymakers decided in favor of Croatian and Slovenian independence on the grounds of self-determination, the same grounds that had led to the reunification of Germany. Accordingly, believing themselves to be representing the Helsinki Treaty's provisions on self-determination, they made no effort to compel Croatia to obey the Helsinki Treaty regarding Serbian minorities there. Nor did they realize that by calling for the breakup of Yugoslavia at the very same time as the EC was trying to negotiate an end to fighting and a political solution, they undermined EC's impartiality and ability to be a credible mediator. Nor did Bonn consider what would then happen to Bosnia, or how Serbian troops could be induced to leave Krajina, if a purely nationalist Croatia came into being.⁵⁹ This does not excuse Serbia's resort to violence to prevent Slovenian and Croatian secession from the moribund union, but it does help explain Belgrade's threat assessments.

Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, Director of the German Institute for Peace Policy Studies, told *Vreme* in Belgrade that even before the fighting started in mid-1991 the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst-Germany's Federal Intelligence Service) ran arms to Croatia with the knowledge of the Foreign and Defense Ministries. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman also held many secret meetings with Chancellor Helmut Kohl's security assistant, Horst Teltschik. These arms shipments went through Hungary and enabled Zagreb to fight the Yugoslav Army. Hungary and Tudjman have also confirmed this operation.⁶⁰ Then in late 1991 Germany forced the EU (EC at the time) to recognize Croatian and Slovenian independence even though the EC was still trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the crisis. This virtually guaranteed Bosnia's subsequent fate since it had to declare its independence. Bonn's actions undid the Helsinki Treaty's guarantee that border changes in Europe could not be recognized if they came about by force and would only be legitimate if the parties concerned agreed to them.⁶¹ These acts confirmed Serbian speculations about anti-Yugoslav foreign conspiracies and helped Milosevic exploit such myths to create a Greater Serbia.

We now pay for undoing the Helsinki Treaty and the OSCE, which has been either bypassed or nullified in most changes of borders. Since 1991 three multinational states in Europe, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, have come apart. Though the Czechoslovak case was through bilateral negotiation, the other two states' dissolution resulted from secession, or war. Russia unilaterally truncated Moldova's and Georgia's sovereignty by force and launched coups in Azerbaijan to undermine that country's sovereignty.⁶² Meanwhile the OSCE has failed to resolve the newly created states' mutual relationships. The OSCE, if not irrelevant, is clearly a marginal player in Europe. Germany's actions in Yugoslavia marginalized the Helsinki Treaty to irrelevance and the EC and OSCE to inaction, since none of these could any longer be considered impartial or neutral, let alone viable. More recently, Hungary's ambassador to the OSCE, in a Washington address, said that the 1994 Budapest conference of the OSCE is, for his government, the organization's last chance to prove itself.⁶³ If the OSCE remains ineffectual it will be, for all practical

purposes, bypassed with very negative consequences for European security.

Balkan Security.

Unquestionably Balkan governments have learned Wiktorin's lesson and studied the four consequences of these wars listed at the start of this chapter. They also have seen how ineffectual all the European security institutions have been and Western Europe's disinterest or inability to help promote Balkan security. Yet, as stated above, genuine Balkan security can only develop in the context of a general European settlement. That is the lesson of each and every flareup of the Eastern Question, namely that to settle the issues that caused the initial crisis, a general convocation of European powers is needed and the settlement must be guaranteed multilaterally by them. These wars are no different. If the West abdicates its responsibilities in the Balkans, either Russia or other local actors will do the job. As it is, Moscow is using these wars and the fact that the Contact Group is utterly divided and incapable of reaching a solution to secure an expanded and permanent role for itself in having a veto power over all issues of European security.⁶⁴ And it has already made clear that if a Greek-Turkish conflict breaks out, a likely outcome if these wars spread, it will support Greece in a war that could easily shatter NATO.⁶⁵ Accordingly, if we are to understand these wars' impact on Balkan security and how efforts to end the wars must promote the latter, we must fully grasp the context of Balkan security. Writing in 1991, when the wars began, Steven Burg, a prominent U.S. expert on Yugoslavian politics, observed:

Yugoslavia is no longer distinguished from the rest of Eastern Europe by either its strategic or political value to policymakers in the West. The importance of the Yugoslav regime as an institutional guarantor of ethnic peace in the Balkans has been eroded.⁶⁶

Since pre-1989 Yugoslavia was a prominent factor in Balkan and Central European security, the changes that Burg registered should have impelled the West to reconsider Balkan and Central European security. Policymakers should have realized that the old structure of regional security was

collapsing and that unless nonviolent solutions were found, war or wars could easily erupt. Instead, Burg's observations served to justify the insulation strategy and a refusal to rethink the situation. Consequently the Balkans are now in limbo. Having seen the West's inability to devise formulas for Balkan security, Balkan states are now embracing the general renationalization of security agendas across Europe as all other solutions prove unavailing.⁶⁷ Bulgaria, for instance is backsliding on its commitment to join NATO and now looks more towards Russia for support.⁶⁸

Even before the end of the Cold War, Owen Greene's analysis of the Balkans showed that Yugoslavia and Romania enjoyed a symbiotic and close security relationship. Each state's independence reinforced that of the other and restrained Moscow's local military presence.⁶⁹ Greene also noted that if Greco-Turkish differences persisted, Ankara and Istanbul would compete for allies in the Balkans. Implicitly this meant that any Balkan war or major crisis would lead them to seek allies.⁷⁰ Writing in the context of the already visible decrease in inter-bloc rivalry in 1988, Greene said that Balkan conflicts or crises would increase pressures for outside intervention among the local states, the great powers, and/or superpowers.⁷¹ By 1995 all these forecasts had come true. In 1994 Moscow and Washington diplomatically intervened in Greco-Turkish relations to make their presence felt and to influence that relationship.⁷² Washington and Moscow were also seeking by 1994 to add Balkan allies to their roster.⁷³

Greene's analysis also stressed Italy's and Hungary's autonomy as factors restraining superpower intervention; they certainly could not predict the rise of Italy's neo-Fascist movement in 1994 or the threats that Yugoslavia's wars pose to Hungary that undermined some of these calculations.⁷⁴ Nevertheless Greene, who knew the Balkans, raised the right issues and questions in 1988. We knew, or should have known, the dangers involved in Yugoslavia's long-expected collapse. But nothing was done to forestall that collapse or construct other outcomes.

As a result Balkan states now have to fend for themselves and pursue policies based much more, if not exclusively, on

purely unilateral calculations of self-interest. The Greek newspaper, *I Kathimerini*, candidly observed:

The West will only act in Macedonia and Albania to avert expansion of current wars, but will not contemplate restoring a status quo ante or creating a new one. Consequently, the statement that Athens is a force in the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans is insufficient. The United States and West Europe's limited intervention capabilities in support of this status quo bring into focus the planning of a Greek foreign and defense policy aimed at handling the change in the present order of things in the Balkans. The fluidity of today's order of things there and the West's inability to provide essential guarantees in its support militate in favor of a flexible Greek Balkan policy that would avoid bilateral obligations and inflexible positions in conflicts and arguments that, according to all indications, will follow their own course.⁷⁵

This statement typifies the viewpoint of those pursuing a purely national or unilateral security agenda and the preeminence of a purely national concept of state interests over alliance commitments. Greece and its neighbors will each likely follow this course of action. Turkey and Romania have evinced a desire to serve as "senior power brokers" or balancing powers on behalf of Europe in the Balkans. Additionally, Bulgaria, which is in danger of collapse, wants preferential treatment in any future rebuilding of Yugoslavia.⁷⁶ Romanian President Ion Iliescu explicitly tied Romania's interest to its geostrategic position as a focal point of intersecting conflict zones where it has uniquely good relations with all the Balkan states. He revealingly tied Romania's aspirations to the need for foreign leaders and states to perceive "the parameters of Romania's geopolitical situation" and sustain it against domestic and foreign conflicts.⁷⁷ Presumably he wants Western security guarantees for Romania.

Unanswered is what happens if those foreign perceptions fail to materialize and no guarantees are forthcoming. One possible Balkan answer to the prospect of divisible European security is bifurcation into rival Greco-Turkish blocs. Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro confront Turkey, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia, a rivalry permeating NATO and the WEU.⁷⁸ A second option is a renewed Serbian-Romanian

entente based on the earlier one. Both that alliance system and a division into Greco-Turkish blocs will polarize regional security ties. Nevertheless, many prominent Romanian leaders favor an alliance with Serbia because they believe it will be a major Balkan military power. In part this is a result of the futility of Western pressure on Serbia.⁷⁹ Either choice spells the triumph of the renationalization option portrayed above and the first steps to create regional blocs coalescing around stronger states. Nationalizing security agendas is, therefore, increasingly the preferred option of the Balkan states, especially in view of their substantial losses incurred in the embargo against Serbia. That Balkan states want to end the sanctions became clear in 1993 as their losses mounted and the East remained paralyzed. Meanwhile, no solution is in sight and the forces let loose by Yugoslavia's wars that are undoing European security are unimpeded.

Towards a Solution.

Obviously the risks to Balkan and European security from prolonging these wars are growing. There is an ever present danger that the fighting will spread to new areas or that combinations of forces, including the intransigence of the belligerents, will frustrate peacemaking efforts and trigger a wider war. Any solution must then avert those dangers while effectively integrating force and diplomacy to be both credible and viable. A comprehensive future solution must address Yugoslavia's problems: self-determination of peoples, the territorial integrity of states and effective guarantees of their security, compensation for refugees, and UN- or internationally-led war crimes trials for the guilty parties on all sides. Finally there must be an economic package for all of Yugoslavia's former republics and the Balkan states that have suffered from the fighting and the embargo. Any future solution must also be guaranteed by multilateral forces and represent those states' concerted long-term economic, political, and military commitment. This means Russia must actively contribute to the solution along with the rest of the Contact Group, Italy, and the European security institutions. And of course, it must be founded on the negotiated agreement of the

belligerents without which no agreement is possible unless it is imposed from without.

The comprehensive quality of the solution outlined here is also stressed by prominent Balkan figures such as Ioan Mircea Pascu, State Secretary for International Relations and Policy in Romania's Defense Ministry. He notes that any comprehensive solution must address all aspects of Balkan security to transform Yugoslavia and the Balkans into stable, democratic, prosperous "security exporters."⁸⁰ His stress on a comprehensive package comports with many Western arguments for broader concepts of and policies for security.⁸¹

The method or form that a solution along these lines must take resembles previous concerted European solutions of the Eastern Question after 1815. Although those flawed solutions lasted only several years until the next Balkan explosion ignited unrest across Europe, a long-term solution is needed given the present horror. Furthermore, a long-term solution allows for the kind of action and commitment outlined above. Given a sufficiently comprehensive solution, time and better policies can be decisive here. This is the only way an international solution that does not contain the seeds of a new round of fighting can be achieved.

Essentially, the Contact Group plus Italy (which should be included in it⁸²) must sustain a negotiated solution that creates effective, viable, and secured borders for all of Yugoslavia's successor states. Sustaining a solution means readiness to back it up with real sanctions up to and including the introduction of large-scale, i.e., ground forces. At the same time, minority rights in those states must also be ensured on the basis of minorities' extra-territorial rights wherever they live.⁸³ These treaties must be solemnly guaranteed by the relevant security institutions and the six powers must also guarantee them by a multilateral commitment of troops on the ground to defend victims of any violation and prosecute the violators. All refugees who can be financially compensated by the six powers must receive compensation. And the UN's Mazowiecki tribunal or some other equally impartial body must also be empowered to try those guilty of war crimes on all sides. Compensation for refugees would not necessarily include

repatriation even though they desire it. While that is justified in principle, in practical terms, efforts to repatriate victims will only provoke animosities which would bog down the process in endless recriminations and new *casus belli*. Finally, the six powers and organizations like the EU and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) must put together a large-scale economic package for the Balkans and Hungary to make up for losses in the war, and, more importantly, reshape basic local economic-political conditions. The European Commission has already voted to back a Balkan customs corridor for rebuilding trade through its PHARE program (Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary).⁸⁴ But that is only a first step. More is needed, e.g., a special long-term program of Balkan relief and reconstruction.

Admittedly there are numerous obstacles along this path. We could, of course, let the fighting go on until one side wipes out the other. But that means abdicating to Serbia's use of force and destroying Bosnia, a recognized state. That will only encourage further efforts to revise the status quo by force. Committing one or another member of the Contact Group to fight for Bosnia will also not transform the conflict-causing conditions on the ground. Similarly, many, especially in Bonn, will object to including German and Italian troops in this endeavor. It would be better for European peace if those states are obliged to participate actively in Balkan security. But if past memories cannot be overcome, their roles could be confined to financial support, trade, and logistical support.

Another objection that may be raised is that this solution undercuts or excludes the EU/WEU and NATO. Indeed this is correct in formal terms, but that is the aim of this solution, to prevent these organizations from being implicated in a failure that can only discredit them further. Neither the EU or the WEU can play a constructive political and military role here on their own. That situation may change in the future, but that is a long way off and the wars are here now. As for NATO, it has no charter for such wars. If it is to operate here it must do so with the full consent and unity of its members' governments. That has not been the case to date. Moreover, NATO unwisely put

its forces at the UN's disposal, implicating itself in the latter's failure. This conundrum, as of June 1995, is still not resolved and can only continue to be a source of future trouble. NATO's ability to be an effective defense alliance is a paramount U.S. interest. NATO cannot be allowed to fail, for that failure unlocks the door to a wholesale renationalization of European security agendas. But our fecklessness and inability even now to devise a unified, coherent policy continues to undermine NATO and allied cohesion. Unless all 16 members agree or the charter is changed, NATO should not be asked to do things for which it was not intended and for which no consensus exists among its members.

Of course, imposing this solution means reversing the ongoing demilitarization of NATO and will require larger expenditures on defense by all the participating parties. But unless they want to continue believing in the fiction of European security's divisibility, this is a cheaper investment than putting out the conflagrations that will result from a failure to act. This solution may, perhaps, ultimately benefit NATO by forcing greater clarity about the relationships between force and diplomacy that must prevail if we are not to return to the 1920s and early 1930s when the West let its own security and that of Eastern Europe erode.

Other objections may be raised as well. Certainly this option entails troop deployments in a combat zone. There is no doubt that the obstacles to the commitment of troops to combat here and elsewhere have grown, and are seen as formidable in Yugoslavia for good reasons.⁸⁵ But it is equally true that most competent observers believe that continued warfare only further threatens the Balkans and European security.⁸⁶ Any spread of the wars to Albania, Italy's traditional protectorate, or Macedonia, will involve U.S. troops, and bring in the Greco-Turkish blocs with profoundly dangerous consequences for NATO, the Balkans, and Russia. Presidential leadership must, therefore, point out the threats to our interests if nothing is done.

That danger to U.S. interests forces us to understand Russia's role in this equation. The insulation strategy is infeasible and bankrupt. Russia must be included in the

Balkans if the latter is to be secured, even though Russia's revolution remains incomplete and Russia is a revisionist power. Arguably, precisely for those reasons Russia should be included before it acts unilaterally to further disrupt the situation.⁸⁷ Moreover, given the divisions among the NATO allies in the Contact Group, any other procedure would be madness. Unless the allies are ready to commit themselves to a genuine and enforceable solution of the wars, the Contact Group will remain split between Russia and the United States, particularly in view of Russia's displeasure at NATO's projected expansion and temptation to promote division wherever possible. This split guarantees the Contact Group's continued ineffectiveness. NATO expansion before Yugoslavia's wars end means drawing a line that excludes Russia from Europe but which cannot be enforced. Or, that sequence of policies will open the door to a division of Europe into spheres of influence. In that case Russia and the West will divide areas of conflict into zones of their "special responsibility," essentially making them exclusive protectorates of the larger powers. That brings back bloc politics and all the negative things we thought we overcame in 1989-91. The West will then also have facilitated the disruptive patron-client relationship among great powers and Balkan states that inhibits progress towards a just peace. Those are the worst of all solutions to Europe's dilemmas. The solution outlined here recognizes the failure of the "insulation" strategy and tries to replace it with one of inclusion.

Including Russia in a conflict resolution process in Yugoslavia both legitimates and recognizes its vital security interest in the Balkans, making it part of the solution rather than a factor behind the problem. Russia never has been isolated from the Balkans, and it is fruitless to attempt to do so now. Bringing Russia into the solution allows the Yeltsin government to claim that the West respects Russia's interests even as NATO expands. Then NATO is freed from the Balkan incubus and becomes arguably less of a threat to vital Russian interests. Inclusion in the solution to the Balkan crisis can be a way to expand NATO and minimize Russian ire over it while strengthening Yeltsin's government at home. Allowing Russia to participate in a solution to these wars shows that it is not

isolated in Europe. By obtaining a concession from the West, Yeltsin can claim success in defending traditional Russian interests by cooperating with the West and look strong at home.

At the same time, including Russia as part of the solution may constrain Moscow's policy options because Russia will find it more difficult to support Serbia's goals from within a structure offering it larger benefits. The regime resulting from a solution along the lines suggested here could constrain Russia's ability to be Serbia's advocate because the risks to Russian security in Europe would be too great. Historically Russia has yielded in the Balkans when it could not risk being the target of a general anti-Russian combination. If it refuses to join the settlement process after having been included, the other powers could proceed without it and Russia will then be excluded *de facto* across the board by its own decision (otherwise, of course, we would revert back to a state of belligerency in the area which would be against the interests of the other states whose troops are on the ground there). While that is intolerable to Moscow it would then be Russia's choice that led to this outcome, leaving the allies a freer hand in the Balkans. Alternatively, while the six-power solution obliges the allies to put up with Russian pro-Serb posturing, it gives Moscow attractive reasons for becoming more impartial over time.

This solution includes Russia in a comprehensive Balkan security system while freeing the West to deal with the vital issues of Central European security, i.e., the no less vital issue of NATO expansion. While the process does not insulate East from West, it does let NATO members deal with Yugoslavia's wars and Central Europe's inclusion in NATO on the respective merits of both issues without bringing them together and risking NATO's unity. The former strategy has long since tied NATO's cohesion to the solution of a war that nobody wanted to solve and now risks undoing NATO while failing to settle Yugoslavia's wars.

These lines were written in early 1995. Unfortunately events have not worked out this way, not least because of Russia's inability to think of a policy other than full support for the Serbs. Western failure to devise a policy throughout this

time also contributed to this stalemate with Moscow. But it must also be remembered that a part of that failure was due to the inability to find a solution that Moscow would buy and sell to the Serbs. As a result, Moscow is now isolated in the peace process, sees the NATO bombing in the greater light of NATO expansion and a threat to itself. It may yet turn out to be the case that this war's casualties will include any prospects for East-West understanding in Europe. But if that be the case, the responsibility for the failure will be shared among many actors.

Conclusions.

The U.S. initiatives of the summer of 1995 reflected the broader understanding that time is running out in Yugoslavia's wars. We no longer could pretend that we could keep flailing around with no coherent policy or military strategy for the Balkans or simply allow aggression to win and expect no ensuing consequences. Nor can we allow NATO to degenerate even as we extend its protective umbrella to countries we have not been and maybe are not prepared to defend. Insulation has failed and we must now pay for that failure, namely a protracted involvement in the Balkans and possible East-West stalemate due to the failure of Russia to find a way to participate in the peace process.

Strong, continuous, presidential leadership is a *sine qua non* of any solution involving U.S. presence in the Balkans and averting further conflict. Fortunately we now are acting if we are ready to engage in the difficult process needed to bring about peace. But time works for us or against us depending on how we use it. If we continue to follow the strategic void that characterized all policies from 1990 until now, time will work against us and our allies because we have had no idea what objectives to pursue or defend. Alternatively, if we act now, with clear goals in mind we can reverse that trend over a long term but not cheaply. However, if that strategic void remains the outcome of present policy, then this "problem from hell" will be a minor challenge compared to the burdens that will then be thrust upon us.

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82. Indeed, the failure to include Italy helped intensify Italian fears of being left out of a region traditionally deemed as vital to Italian interests and helped facilitate the rise of the Right in 1994. This example alone shows how inept allied diplomacy has been.

83. This concept of extra-territoriality was first advanced by the Austrian Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner in the Brunn (Bratislava) congress of the Austro-Hungarian Social Democratic party in 1899 and was designed to solve the Habsburg Empire's nationality problems. It would appear that such provisions would be the only acceptable basis on which a peace could be made.

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